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**Social Policy: Value Your Own Knowledge, Remember Western Practices,
Study the Experience of the East**



Эффективность управления в современном мире неотделима от изучения лучших практик, существующих за рубежом. В последние три десятилетия в России усилилось закономерное внимание к управленческим практикам восточных стран.

Добрососедские отношения с Китайской Народной Республикой дают нам возможность обратиться к опыту великого соседа, не забывая о том, что он в свою очередь восходит к социалистическим практикам прошлого века.

Интерес к Китаю, существовавший всегда, закономерно увеличился после того, как Китай сумел добиться успехов не только в экономике и политике, но и в организации системы общественных отношений в целом. Эффективное и быстрое экономическое развитие КНР привело к тому, что в экономической и социальной сферах страны по-

явились проблемы, характерные для высокоразвитых стран, прежде всего — нарастающая социально-экономическая дифференциация.

В 1950–1980-е годы Китай жил достаточно бедно, но эта бедность была равномерной. Сегодня география бедности и богатства существенно изменилась, обрела новые географические, социальные и социально-профессиональные характеристики. Китайская Народная Республика оказалась перед выбором, измеряемым традиционной формулой: «эффективность или равенство». Возврат к прежней модели равенства в бедности невозможен, однако, как добиться относительного равенства в богатстве, и надо ли это делать, непонятно. Развертывается масштабная партийно-политическая дискуссия по этому вопросу.

Обеспечение социальной справедливости понимается прагматично не только как некий абстрактный, гуманистический принцип, но прежде всего, — необходимая предпосылка эффективности экономики и в России, и в Китае.

Все эти тезисы получили свою трактовку в предлагаемом номере нашего журнала «Управленческое консультирование».

Особо следует сказать о проблемах нового среднего класса. Так называемый средний класс Китайской Народной Республики, не успев сформироваться, сталкивается с вызовами, характерными для всего мира. Во многом похожая ситуация существует и в России.

Укажем и на то, что Китай научился бороться с бедностью, но именно с классической азиатской бедностью, при этом проблема прекариата является новой для наших соседей и, строго говоря, для нас.

Подходы компаративистики предполагают возможность и оправданность сравнения пенсионных систем, практик регулирования миграции.

В предлагаемом номере журнала «Управленческое консультирование» много внимания уделено вопросам борьбы с бедностью, пенсионной политики, трудовых ресурсов, проблемам адаптации внутренних и внешних мигрантов. Все эти разнообразные элементы социальной политики имеют значение как части передового опыта зарубежной Азии, это особенно важно в условиях того, что Европа и Америка высокоэффективными рецептами социальной политики в последние годы не могут поделиться.

Надеюсь на внимание читателей к этому (выходящему на английском языке) и остальным номерам нашего журнала.

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Reducing Rural-Urban Social Inequality: Chinese and Russian Comparative Experience

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ABSTRACT

Rural-urban social inequality in Russia is evident. Russian public opinion proposes to reduce the rural-urban income gap, both within the framework of the self-regulating market paradigm, reflected in public programmes, and within the planned command economy framework. In the same ways it proposes to achieve an inter-regional socio-economic balance.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) also faces the problem of reducing rural-urban social inequality. It looks as if it is trying to solve the problem by applying direct measures that can even reverse the processes of urbanization.

This article proposes to analyze and adopt the most effective ways of reducing rural-urban inequality, as practiced in China. It is also possible to incorporate in the Chinese state's management of social processes the methods of reduction of inequality between rural and urban populations, created by the dirigiste trends of Russian public thought, since the socio-economic system of the PRC readily assimilates elements of the planned economy.

Keywords: social inequality, urban residents, rural residents, urbanization, market economy, planned economy, management of social processes, balanced development

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Introduction

The Chinese government is trying to solve the acute problem of unbalanced regional development with the help of social policy: a kind of social credit in the form of access to certain benefits for migrants in intermediate and small cities. As will be shown, these social policy measures are proposed to solve the problem of rural-urban social inequality, which is even more acute for Chinese society than for Russia.

In Russia, this problem is supposed to be solved by both social policy measures and measures for managing socio-economic processes using macroeconomic policy tools. A comparison of these measures and tools is relevant for formulating policy aimed at improving the social conditions in rural areas in both countries.

Reducing rural-urban social inequality in Russia

Rural-urban social inequality in Russia is evident. We will look at how it is supposed to reduce social inequality within different paradigms of socio-economic development.

The ratio of an average income in the urban and rural areas based on Rosstat's (Federal State Statistics Service) households' budget surveys is presented in table 1.

As can be seen from table 1, the per capita income of the urban residents is much higher than that of the rural residents. But the same table shows that starting from 2010 the income of the rural residents has been growing faster than the income of the urban residents. In 2003–2009, the income of rural residents was 50–57% of that of the urban residents. This value fluctuated from year to year. In 2010 it was 60%, and in 2011 62%, since 2015 it has not fallen below 63%, and in 2018 it was 65%. Despite this positive trend, the income of rural residents is still significantly lower than that of the urban residents.

Graphs of the density of the urban, rural and total population of the Russian Federation by the level of the monthly average per capita monetary income clearly show a lower level of income of rural residents compared to urban residents. The modal values of the curves (i. e., the most common income values) in rural areas are lower than in urban areas. The curve symbolizing the distribution of households according to the self-estimated financial status is shifted to the left for rural residents in relation to the urban curve, as can be seen in fig. 1 and fig. 2. All graphs (for all years) show that

Table 1

Per capita monetary income ratio in urban and rural areas

Year	Per capita monetary income (urban areas), thousand rubles per month	Per capita monetary income (rural areas), thousand rubles per month	Rural residents per capita income ratio to urban residents per capita income, %
2003	3.9	2.0	51
2004	4.2	2.2	52
2005	6.0	3.0	50
2006	7.0	4.0	57
2007	9.0	4.9	54
2008	12.0	6.0	50
2009	12.2	7.0	57
2010	14.0	8.1	60
2011	16.0	10.0	62
2012	18.0	11.0	61
2013	20.0	12.0	60
2014	22.0	13.0	59
2015	23.0	15.0	65
2016	24.0	15.0	63
2017	25.0	16.0	64
2018	26.0	17.0	65

Source: Household Income, expenditure and consumption in 2018 (based on the household budgets' sample survey results). Federal State Statistics Service [Electronic resource]. URL: https://gks.ru/bgd/regl/b18_102/Main.htm; household Income, expenditure and consumption in 2016 (based on the household budgets' sample survey results). Federal State Statistics Service [Electronic resource]. URL: https://gks.ru/bgd/regl/b16_102/Main.; household Income, expenditure and consumption in 2014 (based on the household budgets' sample survey results). Federal State Statistics Service [Electronic resource]. URL: https://gks.ru/bgd/regl/b14_102/Main.htm; household Income, expenditure and consumption in 2012 (based on the household budgets' sample survey results). Federal State Statistics Service [Electronic resource]. URL: https://gks.ru/bgd/regl/b12_102/Main.htm (accessed: 26.02.2020); household Income, expenditure and consumption in 2011 (based on the household budgets' sample survey results): collection of articles of the Federal State Statistics Service. Rosstat. M., 2012.

according to the self-estimated financial status, the rural population is distributed in sections with lower income.

The dynamics of the curves over the years, however, is similar, as can be seen if we compare fig. 1 and fig. 2: the shape of the distribution of urban and rural residents changes almost synchronously, i.e. according to the self-estimated financial status distribution, the urban-rural income inequality does not expand or decrease.

Thus, the bleak picture of rural poverty in comparison with the city remains unchanged throughout the assessed time period. As we see, the per capita income of rural residents is growing faster than that of urban residents. But because the profiles of the density graphs do not change, it can be assumed that the faster growth of rural incomes in certain time periods is due to poorer starting conditions.

It should also be noted that in addition to quantitative indicators of income, rural-urban inequality may also be expressed in accessibility to benefits. These are indirect indicators, expressed, for example, in the number of schools, morbidity, Internet availability, and so on. The inferior situation of rural residents in comparison with urban citizens in this respect is quite obvious, while it is difficult to find any formalized statistics on these indirect indicators. However, the degree of access to benefits is important in developing ways of reducing the rural-urban inequality.




Fig. 1. Distribution of households according to their financial status, 2018




Fig. 2. Distribution of households according to their financial status, 2010

Causes of rural-urban socio-economic status inequality and ways to overcome it

The main factor of rural poverty is considered by most authors to be the single-industry nature of the rural economy. Other factors, such as the spread of informal agricultural employment [27, p. 31], also come down to this. In official documents, public programs and research on the basis of which they are developed¹, industrial diversification of rural areas is the main means of reducing rural-urban social inequality. Supporting tools are considered to be direct budget financing, purchasing interventions, and the introduction of regulatory targets.

Limited access to modern goods for rural residents is a factor also common for society before modernization. It results in weak infrastructure and lower income in comparison with the city. Reasons for weak infrastructure are 1) single-industry characteristics of the economy; 2) lower wages in the agricultural sector²; 3) greater vulnerability of a single-industry economy. The latter implies that a fall in one sector is impossible to compensate for it, and will result in the decline of the local economy as a whole.

All modernization projects proposed that the rural economy should be diversified. The modernization project in Russia in the 1990s was not the exception to this. It was assumed that modernization of the agricultural sector would release unnecessary labour, and this would be accumulated by new sectors of the economy. Thus, sectoral diversification would prevent the threat of unemployment, and, consequently, the outflows of skilled labour from the rural areas, which means a decrease in the quality of the labour force. In addition, sectoral diversification would balance the risks of dependence on only one industry and ensure access for rural residents to goods and services.

The next reason for rural poverty is that employment in agriculture in Russia is still 2–3 times higher than in developed economies³, which explains the low level of wages in

¹ The social and labour sphere conditions of the urban areas and proposals for its improvement. Annual report on the results of monitoring in 1999–2013 (is. 1–15) / Ministry of Agriculture of the Russian Federation. All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Agricultural Economics. Center for All-Russian Monitoring of the Social and Labour Sphere of the Village Moscow. Federal State Budget Scientific Institution “Russian Research Institute of Information and Technical and Economic Research for engineering and technical support of the agro-industrial complex”: Federal law of December 29, 2016 N 264-FZ; The State program “Development of agriculture and regulation of agricultural products, raw materials and food markets for 2008–2012”, approved by the RF Government Decree of July 14, 2007 N 446 (edited on April 23, 2012); The State program for the development of agriculture and regulation of agricultural products, raw materials and food markets for 2013–2020, approved by the RF Government Decree of July 14, 2012 N 717; The concept of sustainable development of rural territories of the Russian Federation for the period until 2020, approved by the RF government edict of February 02, 2015 N 151-r (edited on January 13, 2017); The State program of the Russian Federation “Integrated development of rural territories” approved by the RF Government edict of November 30, 2010 N 2136-r; Strategy for sustainable development of rural territories of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2030 approved by the RF Government Decree of May 31, 2019 N 696; Federal scientific and technical program for the development of agriculture for 2017–2025 approved by the RF Government edict of August 25, 2017 N 996. (In rus)

² Russia in figures — 2019. Federal State Statistics Service [Electronic resource]. URL: https://gks.ru/bgd/regl/b19_11/Main.htm (accessed: 18.01.2020). The exceptions industries are industries where wages are even lower than in agriculture: since 2008 — textiles and clothing; since 2012 — production of leather, leather products and footwear; since 2014 — furniture production; wood processing; manufacture of other finished products (the latter with the exception of 2017 and 2018); since 2015 — postal services and courier activities; activities of hotels and catering enterprises. (In rus)

³ As of December 1, 2018, the share of employment in agriculture in Russia was 5.84%, in the USA — 1.42%, in Great Britain — 1.15%, in Germany — 1.27%, in France — 2.6%, in Italy — 3, 75%, in Japan — 3.41%, in Canada — 1.5%, in Australia — 2.57%. EconomicsData.ru [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.economicdata.ru/economics.php?menu=macroeconomic&data_type=economic&data_ticker=AgricultureEmploy (accessed: 19.01.2020).

agriculture. This is a consequence of the incomplete modernization of the Russian agricultural sector. Complete modernization in a single-industry economy will increase rural poverty, as it will cause unemployment. Surplus labour released from agriculture due to its modernization will not be able to find employment if other industries are not created.

Thus, multi-sector diversification of rural areas will improve their infrastructure, help rural residents to get better access to modern goods; and provide employment in sectors with higher wages. New industries, the emergence of which will be facilitated by the effect of agglomeration, will accumulate labour released from the agricultural sector. This release of labour will occur by virtue of the completion of the modernization of the agricultural sector.

Domestic statistics showing data grouped by federal districts is lacking comparable facts for urban and rural areas. Nevertheless, the imbalance between federal districts is expected to be resolved through sectoral diversification of the regional economy [17; 3; 29; 12, p. 366–429; 4, p. 143; 35; 2; 30; 26]. It is considered that territorial economy multi-sector diversification generally improves the population's standard of living [7].

Multi-sector diversification involves the use of market-based methods of economic regulation. These methods were developed in regional policy theory, which includes stimulating the location of new enterprises in areas with high unemployment (low economic growth, low income; building a regional policy on differences in unemployment rates between regions is a British tradition of regional policy theory), support for companies working in areas of low business activity and generating revenue by increasing public spending in these regions. The effectiveness of such a policy has always provoked sharp debate among economists [1].

Regional policy theory stands on the Theory of the Location of Industries (based on classical works of I. G. Von Thünen [9], A. Weber [8], A. Lösch [16], W. Isard [13], W. Christaller [5]); its modification is associated with the replacement of the a priori assumption of profit maximization by the company's behavioral theory is based on the theory of G. Hotelling [11]. Traditionally, market-based regulatory methods aimed at improving the situation in a depressive location [10] use the Principle of Circular Cumulative Causation [18; 22], and also derive from the growth poles theory by F. Perroux [14; 24].

However, the tendency of addressing direct planning methods of economic development exist even in government programmes and in the speeches of scientists working for these programmes. This tendency becomes noticeable in its soft version in public programmes, when it is proposed to raise wages in the agricultural sector at the expense of government subsidies, preferential lending to agriculture and through purchasing interventions. Later, a draft of federal law, which would ensure parity of prices for agricultural and industrial products, incompatible with market ideology, was suggested (A. S. Shelepa, corresponding member of the Russian Agricultural Academy, director of the Far Eastern Research Institute of Economics and the organization of the AIC in terms of a discussion club) [21, p. 40]. There is even an opinion that it is fatally impossible to "achieve the right balance in the exchange between agriculture and industry on a purely pricing basis" [19, p. 13].

Next, we will consider the "purest" type of the direct planning of the territories' economic development, the plan for equalizing socio-economic imbalances between territorial entities. This type of planning is equal both for the regions and for the urban and rural areas.

Ways of solving the rural-urban social inequality problem in the framework of a mixed (planned-market) economy paradigm

Multi-sector diversification by market methods under the conditions of our country seems impossible. This requires a radical reduction in the tax burden on enterprises in industries important for certain regions. In addition, these enterprises must be provided with

cheap and long-term credits, which the existing economic model is unable to grant under the current conditions in Russia.

The reason for this is that in order to reduce interest rates, a radical suppression of inflation is needed, but this raises the ruble exchange rate above the parity value due to the “Dutch disease” and, as a result, to decline the price competitiveness of domestic goods and their displacement from the markets. Cuts in taxes lead to a State budget revenue decrease, which is already insufficient to ensure the social obligations of the State.

Only direct State management of the enterprises can mobilize resources to solve the problem. Thus, a market economy needs to be supplemented by the mechanisms of directive State management that would turn a market economy into a two-sector planned-market one. A model of such an economy was proposed by G.V. Zakimatov [34].

A distinctive feature of this economy is the simultaneous operation of enterprises, regardless of their form of ownership, both in the planned sector of the economy under State management and in the market sector of the economy under a free enterprise model. The ruble currency is used as the currency for serving the market sector of the economy, and State budgetary money are used as the currency for serving the planned sector under State management.

Budgetary money actually turn into a second quasi-currency with the provisional name “public money” (p-money) and the currency unit “public ruble”. P-money is withdrawn from circulation of the rest of money and is used only at the production stage. They are automatically converted in a one-to-one ratio into ordinary money when the State pays for its expenses not related to the State order, and when enterprises pay their employees. The planned sector of the economy uses nominally low government prices and tariffs. An overvalued and fixed exchange rate of p-money against the foreign currency would be established. Thus, p-money is ordinary money, but with increased purchasing power due to low prices fixed by the government.

A dual-sector market-planning economy is able to reduce the rural-urban incomes inequality by managing investment processes by establishing quasi-subsidized lending standards determining the investment loans share issued in expensive p-money. These loans are repaid with ordinary cheap money. This money is received by the creditor bank and is automatically converted in equal shares (one to one ratio).

This mechanism is equal to a credit with negative interest rate, but here financial costs on the part of the government for credits’ interest subsidies are not needed. Investment management mechanism using p-money will allow, in our opinion, to direct the investment process towards agriculture, industries that can differentiate the economic specialization of the rural areas, infrastructure construction. This, as well as an increase in directly redistributed incomes, for which the planned sector of the economy is created, will solve the problem of urban-rural social inequality.

Reducing rural-urban social inequality in China. Rural-urban social inequality and urbanization

There is a striking difference in overcoming the rural-urban social inequality problems in China and in Russia, since in China they are inextricably linked with the urbanization phenomenon. Urbanization in China managed so efficiently and at such an unprecedented pace¹ that the social situation of recently urbanized residents of large cities became worse than that of the rural residents. Under these conditions, in an effort to deconcent-

¹ According to the data of the National Bureau of Statistics of China during 1978–2015 percentage of the urban population increased from 17.9% to 54.77%. The increase was about 580 million people [China Statistic Press, 2015, cited on 28, p. 129].

trate residents, the Chinese government launched direct management methods, distributing them among medium-sized cities, thus regulating the process of de-urbanization, or reverse urbanization. And, at this stage of the socio-economic process management, such methods become extremely interesting from a Russian viewpoint, because Russia faces a problem that is somewhat similar to de-urbanization: prevention of the extinction and devastation of rural areas.

The rapid development of urbanization in China is due to a relatively late start for historical reasons. Among them, Westernization with the opening of foreign trade in the middle of the 19th century; the most difficult economic situation since the civil wars and the war with Japan (the urban population was 10% by 1949 [16, p. 129]); negative attitude to urbanization, which was considered only a capitalist countries' phenomenon, on the part of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) during the government campaigns "Great Leap Forward" of 1958–1960 and the Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976 and the introduction of the Hukou Family Registration Institute (Hukou, sometimes also called a household registration) in 1958.

The Chinese urbanization process began in 1978, with the reforms of Deng Xiaoping, when creation of the special economic zones led to an increase in the quantity of jobs and triggered an increase in the number of rural migrants, who subsequently made up the population of the world's largest megacities. The government recognized the need for urbanization to modernize the economy, since the labour migration of rural residents had formed the basis of low-cost labour, and the registration system was weakened (the population received the right to temporary registration, allowing employment), collectivization in the agricultural sector was cancelled. As a result, rural residents received the chance to search for job and freedom of movement, and by 1984, a city explosion occurred in China. About one million rural residents in one year became citizens [28, p. 130].

By 2010, urban residents already made up 50% of the country's population [28, p. 130]. The urbanization dynamics in China in recent years is presented in table 2.

However, the pace of urbanization, according to the Chinese government, was still not satisfactory. They still lagged behind the pace of other modern countries, and, starting with the 10th five-year plan (2001–2005), the topic of urbanization was included in a number of primary State planning issues and was developed in the 11th, 12th and 13th five-year plans, as well as in the National New-type Urbanization Plan (2014–2020).

At the same time, China, like Russia, was facing regional development imbalances. Two-thirds of migrants travelled from inland to coastal cities. Their main centers of gravity are three agglomerations — the Pearl River Delta, the Yangtze River Delta and the Bohai Economic Rim. In the southeastern territories, which occupy 43.8% of the country's territory, 94.1% of the country's population live, while in the northwestern lands, which occupy 56.2% of the territory, 5.9% of the inhabitants [28, p. 131].

Table 2

The urbanization dynamics in China

Years	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Proportions of urban population at the end of the year, %	49.95	51.27	52.57	53.73	54.77	56.1	57.35	58.52	59.58

Source of data: China Statistical Yearbook 2019 [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2019/indexeh.htm> (accessed: 27.01.2020).

The level of urbanization is also differentiated: the minimum in the southwest is less than 41%, and the maximum in the east is more than 65%. The highest level — over 75% — is characteristic of the cities of central subordination: Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin [23, p. 38]. On November 27, 2014, Prime Minister Li Keqiang set the task for the country's scientists to find an opportunity to increase the population density of the northwestern provinces. Since 90% of Chinese cities are located in the southeastern part of the country, the Chinese government has set the task of building new intermediate and small cities in the internal and western border regions of the country.

The situation of the rural residents, urban residents without a household registration (hukou) and residents of overpopulated cities

The rural-urban social inequality in China nowadays is very high. The incomes of urban residents in China were 3.05 times higher than the incomes of rural residents, in Russia they were 1.67 times higher [20, p. 183]¹. Table 3 shows the incomes of urban and rural residents in China; however, the method of calculating them does not allow them to be compared with the data for Russia given in table 1 (they are based on the definition of income as the amount of income). In Russia, such data are not presented across the urban / rural areas, and those that are presented are based on income as the amount of expenses, in China, income data is based on the microeconomic approach covering only urban residents.

But even a rough comparison of per capita incomes in urban and rural areas shows that rural-urban social inequality is higher in China. The reasons for this inequality are the same as in Russia, the lack of employment in rural areas, the large income gap between rural and urban residents and the lack of access to social benefits in rural areas, such as medicine, higher education, etc. In Russia, unlike China, the commitment to provide rural residents with access to social benefits is traditionally fixed at the legislative level. In China this was never a goal of the social policy.

“The absolute gap between the urban and rural residents in 1978 was 210 yuans, but to 2012 it increased up to 16 648 yuans” [33, p. 170].

The social situation of newly urbanized residents without household registration is equal to the situation of rural residents. Both of them don't have access to social ben-

Table 3

The ratio of per capita income in urban and rural areas in China

Year	Per capita monetary income ratio (city), yuan	Per capita monetary income ratio (rural areas), yuan	The rural residents per capita income ratio to the citizens per capita income, %
2013	26 467.0	9429.6	35.63
2014	28 843.9	10 488.9	36.36
2015	31 194.8	11 421.7	36.61
2016	33 616.2	12 363.4	36.79
2017	36 396.2	13 432.4	36.91
2018	39 250.8	14 617.0	37.24

Source of data: China Statistical Yearbook 2019 [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/nds/2019/indexeh.htm> (accessed: 27.01.2020).

¹ Due to the statistical features of data collection, they are difficult to convert to a comparable form. To do this, in her research L. I. Nivorozhkina made a great work. The Chinese data refers to 2002, and data for Russia refers to 2003.

efits. We do not consider per capita income level, as it can hardly be recorded due to the absence of household registration institute¹.

In 2012, the level deprived of civil rights within the urban population share (deprived of a household registration) was 64.7%², children from families of labour migrants did not have access to public education. 43.1% of urban residents in 2012 were without access to a pension³. Labour migrants in the city only had access to State medical insurance almost equal to the urban residents with a household registration: in 2012, the State medical insurance was available for 95% of urban residents, and by 2020 they had planned to raise this number to 98%⁴. In China the State medical insurance is not available for rural residents.

Overcrowding in large cities reduced the urban residents' access, both with and without a household registration, to so-called public goods, which worsened their situation compared to the rural residents. Among these public goods there are access to drinking water and fresh air, wastewater treatment and the disposal of household waste, access to space, "traffic jams, lack of natural resources, environmental deterioration, and an increasing workload of public services, etc." [25, p. 32; see also 32].

In 2012, only 81.2% of urban residents had access to drinking water. By 2020, it was planned to raise this share to 90%. In 2012, less than 50% of prefecture-level cities met the Chinese air quality standard⁵. Compact construction as a means of harmonizing urbanization processes suggests limiting the urban space per inhabitant to less than 100 m⁶.

Problems connected with the concentration of the population in large cities forced the CPC leadership at the 18th Congress to raise the question of small and intermediate cities comprehensive development (up to 500 thousand people).

De-urbanization in China only concerns the direction of migration flows from large cities to intermediate and small ones, but the ongoing urbanization in China is in demand. The basis of cheap labour for the growing Chinese economy is still the labour migration of rural residents, and despite the high rates of urbanization, China's rural territory is still characterized by a high population density. According to the New-type Urbanization Plan (2014–2020), by 2020 the share of the urban population should be 60%. As shown from table 2, China is close to achieving this goal.

Manipulating household registration as a tool for balanced regional development

De-urbanization is expected to be achieved through the manipulating household registration (Hukou). The essence of the household registration system is that a person receives registration only at the place of birth, and his rights to social benefits differ depending on this location. For example, citizens born in one area are prevented from accessing healthcare, education or social benefits in another area. Those who have registration in Shanghai are the holders of the most significant rights, the rural residents on the contrary are the holders of the least significant rights.

This institution, with its introduction, was called upon to reduce the slums⁷, and is the same purpose it serves to this day. To realize the goal of stopping the flow of labour migrants to large cities and developing small and intermediate cities set by the 18th

¹ "It is impossible to say how many citizens don't have a household registration at all" [31, p. 317]. Therefore it is also impossible to estimate their per capita income.

² The New-type Urbanization Plan (2014–2020).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ L. Lian considers the institution of registration a tool of rural-urban social inequality [15, p. 80].

Congress of the CPC, in 2014, the registration system was cancelled for small and intermediate cities. For the largest cities of the country, the registration system as an instrument of social inequality has been preserved. "The Chinese government applies a differential multi-tiered approach, according to which the criteria for obtaining a permanent household registration are tightened depending on the size of the settlement" [6, p. 43]. In such a way, it is proposed to make the largest cities unattractive for labour migration.

Manipulating household registration will reduce social inequality between the indigent urban residents and rural migrants living in the cities, whose position due to lack of access to social benefits is comparable to that of rural residents who did not leave rural areas. Thus, according to the New-type Urbanization Plan (2014–2020), the share of the urban population with a household registration should be 45% (in 2012 it was 35.3%). More than 99% of children from labour migrants' families should have gained access to public education by 2020 (in 2012 there were none). More than 99% of urban residents should have received a pension by 2020 (in 2012 this percentage was 66.9%).

Thus, by expanding and narrowing the rights of certain categories of the population, the Chinese government directs the flows of migrants from rural areas and large cities to intermediate and small ones, thereby improving the situation of all three population categories of the territorial entities.

Conclusions

The problem of eliminating rural-urban social inequality in both Russia and China is connected with the problem of imbalances in regional development.

In Russia, the solution to this problem is declared by market methods of economic sectors diversification, but in practice, direct redistribution of transfers is used to a greater extent. In the framework of alternative paradigms of socio-economic development of Russia, it is proposed to solve this problem by direct economic methods of regulation with the help of a transition to a two-level planned-market economy.

In China, this problem is solved by methods of direct non-economic regulation of socio-economic processes i.e. by manipulating access to social benefits using the registration institute.

Based on the analysis, the following recommendations are made:

For China, demonstrating a high degree of State-controlled economy:

Determine the planned sector of the economy under the direct control of the State, operating in parallel with the market sector of the economy;

- Introduce at national level a second national currency, or quasi-currency (budgetary funds), serving exclusively enterprises operating in the planned sector of the economy;
- Separate the budget money circulation at the production stage from the rest of the money circulation sphere;
- Use nominally low government prices and tariffs in the planned sector of the economy;
- Use the overvalued exchange rate of quasi-money against foreign currency;
- Automatically convert budgetary funds into ordinary money in a one-to-one ratio when the State pays its expenses that are not related to the State order, and when the enterprises pay their employees;
- Issue loans aimed at stimulating investment processes for sectoral diversification of the rural economy in expensive budgetary funds, and repay in cheap ordinary money.

For Russia, it is recommended to use the experience of China in introducing a system of social privileges for skilled migrants in rural areas in order to diversify the rural economy.

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The Social Credit System of the People's Republic of China through the Eyes of Foreign Researchers

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this article is to identify and analyze the ideas currently available in world science and practice among foreign researchers on the Social Credit System (SCS). The article analyzes the basic principles of SCS, which allowed us to draw the following conclusions: the social credit system for China is very close to ours mentally and historically, it fits well with the management paradigm based on the principles of Confucianism and Taoism, its main task is to promote the formation of citizens' behavior based on openness, following rituals.

The main conclusions are made, such as the fact that this system allows you to put into practice the principle of the golden mean, that the application of SCS will contribute to the formation of citizens' behavior on the basis of openness, following rituals and the desire for peace of mind. The formation of the population's habit of living in the context of SCS, as the authors believe, will help to increase the sincerity of life. An analysis of the materials of foreign researchers was carried out in the article, which gave reason to conclude that the social credit system, launched in China, so far scares the rest of the world. In this regard, the article discusses the five main fears associated with SCS, as well as the five advantages of introducing this system, draws conclusions, and develops recommendations.

Keywords: social credit, social trust, social management, social control, social credit system

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Introduction

The social credit system (hereinafter — SCS), created and introduced in the People's Republic of China, is a widely discussed topic in the world community. Human rights defenders, statesmen and, of course, scientists of various specializations have an increased interest in this phenomenon. However, despite significant public resonance, this problem has been poorly worked out from a scientific point of view. There are still few serious, in-depth analyzes of the social credit system launched in China, in the world. In part, this may be because the system was fully operational only in 2016.

The purpose of this article is to identify and analyze prevailing points of view among foreign researchers at the SCS.

It should be noted that the attitude of foreign researchers to the “Chinese system”, as it is often called by foreign authors, is ambiguous, and most importantly, is very different from the attitude of the inhabitants of the China Republic.

In our study, we used the methods of content analysis of publications placed in scientific citation indices (RSCI, Scopus, Web-of-Science), as well as scientometric methods and special tools for assessing the data array on the topic under study. The main method was a critical analysis, with the help of which it was possible to identify and analyze all the arguments for and against SCS.

The origins of China's social credit system: background

China belongs to the traditional eastern civilizations, respectively, what is happening in this state has deep mental and historical roots. For the first time, the need to deploy and implement a Social Credit (trust) System — SCS (international abbreviation) was formulated in 2007 by the former PRC President Hu Jintao. On his initiative, the first technical plan for the deployment of the system was developed, and in the same 2007, "Some comments from the Office of the State Council of the China Republic about the creation of a social credit system" were published [14, p. 88].

But, as we noted above, the basic principles of SCS are deeply rooted in the Chinese mentality and in the traditions of public administration. Even in the I century B.C. the great Chinese reformer, Shang Yang, ordered the people to split into groups of 5–10 families (so called *commune*) to observe each other, thus bearing collective responsibility for the crimes committed. And even for minor misconduct, the punishments were severe. The law also prescribed that there should be plates on the doors of houses with a list of all family members, and the elder (the one, being responsible for the commune, mentioned above) regularly reported on all movements of residents to their superiors. This system was called "baojia" and for many centuries it periodically appeared again and again in China — mutual responsibility [9, p. 22].

The dispute that has been going on for more than two thousand years between the followers of Shang Yang, the so-called legalists-legists, who advocated the management of society with the help of strict measures (so called *whip*), and the Confucians, who called for the upbringing of ethical standards among the people through education and a personal example of those in power, became one of the main incentives for the development of management science in China.

Recently, Si Jinping said that the party's strong centralized leadership allowed us to enter a new era of reform and openness, to begin a new path to the great revival of the Chinese nation. In this way party and state leadership relies on the millennia-old tradition of Chinese managerial thought and takes all the best, reliable and tested from the provisions of Confucianism, Legism and Taoism.

Moreover, President of China Si Jinping formulated the "Chinese dream" back in 2013, which meant the idea of creating a prosperous and powerful state, the dream of realizing a national revival and achieving prosperity. In his concept, Si Jinping said that in order to achieve the "Chinese dream" three basic conditions are necessary:

- "It is imperative to follow the Chinese path, that is, the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics. The Chinese nation is a nation of outstanding creativity. Since we managed to create a great Chinese civilization, then, all the more, we will be able to continue and expand the development path corresponding to Chinese realities.
- It is necessary to exalt the unity of the Chinese people, based on trust, the Chinese spirit, the core of which is patriotism, as well as the spirit of the era, the core of which is reform and innovation.
- The forces of the nation, which are born of the great cohesion of 56 nationalities of the 1.3 billion people, should be combined. The Chinese dream is the dream of the whole nation and the dream of each Chinese individually" [13, p. 32].

It is well known that, according to the traditions of Confucianism, trust is a synonym for harmony between a person, society and the state [3; 11]. In turn, harmony is the

highest duty, goal and need of the Chinese. Harmony is achieved through self-improvement, obeying to the rules of decency and norms of society, and the performance of rituals involving the observance of tradition. As for self-improvement, its key meaning in Confucianism is “overcoming oneself as a separate individual who is being apart from the family, community and people, fulfilling a public duty, pursuing the Chinese dream”.

If we analyze the basic principles of SCS, it becomes obvious that this system allows you to put into practice the principle of the golden mean or middle path, which is expressed by:

- compliance with the necessary moderation and rejection of two extremes — excess and deficiency;
- condemnation of all extremes and the desire for a full, open, not having dark secrets life;
- strengthening justice, when not officials or neighbors, but artificial intelligence evaluates misconduct and makes judgments free from bias and one-sidedness;
- development of averaged norms and values that are acceptable to the general population;
- refusal from excessive and unfruitful regulation of all aspects of the life of the Chinese, administration and dependence of the lives of ordinary people on the possible arbitrariness of officials who do not follow party instructions and do not follow the course of the Chinese dream.

Since SCS is the most important contour of party-state administration, the hardware-software solutions in this system must fully comply with the ideology of Chinese management at the present historical stage. SCS, within the framework of the party course and management ideology, should provide the following positions: implementation of the Great Limit principle underlying the Chinese mentality, which implies the interpenetration and removal of opposites, the solution of all issues “according to circumstances” — on a specific situation based on a uniform assessment system for all; accounting, which assumes that the disorder is hidden in the visible order, but in the apparent disorder, on the contrary, the indestructible order is hidden; strengthening the basic interdependence for the behavior of any Chinese in relations between people with each other, with the community, with the party and the state.

The social credit system should also contribute to the implementation, in specific modern conditions, of the most important principle of “following the circumstances of the time”, which is largely being absolutized in Taoism. This suggests that: any practice serves to improve oneself (this is true both for individuals and for organizations and SCS itself); the use of SCS will help to shape citizens’ behavior based on openness, following rituals and striving for peace of mind; as people develop habits living in SCS conditions, this will help to increase the sincerity of life, and will allow people to at least partially predict the course of events and directions of their own lives.

Thus, the SCS is not a new form of establishing order in China, but a harmonious continuation of the management traditions in this country, which has mentally and historically matured. That is why they do not cause rejection among the inhabitants of the Middle Kingdom, but are not entirely clear to representatives of other countries, which forms such different, and sometimes even counterattack, assessments of SCS, including among the scientific community.

Review of scientific literature and approaches to the social credit system of the PRC

On 27 of June, 2014, the “Plan (Circular) for the Construction of the Social Credit System for 2014–2020” was officially published. Thus, the State Council of the PRC planned to introduce and disseminate SCS throughout the country by 2020, when every citizen

will be evaluated according to his “creditworthiness” and “loyalty” using quantitative indicators (points) based on the historical and current social and economic activities of the citizen, and these credit ratings will determine whether a citizen can receive benefits, or should to be punished somehow [36].

Despite the fact that the crucial document “The program of building a social credit system” was published in 2014, back in 2007, “Some comments from the Office of the State Council of the PRC on the creation of a social credit system” were published. However, this document in the scientific world did not receive a more or less noticeable response then.

Of course, credit scoring issues, or rather, the use of information technology to determine customer reliability, were investigated much earlier, from the 70-s of the last century. But only after 2007 and only in China, big data technologies (bigdata) were aimed at collecting information about each citizen in order to determine reliability not only financially, but also in all spheres of human activity. For example, in Rongcheng (Shandong Province), a successful social credit system takes into account everything — from the facts of traffic violations to the inability to take care of elderly parents [37].

The very name of the system using the phrase “social credit” is already ambiguously perceived outside of China, since there are certain differences in terminology. In the West, and in Russia, the term “credit” is most often understood as a system of deferred payments. In the Chinese language, in addition to the generally accepted economic meaning, the term “credit” also reflects the social meaning — ethical standards and codes of conduct that citizens must observe throughout their lives, that is, the relationship “citizen — citizen” and “citizen — society” based on ethics. In other words, “social-credit relations of all entities constitute the credit environment and the social order of the whole society” [27].

While the status of a credit entity in the economic sense can change as a result of any unlawful or non-documented actions (defaults, fraud, etc.), the status can be changed socially due to such illegal or unethical action. And both in the banking system, information (credit history, work experience in one place, etc.) is the basis of trust in a client, so in the social credit system in China, trust is based on information on a citizen’s daily life.

It is this aspect that worries most of those who have absorbed the Western values of freedom. Total control, interference in personal life, tracking movements, purchases, social circle — someday this will certainly become a weapon in the hands of either scammers, or, even worse, criminals.

The first articles on the ideas of “social credit” appeared in 2006 [43], but until 2017 interest in this topic could not be called massive. Separate articles are being published, and these are mainly articles by researchers from China that describe either the operation of this system, its features and forecasts of the development of relations between the citizen and the state [35; 41; 46], or discuss the SCS in the light of political issues [39].

And only in 2018 did a series of articles appear (11 publications in the Scopus database) that describe the system in detail, on the one hand [23; 36; 42; 44] and the attitude of scientists to this Chinese phenomenon, on the other [20; 26; 40; 47]. In 2019, according to Scopus, 24 articles have already been published. We predict that the number of studies will continue to grow exponentially, since on the Internet they both are being actively discussed — the positive effect of the introduction of the system and citizens of the Middle Kingdom who are satisfied with SCS [25; 30; 45], as well as the fears of outside observers who see the principles of the social credit system as a threat to democratic ideals and economic stability [24; 26; 29; 32; 34].

The Asian Institute for Political Studies (South Korea) expressed particular concern, proposing that the new system be called not a system of social credit, but a system of social control [38]. In a research paper “Orwell’s Nightmare: China’s Social Credit Sys-

tem”, AIPS scientists anxiously recounted “disturbances” in public life (crossing the road on the red light, staying on the Internet for a long time playing video games, late payment of bills) for which Chinese citizens are being reduced points are concerned about the total control that should be ubiquitous under such a system and that applies to all citizens without exception. In addition to the conviction that such a control system is in principle unacceptable in democracies, the authors suggest that corruption in China will only intensify, as you can always find ways and people to change their score, or make adjustments to reporting.

However, after a large case study conducted in 2019 [31], it turned out that about 80% of the Chinese population approve the system and are convinced that points are awarded impartially and fairly. In addition, in Rongcheng, where the social credit system has been operating for more than 5 years, tax conflicts and disputes have decreased by 22.8%, and population satisfaction has become higher than 96%. The study was organized through websites and asked questions to Chinese people about their attitude to SCS. The results of this study confirm the hypotheses of researchers [34; 36] that for the citizens of China, the new system provides more advantages than inconvenience or fear for the leak of confidential information.

While other studies indicate that the emerging SCS is being designed as a “state surveillance infrastructure” [21; 22] and as an instrument of social management [28; 36], the article by a German researcher Genius Kostka [31] emphasizes that these goals are not priority in the minds of Chinese citizens. The study shows that SCS is already widely used in China — more than 80% of respondents use commercial SCS and 7% of respondents report local self-government participating in SCS of [31, p. 1573], while the population shows a very high level of approval by the system. For example, 80% of respondents either unequivocally or with a high degree of confidence approve SCS. Only 19% of respondents perceive SCS as neutral, while only 1% reported that they clearly do not approve of SCS. Of course, it is likely that the answers reflect some caution among respondents living under an authoritarian regime. Despite the fact that the survey participants were informed that the questionnaires were anonymous and the research was purely scientific, it is likely that some of the respondents did not express their disapproval by the SCS system. To correct such errors, the researchers conducted a series of interviews with people of different ages, which also showed high levels of approval by the population of the SCS.

Interestingly, strong supporters of CSC are generally older, have higher incomes, are male gender, are more highly educated and live in urban areas.

At first sight, it seems illogical that wealthier and more educated citizens support state and private SCSs, since it is precisely these that potentially affect economic, political, and social freedom and citizens' capabilities. One explanation for such a high degree of approval may simply be that the richer educated citizens have technical knowledge and are more open to technological change. In addition, more educated and wealthy citizens, especially in urban areas, have access to a wider range of benefits provided by the SCS, and the system itself is perceived not as an instrument of supervision and the use of confidential data, but as a tool to improve the quality of life leading to a more honest and law-abiding social behavior.

The view of researchers in other countries carries a significant share of skepticism regarding the “honesty” and transparency of citizens' assessments. A research team from Munich (Germany) [24] analyzed about 200,000 behavioral records and citizen behavior reports published on the official website of the Beijing Social Credit System, and revealed a significant asymmetry between the description of the events of “good” and “bad” behavior. Scientists have found that the cause investigative relationships in the case of inappropriate behavior are described in more detail and more thoroughly.

In general, an analysis of the materials of foreign, mostly American and European researchers, gives reason to conclude that the social credit system, launched in China, so far scares the rest of the world. And if researchers agree with the need to receive information about a citizen in terms of their financial viability or credit history, penetration into the personal lives of citizens, whether it is recognition of people on the street, behavior, preferences, friends, etc., already refers the Chinese system to a field of outright fear [18; 19; 33].

Russian researchers drew their attention to SCS in China also relatively recently. Since 2018, a number of publications appear, describing the system of social credit itself [1; 5; 7] and its assessment in terms of viability [4; 6], risks and prospects [17], the impact on international relations in the world [15], as well as the possibility of introducing a similar system in Russia [12].

An analysis of Russian-language scientific publications on the issues of the PRC social credit system shows that the attitude towards it in the post-Soviet space is more calm and even loyal. There are no frank fears or negative assessments; rather, the authors agree that this system still needs to be studied and constantly monitor the progress of its development in China. Buriлина M.A. [4] points out the imperfection of the system, which is designed to accustom citizens to self-discipline, and expresses the opinion that in Russia and Europe it will not be easy to introduce such a system due to differences in mentality, religions, moral standards and rights. However, the “social credit” method would, in her opinion, be very useful in resolving migration issues in Europe. Timofeeva E.A. [17] points to the positive effect expected by the Government of China from the introduction of SCS in the country in the form of strengthening sincerity in the interaction of the state, business and people, in stabilizing the legal system. Grigorenko O. and Zhulev F. [7], describing life with a “social credit”, noted that citizens who have so to say, “right way of life” have much more opportunities to get a good education, succeed in business, receive rewards, so that Chinese themselves are pretty satisfied with this system.

Pashkovskaya I.V. and Valentseva N.I. [12], comparing the reputation systems of China and Russia, they note only the difference in the set of indicators and the scale of the data, pointing to the obvious advantages of introducing a full-fledged credit scoring system. The last but not the least, SCS of China is also welcomed by scientists because its full functioning is based on the use of “big data”, information and communication technologies and their implementation in business projects common in China and not only (Alibaba, WeChat, etc.) , that is, SCS contributes to the “further technologization of society” [5]. Moreover, scientists [6; 8; 13] with varying degrees of doubt say that it is impossible to use the SCS of China in Russian conditions “as it is” and emphasize the need to proceed from a different state system in Russia, Russian traditions and values.

From a juridical point of view, the problem of applying fiduciary ratings was considered by D. Beloborodov [1]. He noted that such a moment of “rating” citizens as denunciation has very dubious prospects, despite the fact that the Chinese themselves believe that denunciation in the legal and industrial spheres will work to increase the growth of the citizen’s moral consciousness. Pointing out the changes in the concept of morality (according to the practical experience of China today, morality is money), the author concludes that the introduction of high-tech means of monitoring, for example, former convicts, would be a very promising project for Russia.

A number of publications that give a varying degree of negative assessment of the CCK were reviewed by A. Bepalko [2]. He made a convincing conclusion about the predominantly emotional nature of such critical evaluations. In the article “On the issue of criticism of the social credit system”, the author lists standard theses from critics of the social credit system and, analyzing, argues for their failure.

From our point of view, we will try to do more profound analysis further on.

Analysis of the pros and cons of the social credit system

Due to the fact that the main purpose of this article is to carry out a well-reasoned analysis of the social credit system in the PRC, we will turn directly to it as a system designed to create conditions for the open social existence of society:

Contra 1. The system of social credit can deprive citizens of their rights, which is wrong and violates the principle of social justice, which is traditionally insisted on by the management system in a given country [2].

Pro 1. Throughout the world, even without the participation of electronic systems, on the basis of the law, citizens are deprived of their rights: parental, property, driving license, right to hold certain positions, purchase alcohol and cigarettes, etc. In case of offenses, citizens are limited their freedom movement, imprisonment. Many countries still use the death penalty.

Contra 2: The social credit system deprives citizens of their personal privacy. It is not the fact of collecting information that matters (we can't help it anymore), but the question: who will use this information and how. What information and for how long is stored, to whom and on what grounds can or should be transmitted. And, finally, the most important thing: who and how will control the implementation of the rules for processing, storage and use of this information.

It is interesting that the fact that our personal life has long ceased to be only our "personal" is often perceived as a fact with which we can not do anything. In order to ensure security in societies (in all, European, American, Russian and Chinese, etc.) after a series of terrorist attacks, security measures and, accordingly, ways to control our lives have intensified so much and toughened up, that we already perceive it as a bio-survival given, as a necessary measure to ensure our security of our lives on the part of the government of any country. Therefore, the "inviolability" of personal life has long been essentially violated for a long time, and in return, our promised security is that "currency" that we pay, allowing the state to control us in this [48]. Therefore, the SCS is just one more direction, where can one can use the data, since they already exist and are already in use.

Pro 2: The social credit system itself does not create any new data about a specific person, it systematizes the existing data. Just like an HR-specialist, before inviting a candidate for a final interview, monitors the social accounts of the candidate, his friends, his popularity, his activity in social networks. The same does the social credit system: also monitoring the information already available on the network.

No matter how sad it sounds, but if we don't know ourselves, then Google or any other search engine had done it for a long time. Whether we make requests, we keep friends' contacts, we watch videos — Google remembers and structures everything, gives us contextual advertising, clips specially selected for us, music, movies, offers friends on social networks, etc. The social credit system uses what global firms and the global market have long been using for promoting their products and services; they simply have not made a statement about it (didn't make it loud).

Banks store data about customers and all financial transactions, stores collect information about citizens' purchases (loyalty programs, bonus systems and so on). Uber, Booking, Trip Adviser know everything about our movements, Pedometer on the phone — about calories spent, and Fat Secret — about calories intake, etc. This is stored in our phone, the data of which is constantly updated, transmitted, processed. Thus, at present, talking about personal privacy is ridiculous and pointless, the only thing we can do is that, becoming public, we should not be ashamed of our life and the facts of the biography in it. Under the term *publicity* in this case we understand social rating as well.

The social credit system by itself does not create new data about society and the citizen, for the most part it receives and processes information already available in

other social and commercial institutions. That is why one of the first providers of information for the work of SCS in China was the world's largest online platform trading with Sesame Credit's own rating service.

Not a social credit system deprives people of their privacy, but new technologies in the service of banks, Internet providers, mobile operators, social networks, online stores, trade and transport organizations, and others. The social credit system evaluates people according to these parameters, which is why it causes such a wave of criticism. It is one thing to simply own information, and another to use it to evaluate and rate citizens, creating a justified stratification of our information society. People do not like to be evaluated and compared with others. The basis of the negative attitude towards this, from our point of view, is fear of non-compliance, fear of being worse than others.

Contra 3: Evaluating people is inhumane because everyone is equal. This thesis is gaining its popularity especially in Western European countries. The authors of the article remain supporters of P. A. Sorokin's classical theory of social stratification [16], who convincingly proved that we are already born unequal, that social equality is a utopia. Since the great sociologist wrote his work, little has changed; we continue to dwell by three main parameters of the stratification of society: economic, political and professional. Unless social elevators, due to the transition of society from industrial to informational (postindustrial), from Christian to post-Christian, have changed. This topic requires a separate careful presentation, so we are not talking about it.

Pro 3: We are born not equal, this was described in detail by the mentioned above classic P. A. Sorokin, having convincingly developed the theory of social stratification and social mobility [16]. We evaluate people and they evaluate us. We evaluate school-children, students, workers. Everyone gets different grades, different salaries, different accesses to social benefits. The methods for assessing personnel are very well developed: interviews, assessment-center, 360 degrees, KPI, etc. These and many other methods for evaluating candidates or existing employees are no different from what the social credit system does. Both social credit and the HR specialist set as their goal the obtaining of a comprehensive assessment of the candidate, including in the aspect of reliability. Now it doesn't occur to anyone to protest against the assessment when applying for a job, everyone considers this to be well-established and perfectly normal. At the same time, social credit will simplify the work of HR specialists, since the accumulated social credit will speak for the employee better than he does for himself in an interview (giving socially expected answers to the tricky questions of the employer, for example).

Contra 4: the assessment system is like "the last judgment in life," it will destroy social ties.

Pro 4: The social credit system actually has already entered our lives, together with the rapidly developing and already thriving sharing economy. Let's think, will we rent a house through Airbnb for a person with three negative and one positive feedback? No, because his "social credit" is mostly negative. Will we deal with a couch-surfer on the Couchsurfing website if he has five negative reviews? And with one that has 300 reviews and all are positive? And finally, we most often cancel the order at Uber, if the driver rating is below 4.5, and if its rating is below 4.0, then the system itself "turns him off". There are many such applications, without having studied the rating and without having read the reviews, we do not even begin communication with the person. None of the application users have ever complained about the existence of a rating and a feedback system in them. On the contrary, all sharing is based on such sites, interpersonal communication, reviews and trust. Fear of receiving negative feedback and losing the ability to rent or housing leads to the fact that the participants do even more than is necessary according to the rules (meet guests, conduct excursions, etc.).

Evaluation and ratings help navigate the social space, give a signal of danger or, conversely, allow you to trust a person based on his “earned karma” / social credit. And the participants themselves know this. Thus, the social credit system should not cause a negative reaction, and if it does, it should be alarming: maybe a person knows that his rating will be low due to his actions? In a modern society where we don't even know our neighbors, social credit will help us to distinguish who is a “person to be trust”, and who is not trustworthy.

The social credit system will be converted into a quantitative indicator by the public opinion accumulated by each citizen about it. Of course, such a transition from “quality” to “quantity” cannot but frighten, therefore, an assessment system is important, *who* evaluates, evaluation *parameters*, assessment *methodology*, impartiality of assessment.

We can assume that the presence of electronic “public opinion” will increase the level of trust between people and will allow us to quickly establish interpersonal relationships. Perhaps this will also affect the growth in the number of marriages and the decrease in the number of users of dating sites.

Contra 5: The social rating system is designed to develop and maintain totalitarian and authoritarian societies and is not applicable in democratic countries.

Pro 5: The social credit system, as an accumulated public opinion about each citizen, being transferred into quantitative indicators, can prevent the “negative” citizens from getting into power, that is, having a low value of social credit. If we trust our life to the Uber driver based on information about his experience and rating, then why can't we use the same system when we trust our lives to politics, not for an hour of travel, but for a “trip”, 4–5 years long and more? Moreover, having seen the driver's unreliability, we can always ask him to stop the car and leave, but a politician, once being chosen, can't be replaced easily. Moreover, modern PR-technologists can beautifully “pack” any political “product”, but when a “product” has a rating that has been created over the years, it will be much more difficult to mislead people with effective technologies.

You can set some “threshold value” of social credit, upon reaching which the candidate can apply for public service (if the social credit system had already existed in Germany in the 1930s, Hitler would not have come to power). And imagine how much social credit will ease the work of HR-specialists, as we have already mentioned. The validity of all kinds of modern assessment methods simply fades in comparison with the public rating that the candidate already has.

The system of social rating will allow to outline most worthy candidates for public service, offering important positions to the most worthy, this will directly reduce the level of corruption.

Conclusion

The main target function of the social credit system was formulated in December, 2016 by Si Jinping at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. He noted: “To combat the acute problem of lack of trust, we need to take a firm hold on creating a system for assessing reliability that covers the society in general. It is necessary to improve both the mechanisms for encouraging law-abiding and conscientious citizens, and the mechanisms for punishing those who violate the law and lose confidence, so that a person simply does not dare, simply cannot lose this trust” [10].

Of course, SCS initiatives are still at an experimental stage, and it is quite possible that public opinion will change as the system develops. It is obvious that the balance of rewards and punishments will influence and will affect the perception of the system. In addition, the transparency of scoring methods is a condition of citizens' trust in the social credit system itself. Already now, the more understandable is the assessment,

the more impartially it is being fulfilled, the stronger is the public support for the entire project in China.

Our analysis showed that the vast majority of publications reduce the SCS to an assessment of the behavior of only ordinary Chinese, but this is not entirely true. Si Jinping's speeches and normative documents have repeatedly noted that the individual rating system that is being created is no more than just the first step. In the near future, not only Chinese will be rated as individuals, but also companies as legal entities and then various non-profit and management structures and organizations, and their leadership.

The working system of social credit, as conceived by the Chinese leadership, should lead to:

- developing transparent e-democracy;
- faster establishment of trust between members of society;
- responsible attitude to their social behavior, depriving them of feelings of impunity and impersonality;
- meritocracy;
- a transparent system of social stratification.

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Social Policy of the State as a Tool of Motivation of Social Development

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ABSTRACT

The article shows that the activities of the State in the field of social support and social protection are aimed at addressing the needs of the lower levels of Maslow's pyramid of motivation: physiological needs, the needs of a safe existence. Currently, we are fighting poverty, while we need to create conditions for the formation of an active life position of citizens, which is aimed at the development of the human capital of the country, on the quality of which the successes of modern society depend. This task is achieved by forming motivations of the highest levels of the pyramid: the need for social contacts, self-affirmation and self-expression. The development of the Concept and Program for Human Capital Development would allow to coordinate and link all activities of a socio-economic nature, both already being implemented in the country and formulated in the Address of the President to the Federal Assembly on January 15, 2020.

Keywords: motivation, stimulus, social policy, social state, human capital, social justice

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In modern scientific literature, motivation is understood as the conscious behavior of the acting subject, aimed at achieving the goals [7]. The main conceptual problem is that in contemporary literature motivation is considered at the level of an individual or group, a collective as a concept of organizational management, personnel management, pedagogy, psychology, but not as a concept of management theory at the level of society as a whole. At the same time, state and municipal management nowadays conceptually proceeds from the management approach and actively uses concepts that have not been previously applied in the domestic practice of public administration: brands, image, territory marketing, etc. Therefore, to consider the motivation of society as a factor in state development, and to reveal the social policy of the state as a tool for motivating social development is an urgent task of state and municipal government at the present stage.

Motivation (from lat. Movere) — an impulse to action, a psychophysiological dynamic process that controls the behavior of the subject, determining its orientation, organization, activity and stability; the subject's ability to actively satisfy his/her needs. Motivation of behavior is nothing but the characteristics of the ideal side of the action, such as intention, aspiration, desire. A motive is a material or ideal object, the desire to achieve which is the meaning of actual activity. The motive is given in the form of certain experiences, which are determined by positive emotions from the anticipation of achievement. In the opposite sense - without receiving anything — negative.

Three main methods of motivation are determined:

- organizational and administrative;
- economic;
- socio-psychological.

Such a classification is based on highlighting the direction of the impact on the needs of the subject.

Economic methods of motivation are supported and reinforced by economic incentives. Organizational and administrative methods are based on directives, secured by laws, the rule of law, i. e. act by applying administrative incentives. Socio-psychological methods are needed to increase social activity. With the help of tests, surveys, interviews and questionnaires, the interests and needs of the subject are identified. Socio-psychological stimulation corresponds to his interests, religious, social and aesthetic preferences.

Actually, social policy is a system of incentives aimed at forming the motivation of society for an active life position. In the scientific literature, there are several approaches to the definition of the concept of “social policy”. The broadest definition interprets social policy as the actions of the authorities aimed at achieving the goals of society. This point of view is reflected in the works of P. D. Pavlenko, T. I. Zaslavskaya, I. M. Lavrinenko, V. M. Kapitsyna [4]. In studies of other authors, social policy is defined as a system of social support for low-income and socially vulnerable segments of the population to ensure the necessary level of satisfaction of their needs [8]. Social policy is also understood as a public administration tool aimed at redistributing public goods in order to equalize existing social inequality [2]. In addition, there is an approach to understand social policy as a system of measures aimed at implementing the principle of social justice [1].

In modern studies of state and municipal government, social policy is mainly understood as social support and social protection of the population. Thus, the stimulating orientation of social policy disappears, which does not allow it to fulfill the role of an instrument of motivating citizens to an active life position in all spheres of society.

The social policy of the state is the most important area of government. It is social policy that displays the real level of socio-economic development of the country and the political orientation of government action. Therefore, social policy is a holistic system purposefully developed and implemented areas and activities aimed at meeting the needs of society in accordance with the level of its economic development and the strategic goal of public administration. In this case, social policy acts as an instrument of public administration, combining the state orientation of development with the initiative of society. The implementation of this function of social policy can only be effective when the society is oriented towards the fulfillment of the main strategic task, i. e. the motivation of society, citizens of the state is the most important factor in state development.

Today, the state’s implementation of modern social policy does not show orientation toward strategic development tasks, but a tactical search for solutions to existing problems. Yes, of course, the number of poor in our country is prohibitive. And the category of this population must be supported. In the Address of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin to the Federal Assembly on January 15, 2020, new state initiatives were formulated to support low-income citizens, while it was noted that 70–80% of low-income (that is — poor) people are families with children¹. Yes, of course, demographic problems require urgent solutions, otherwise in 20 years they will become

¹ Annual Address of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin to the Federal Assembly. January 15, 2020 [Electronic resource]. URL: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/> (accessed: 20.04.2020).

the main factor hampering our development. The proposed changes in the payment of maternity capital optimally reflect the features of the current stage of the demographic development of our country. This is, first of all, the generation of the 1990s – 2000s that came into childbearing age. During this period, Russia had a low birth rate. You also need to add the consumer life orientation of this generation, low willingness to enter into official marriages, the desire for a comfortable life or career advancement. Therefore, the birth of the first child is most often postponed to a later period, and the second, in this case, may not appear at all. The proposed payment of maternity capital for the first child is a good timely incentive. But it's important not only to give birth to a child, it is important that, becoming an adult, he can realize himself as efficiently as possible for the benefit of society. No matter how significant the stimulating role of social policy measures aimed at supporting vulnerable groups of the population is, it has a weak effect on the formation of citizens' motivation for social activity. The main reason for the situation is that we are fighting poverty, while it is necessary to combat the social failure of our citizens. And this task requires a focused integrated and systemic solution. First of all, we need to “reanimate” the main development goal of our country, defined by the Constitution of the Russian Federation: the Russian Federation is a social state. As you can see, in recent years, much has been done to support vulnerable segments of the population. But, if we analyze the proposed measures from the point of view of the theory of motivation and A. Maslow's pyramid known to all, then the actions of the state are aimed at solving the issues of satisfying the needs at the lower levels of the pyramid: physiological needs, the needs of a safe existence. These needs of the first two levels are solved by measures of a passive nature: people protect, support and help. But the essence of the social state is that it creates the conditions for every citizen to fulfill the needs of the highest levels of the A. Maslow pyramid: the need for social contacts, self-affirmation and self-expression. The needs of the three highest levels are associated with the personal development of a person.

The basic principle that determines the nature of the actions of the authorities aimed at the implementation of these needs is social justice. The content of this concept is culturally historically, socially, emotionally and psychologically determined.

What is the strength of the famous expression, which is considered the national idea of the Russian pre-revolutionary society — “Orthodoxy, autocracy, nationality”? The point is that this expression very accurately reflects the idea of society about its unity, that the three main forces of social development are perceived as interconnected, represent a single whole, expressing the cultural and historical essence of the state, society, and man, they are inseparable from each other.

Actually, the semantic nature of this expression determines the essence of the principle of “social justice” for Russian society. The scientific literature constantly emphasizes the collectivist nature of the values of Russian society, but draws attention to the paternalistic nature of relations between power beholders and the individual. In terms of meaning, this is not at all true. Nevertheless, the choice of tools with which the state realized the interaction of power and society, especially in the Soviet period, formed just such a social perception of the principle of “social justice”. The social policy of the state, based on the redistribution of social benefits to equalize social inequality, reinforces this perception of the principle. Psychologically, this approach forms the stability of society, but with high demands on the obligations of the authorities and social infantilism of the individual. The hard and difficult period of our country's development is currently reinforcing this contradiction due to low salaries, meager unemployment benefits, the difficulty of finding jobs after 45–50 years, the excessive cost of educational and medical services, and the lack of social elevators. The generation of those who are 20-year-olds no longer hopes for state assistance, but blames it for their failure. There are objective reasons for this. At present moment, **no** conditions have been

created to allow each person to realize themselves in society in accordance with their abilities. One of the important issues is identifying abilities. Many methods have been developed aimed at determining a person's predisposition to a particular activity, based on his abilities and personal characteristics. But such a state program, which should be implemented already in kindergarten, is absent. School psychologists also do not deal with issues of vocational guidance. There is no state concept for the development of the domestic labor market; there is no state policy on the development of the country's labor resources. Of course, the state is taking steps to streamline relations on the labor market: developing professional standards, establishing Qualification Assessment Centers, redistributing budget places between institutions based on their professional orientation, developing characteristics and directions for creating a digital society, etc. But in this case, we again see a reactive, rather than an active state policy. Moreover, it is not comprehensive, which does not make it possible to enhance the effectiveness of the measures taken, since there is no synergistic approach. Thus, large resources, both material and intellectual, are spent on implementing measures in the social sphere, but the result leaves much to be desired: sociologists call the generation of 20-year-olds "a generation without a future" [5]. It is not only about the fact that in the generations of one family poverty is reproduced, but also about the fact that young people stop dreaming, realizing that achieving a dream is unrealistic. It is not an active life position that is being formed, but social apathy. The young man chooses, so to speak, not a profession, but a job that would allow him not to be poor. The exam, which, according to officials, provides an opportunity for talented and able to get a good education and successfully implement, does not solve this problem. Thanks to USE scores, he enters the budgetary education of a prestigious institute (in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk, etc.), the young man still has to live on some money. And if parents have low incomes, then they cannot help the student. Quite often, such young people do not finish their studies, since they need to earn money for a living. Thus, the growing social stratification of society gives rise to distrust of the ability to change the social conditions of life; the goal formulated in the Constitution of the Russian Federation becomes illusory, even mythical. Under these conditions, no stimulation will form a motivation for social activity. Thus, the motivation of society, which can be formed on the basis of expectation (the theory of Victor Vroom) [6], does not receive confirmation by incentives, and the type of behavior of citizens is consumer in nature, and not creative. One cannot "exploit" the expectations of citizens for a long time. The result is fairly predictable: social stress and social apathy. We emphasize once again the timely nature of the government's appeal to the solution of social problems, which was recorded in the President's Address. But the issue of the formation of social activity of citizens remains on the agenda of the near future, because at the present time, in the era of innovative development, the formation of a digital society, the main force for the development of the country is human capital.

"How does human capital affect the "wealth of nations"?"

First, he creates and distributes new technologies and products. Secondly, the owners of high human capital quickly master such technologies and implement them in production and everyday life, thereby generating a demand for innovation. More educated and qualified specialists are capable of more complex work, and the latter creates more added value per unit of time than labor of a low-skilled worker. *"Among the externalities of human capital, there is a higher quality of social ties, civic activism and the culture of society"* the report emphasized. It was prepared for the XIX April international scientific conference on the problems of economic and social development (April 10–13, 2018, Moscow) [3, p. 7].

According to the integral index of human capital, in 2017 Russia took 16th place. Our country has high indicators, characteristic of the "industrial economy of the twentieth

century” [3, p. 15], but not for the post-industrial economy, where our indicators are rather low, therefore, our country ranks 89th in the indicator of “accessibility of skilled workers”. In the speeches of experts and scientists, it was emphasized that a “breakthrough in the development” of human capital is possible only on the basis of changes in three sectors: education, healthcare and the social support system [3, p. 30]. Thus, the authors raise the question of the complex nature of the transformations, but do not conceptually develop their proposals. Again, important, necessary, useful, and fairly financially costly measures in the areas of socio-economic development “dissolve”, and their complementarity and coordination are not ensured. At the same time, the report rightly noted that the contribution of human capital to the development of the country depends not only on its quality, but also on the actions of those who use it [3, p. 7].

Thus, the need has ripened for developing a Concept and a Program for the development of the country’s human capital, and coordinating and linking in the program all social projects that are currently in force and which are expected to be put into effect in the near future, coordinating them in terms of time and resources. In this case, all projects, such as incentives, would work for the formation of motivation for social activity, for life success, for the growth of human capital in our country.

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Sociocultural Adaptation of Labor Migrants: Factors and Prospects

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ABSTRACT

Migration is a complex social process, which is not limited to territorial movement. It includes economic, labor, psychological, cultural and other aspects. In this regard, adaptation processes are an important goal of the study. They can be either successful or unsuccessful. It depends on many conditions that are classified into external and internal. The aim of the article is to analyze these factors affecting the adaptation process. The study of subjective factors of adaptation is associated with the internal motivation, attitudes, goals and motives of migrants moving in another country. The article focuses on the steps and levels of migrants integration in the host society. The determining influence on the dynamics of adaptation processes is provided by migration policy that regulates migration flows. The adaptation process itself seems either multilevel, progressive, otherwise it ends at some stage. The purpose of the article is precisely to reveal the passage of adaptation steps and levels, mainly of labor migrants located in Russia.

Keywords: migration, adaptation, acculturation, migration process, migrants

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Research methods

Ethnic and migrant groups are the most complex objects of sociological research because of their social exclusion. This is expressed in a certain isolation of ethnic diasporas, migrant enclaves, etc. Sociological methods are widely used in the study of integration processes. This article uses methods developed by the Chicago School of Sociology, which include quantitative and qualitative tools. The expert method turned out to be very productive, which made it possible to elicit the opinion of specialists in the field of migration on the complex problems of various migrant groups adaptation, as well as content analysis. The questionnaire method with a small sample set was used. The topic of the article does not involve mass polls: it's aimed at studying motivational orientations and conditions, inclusion mostly of labor migrants in the new social environment and adaptation to it.

The experts interviewed included representatives: Charity Fund for Support and Development of Educational and Social Projects "PSP-Fund", St. Petersburg Regional Branch of the All-Russian Public Organization "Russian Red Cross", Autonomous Non-Profit Organization of Socio-Cultural Programs and Projects "Children of St. Petersburg",

executive body of St. Petersburg (officials of the Committee on Interethnic Relations and the Implementation of the Migration Policy of St. Petersburg, the Committee on Labor and Employment of the Population of St. Petersburg), St. Petersburg State Autonomous Institution "Center of manpower", St. Petersburg State Brech Institution "St. Petersburg House of Nationalities", St. Petersburg University of the Ministry of Interior of Russia.

Theoretical and Methodological Provisions

Migration as a natural process takes place throughout the history of mankind, but it takes on a large-scale character in the XX–XXI century. This is due to industrialization trends and socio-economic processes globalization.

In addition to globalization, the more specific reasons for the growth of migration rates include a gap in the level of socio-economic development of different countries. For citizens of countries with a low level of development, economically developed countries that have more opportunities for life become attractive.

The Russian Federation is a country in need in foreign labor and host migrants. For her, labor migration is more in demand, with an emphasis on unskilled labor. Although it should be noted that the analysis of changes in the legal framework revealed a shift in the vector of migration policy in Russia from low-skilled migrants to those with professional training. The migration policy of Russia declares the need to attract migrants and especially skilled, creating legal grounds for this, as well as the migration policy of any state that uses migration resources [23].

As an example, we give the Order of the Ministry of Labor of Russia dated December 16, 2019 N 791n "On the distribution among the constituent entities of the Russian Federation of quotas approved by the Government of the Russian Federation for 2020 for issuing foreign citizens arriving in the Russian Federation on the basis of a visa, work permits and invitations to enter The Russian Federation for the purpose of carrying out labor activity", Order of the Ministry of Labor of Russia dated December 27, 2019 N 834 "On approval of the list of professions (specialties, positions) for attracting foreign workers arriving in the Russian Federation on the basis of a visa, for 2020" etc.

A comparative analysis showed that in the list of quotas for 2020 the share of foreign workers in certain sectors, for example, the transport sector, was reduced. The resolution was approved in the Russian legal framework in relation to foreign citizens. The percentage of foreign workers in the economic sectors is reviewed annually, taking into account the market characteristics of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, as well as the demand, primarily, for jobs for Russian citizens.

However, the direction to invite specialists has only a tendency to development. In the Russian Federation as a whole and in particular in St. Petersburg, the number of low-skilled migrants continues to prevail [16, p. 277].

This fact is confirmed as experts in the field of work with migrants, who estimate that a significant part of migrants occupy low-skilled jobs, as well as statistical data provided by the St. Petersburg State Autonomous Institution "Labor Center".

According to work-based data provided by the Center with labor migrants and their employers, the quantitative indicators of labor migration over the past 5 years remain at the same level (230–270 thousand migrants). In the example of 2018, we consider the areas of employment by which migrants are distributed. (88% of the total number registered at the Center were predominantly employed in the low-skilled sphere).

Thus, from an economic point of view, the demand for Russia in a foreign workforce with different qualifications is very obvious. It is necessary to consider labor migrants not only from the point of view of production feasibility, but also as potential social

The scope of employment of labor migrants in St. Petersburg in 2018

Name of the enlarged group of employment	2018	
	pers.	%
Unskilled construction and industry workers	60 413	21,8
Unskilled workers in housing and communal services	31 207	11,3
Woodworking professions	26 060	9,4
Unskilled workers in trade and services	24 042	8,7
Technical employees involved in the preparation and accounting of information, documentation	23 382	8,4
Other professions that do not require training	19 431	7,0
Industrial and civil engineering technicians with secondary vocational education	16 746	6,0
Catering professions	14 285	5,2
Administrative staff with secondary vocational education	8677	3,1
Food industry professions	8317	3,0
Professions of transport	6657	2,4
Health care professionals with secondary vocational education	5518	2,0
Total	24 4735	88,3

capital, a sub-institution of primary human or economic capital with a tendency to further incorporation into a new social environment [18, p. 116–118].

In the article by O.L. Proskuryakova “Adaptation of migrants as a social process” noted that social adaptation means a form of adaptation of an individual or social group to the surrounding social environment [17, p. 59]. The author analyzes the concept of “social adaptation” in relation to the social group of migrants, which allowed to determine its structure, as well as to identify internal and external factors that affect the structure of the adaptation process.

The adaptation process of migrants is multi-stage and multi-level, can be characterized as integrative, but not always progressive, with a transition from one level to another. It can persist at any one stage.

The inclusion of migrants in a new society for them is a long evolutionary process, depending on many factors: employment opportunities, social conditions, the attitude of the local population towards migrants, socio-economic situation, etc.

The process of integration into the host society depends not only on favorable conditions in a foreign environment (although this is important), but also on the motivational component and previously established social attitudes.

The socialization of migrants is based on the perception of social norms, social and cultural values of the host society. A promising prerequisite for the integration of migrants is their orientation to a long period of stay in Russia and their intention to obtain Russian citizenship.

It is important to note that obtaining citizenship by migrants does not mean their final integration into society, since they retain their attitudes and stereotypes. For example, for former migrants, possession of French citizenship automatically means inclusion in French culture, recognition of fidelity to French values. However, Muslim neighborhoods live their own lives, according to their laws and traditions. The integration of migrants reflects not so much its sequence as the staged versatility and depth of this process.

In our opinion, an indicator of integration into the new society is the formation of sustainable social ties at different levels in the host society: both with individuals and institutions (official institutions)

Results

A sociological approach to the study of migration processes, focusing on the problems of adaptation and integration of migrants, widely represented in the works of both foreign and Russian researchers (W. Thomas and F. Znanetsky [24], R. Park [22], A. S. Akhiezer [1; 2], A. V. Dmitriev [8], A. G. Zdravomyslov [9], M. N. Guboglo [6; 7] and others).

Migration processes are also studied from the perspective of the emergence of migration risks that are directly related to the theory of social integration. So, in 2000, the theory of social integration (Harmut Esser [19]) was developed. It was improved by Friedrich Hekman [20, p. 69–70, p. 181–182] in 2015: the theory is based on the difference in systemic and social integration, introduced by the British sociologist David Lockwood in 1964.

It should be noted that in the 2000 a number of scientists (for example, R. Brubaker [3, p. 235–237]) presented an altered understanding of the term “assimilation”, originally formed by M. Gordon [21]. Within the framework of this approach, the dominant topic for study is the problems of adaptation and integration of migrants in the new society: cultural and ethnic environment. This or that social space will be more or less attractive depending on the migration experience of previous generations of ethnic groups, the presence of friendly ties of fellow countrymen living in a given period of time.

According to the author's approaches, a different classification is given to the processes of social integration. For example, H. Esser identifies four forms of social integration: acculturation, positioning, interaction, identification, on the basis of which F. Hekman formulates and operates with such concepts as cultural, structural, interactive and identification integration. [20, p. 69–83]. It should be noted that there are different variations of acculturation regarding the interaction of ethnic cultures. For example, V. Malakhov noted the term “integration of migrants” often implies assimilation, cultural adaptation, structural adaptation [13, p. 32]. These terms are not synonymous. They indicate that the integration of migrants is a complex phenomenon that affects various aspects of their lives. Without dwelling on the terminological specifics, we believe that acculturation is the highest level of integration, which is characterized by a high level of ethnocultural tendencies and can be carried out subject to counter flows, both from the side of migrants and the receiving side. Here, a large role belongs to the carriers of the basic culture, capable of perceiving the culture of the arriving ethnic groups, which in turn should be ready to adapt to it. Acculturation as the most high-quality sociocultural process takes a long period of time. We focus on the initial phases of the integration of predominantly labor migrants taking into account Russian conditions, that is, on adaptation processes, which includes several levels [10, p. 349].

The first level of adaptation is more typical for those labor migrants who are focused only on earning and mastering basic norms of behavior with the employer and the migration services.

This level of adaptation is characterized by the fact that social contacts of migrants are carried out mainly within their ethnocultural diaspora and with the employer on organizational and production issues.

Thus, entry into the cultural space of the host society practically does not occur, but parallel spaces arise to satisfy cultural and domestic needs within their ethnic enclaves.

The second level of the socio-cultural process reflects the state of adaptation of migrants and is understood as the adaptation of legal migrant workers to the host society.

The real manifestation of this process is communication with the local population in Russian and the desire to master labor skills in a specific field of activity, which is caused by the need to consolidate their labor status.

A clarifying concept of the considered level of sociocultural adaptation is accommodation, which in literal translation from Latin means “adaptation”, “adaptation”.

According to experts, it depends on many reasons and, in particular, not so much on the fact that they do not want to adapt to the host community, but rather on the fact that the institutions of socialization, adaptation and integration of migrants are ineffective today, which is partly due to insufficient regulatory, legal regulation and lack of a structured system.

The third level of the sociocultural process, which takes a longer period of migrants in a foreign cultural environment, is called separate, associated with a real attempt to find certain interactions in the field of the culture of the host society and the cultural norms of migrants, initially functioning separately and, possibly, contradicting each other [14, p. 47].

Under the condition of various external and internal factors that influence integration trends, its subject is the migrants themselves, who have a certain potential. The analysis allows us to draw a fairly general conclusion that the newcomers in their mass do not have sufficient readiness to adapt for certain reasons. We can say that, relatively speaking, they are at the zero level and they have to go through different stages of the adaptation process.

So, in the conditions of Russian society, there are the following conditions that impede the adaptation of migrants to this society.

Firstly, migrants are a heterogeneous mass: they differentiate in terms of education, training, purpose of arrival, and are also representatives of different socio-demographic groups, ethnic groups, and religious groups.

Secondly, new cohorts of foreign citizens coming to local labor markets, most often coming from traditional patriarchal societies, with a different culture, different norms and values, and other rules of behavior.

Thirdly, the inevitable increase in the ethnocultural diversity of the regions, the “erosion” of the existing ethnosocial composition of the population create the preconditions for confrontation between the local population and migrants.

Today, the relationship between the host society and visitors is far from ideal.

Fourthly, some foreign ethnic migrants ignore the norms and traditions of behavior in the host community. Areas of ethnic settlements in rural areas and in cities are being created.

Fifth, the remoteness of territories and differences in culture, the development of social infrastructure, the climatic and geographical position of Russia and donor countries (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, etc.) determine the existing difference in religious, cultural traditions and everyday life of the host community of migrants.

Sixth, the migrant socioculture itself is very amorphous and is based mainly on ethnocultural traditions and elements of a subculture acquired in a social Russian environment that is foreign to them.

Seventh, in modern conditions at the state level, serious attention is paid to the shortcomings of the state migration policy. In particular, it is said that existing migration rules are not sufficiently clear and unified. The level of application of information technology in the provision of public services and the implementation of state control in the field of migration remains low.

The main factors contributing to the integration of migrants in Russian society, based on real practice, we can name the following: regulatory, family, organizational and others.

First of all, attention should be paid to improving regulatory factors. As already noted, we are talking about reforming migration policy. On March 6, 2020, the

President of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin approved a list of instructions to implement the concept of state migration policy for the next six years, which proposes: to reform the work of migration regimes and the institution of citizenship of the Russian Federation, to ensure the adjustment of the action plan for the implementation in 2019–2021 of the Concept of state migration policy of the Russian Federation for 2019–2025.

At present, discussion and development of the Migration Code as a single regulatory document governing migration processes and relations arising in this area is also underway.

Improving the legal framework can allow more efficient management of migration processes in the interests of the state, society and migrants themselves, who face various problems, and are also often poorly integrated into the host community.

When answering an interview question about what a complex of measures aimed at social adaptation and integration of migrants in Russian society includes, experts noted that there is virtually no legal basis for operating with the terms “adaptation” and “integration” in the official spirit. Over the past nine years, the development of the Federal Law of the Russian Federation.

“On the social and cultural adaptation and integration of foreign citizens in the Russian Federation”, containing the necessary legal terms.

Actual lack of legislation in this direction, with regard to immigrants it does not allow to freely use the proposed terms and talk about the formation and development of a system on the basis of developed regulatory legal acts, while activities in this area are carried out in the framework of the implementation of program documents. Of course, despite the absence of legislatively fixed norms, work in this direction is being carried out.

According to the migration policy, the following areas have been identified for the integration of migrants:

- creating favorable conditions for resettlement to the Russian Federation and obtaining, if desired, Russian citizenship by persons who speak the Russian language and are close to us in mentality and culture;
- the formation of understandable migration rules both for people who are ready to choose the Russian Federation as a new place of residence, and for those who come to us for a while, as a tourist, for work, study or for other purposes;
- increasing the level of security, including through the wider introduction of modern information technologies in the provision of public services and state control. To maintain social stability and prevent conflicts on ethnic grounds, it is necessary to take into account the national structure of migrants arriving in the country when implementing state policy [12, p. 56].

The family factor (poorly understood) includes the influence of the family on the process of integration of migrants in Russian society. It is noted that during a family move, the likelihood of focusing on permanent residence in the future increases, since each member of the family makes certain social ties that will contribute to successful integration in the future. Within migrant families tendencies may develop over a long period of stay in Russia with the prospect of obtaining citizenship.

This is due to the fact that family members at different levels form social ties. The device of life and inclusion in the social environment, the formed network of social interaction contribute to a long stay in Russia. The younger generation integrates through educational institutions, the older generation through job placement. Non-working family members (mainly women) who are less integrated into the host society receive little attention. During the expert survey, information was received on what problems migrants who come with their families most often face. In addition to employment, the following come to the forefront: the high cost of housing, the receipt of medical care (the high

cost of a medical insurance policy), the placement of children in the organization of the educational system (preschool and general education), etc.

Over the past five years, significant changes have occurred in the structure of work with labor migrants and members of their families in St. Petersburg. So, in addition to the general structuring of the work system the direction of differentiated work with migrants has developed significantly: with labor migrants, their children (if in 2012–2013 such a question was just beginning to be considered by leading experts, then in 2019 work with children has already been formed and is being established, which, however, requires further scaling and improvement), the foundations are laid for the formation of work with women who are not engaged in labor activities. Which, of course, is important, since there has been an increase in the number of women and minor children in the migration structure [15, p. 920].

The recorded increase in the number of women among the total number of migrants is due to the fact that the initial goal of migration is often to accompany a spouse.

School children staying on the territory of Russia often do not have acceptable knowledge of the Russian language, necessary for general education. In this regard, children face problems in mastering the school curriculum. In most cases, their parents do not have the necessary financial resources to pay for tutors. In the case of a large concentration of such children in a classroom or school, it is possible to form their closed group, poorly integrated into communication with the host society.

During the interview, the experts also noted that today a number of cultural events have been organized that contribute to the inclusion of migrant children in society by the State Treasury: the St. Petersburg House of Nationalities and narrowly a specialized representative of the non-profit sector, the public organization Children of Petersburg, which organizes courses in the Russian language and culture, as well as classes in other relevant academic subjects, etc.

Interaction with representatives of the city's district administrations and local governments allows us to identify schools and classes with the highest concentration of migrant children and possible conflict situations due to the closeness of children and low levels of inclusion in society.

An important factor affecting integration processes is organizational.

An example is the organized recruitment of migrants. The organized recruitment algorithm includes the following main stages: an application for the recruitment of necessary workers from the employer and an application for the search for suitable work in St. Petersburg from a foreign citizen who indicates his professional knowledge, skills, work experience, etc.; checking candidates for the presence of a ban on entry into the Russian Federation, searching for suitable jobs and selecting the necessary workers based on an analysis of databases of vacancies and job seekers [11, p. 145]. A targeted, organized recruitment of migrants can be characterized as selective.

This is a focused process of attracting foreign workers to Russia, which is regulated by relevant legal acts, for example, such as:

Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation dated December 3, 2019 N 1579 "On determining the need to attract foreign workers arriving in the Russian Federation on the basis of a visa, including for priority vocational qualification groups, and approval of quotas for 2020"; Order of the Ministry of Labor of Russia dated December 16, 2019 N 791n "On the distribution among the constituent entities of the Russian Federation of quotas approved by the Government of the Russian Federation for 2020 for the issuance of foreign citizens arriving in the Russian Federation based on visa, work permits, and entry invitations to the Russian Federation for the purpose of labor activity", Order of the Ministry of Labor of Russia dated December 27, 2019 N 834 "On approval of the list of professions (specialties, positions) for attracting foreign workers arriving in the Russian Federation on the basis of a visa, for 2020".

Conclusion

Thus, labor migration in Russia is considered at the present stage, as one of the resources for replenishing the workforce, i.e., the able-bodied population, under the conditions of the tendency of depopulation of the Russian population. However, from the perspective of the socio-economic development of civil society, this does not mean only a simple increase in the population as a temporary workforce due to its mechanical growth. An important stage nevertheless is the sociocultural adaptation associated with the demand for migrants. Acculturation of migrants can concern only a small part of them. Today we can assume that this process will take a fairly long period of time, with the prospect of a qualitative, selective result.

Significant adaptive potential is possessed only by those groups of migrants who are focused on a long stay in Russia, speak the Russian language, are in constant contact with the local population, are ready to do any job, have professional skills and respect the Russian culture and its traditions.

Today it can be said that 4–12 percent of migrants are fully integrated, about 7 percent are in the integration process (V. Mukomel). Given the differentiation of different immigrant groups, their target behavioral attitudes, the specifics of ethnic culture, etc. it is necessary to develop and implement socially adaptive forms and mechanisms of socialization of migrants, as well as ensuring social security [13, p. 47].

Also, when developing various legal documents, adaptation and integration programs, it is advisable to turn to the experience of other countries that have encountered a solution to this issue with an increase in migration flow. Different countries use different tools for the quality integration of migrants. Work is being done both with migrants and with the host society [4].

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The State and the Citizen: From Paternalism to Neopaternalism

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ABSTRACT

In article historical aspects and a current state of system of mutual relation of the state and the citizen are analyzed. The novelty of the author's approach consists in demonstrating the cyclic process: from civil paternalism to a social contract society and neopaternalism. The basic models of social support based on the degree of state intervention in the life of civil society and citizens are developed. A substantiated conclusion about necessity of social support not only not protected social groups, but all citizens of the state, transition from vertical to the horizontal social contract. Features of a formed Russian neopaternalism, its inconsistent character are specified. Necessity of forming of new system of mutual relations of the state and its citizens, based on trust and mutual responsibility of the parties is underlined.

Keywords: paternalism, neopaternalism, social support, models of social support, social contract, civil society, social state

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Mutual relations of the state and civil society, the state and the citizen - not passing theme philosophical, sociological and economic researches. In different periods actualized various aspects of the problem: an origin of the state as a result of the social contract; forming of the social state and the social rights of citizens; social responsibility of the state and the citizen etc.

The urgency of the given research is caused by necessity of theoretical judgement of the new phenomena arising in mutual relation of the state and the citizen, change of the maintenance of functions of the modern state, and, as consequence, transformations of system of social support of the population, forming new models.

It is also necessary to explain the survivability of the phenomenon of social dependency — the existence of a fairly large number of people who do not want to be aware of the realities of modern society and continue to demand from the state that they solve all their social problems. According to sociological polls, up to 70% of Russian citizens adhere to state-paternalistic positions [4]. At this conjuncture the explanation of that fact is necessary that the quantity of such citizens does not decrease, despite considerable reducing of a cohort of the people, which *all* social blessings received from the state.

Besides, abundantly clear a duality of a position of the modern Russian state in relation to citizens. On the one hand, the state would like to dump from itself a part of the financial loading connected with execution of obligations taken on, but with another —

especially in the beginning of 2000th years did attempts to divide this burden with new business and structures of a civil society [6, p. 7].

The purpose of the present research is the analysis of process of transformation of system of mutual relations of the state and the citizen as member of a civil society, origin of new not state institutes and new forms of social support of citizens.

As methodological basis of research the classical works devoted to studying of functions of the state and its mutual relations with citizens, works of modern western and domestic analysts act. First of all it is the fundamental works devoted to evolution of the state paternalism, the analysis of its historical stages, their maintenances and A. S. Ahiezer and A. J. Rubinstein, N. M. Pliskevich, T. J. Sidorina, T. V. Chubarova etc.

The position of supporters of the “new” paternalism developed within the limits of modern behavioural economy is worthy also. In works of key ideologists R. Thaler and C. R. Sunstein “the new” paternalism is contrasted with a criticised “old”, traditional paternalism and is based on idea that influence of the state and private structures on a choice and preference of people (including in the absence of effects of influence) not only is not reprehensible, but also is justified by the purpose of such influence — welfare improvement “patronised individuals” [14, p. 1161–1162].

In the domestic literature the criticism of ideology of a new paternalism [10, p. 29–30] is given. Although it is noted that the predisposition to paternalistic guardianship of civil society is “inherent” to the institution of the state as such. But the question always remains: does this “innate” tendency come up against any restrictions and how strong are these restrictions [2, p. 51].

The empirical basis of the study was the data of state statistics (Rosstat), the results of public opinion polls of leading research centers: Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) and Levada Center [4; 5].

From Hobbes to Locke, from a paternalism to “the general welfare state” and a neopaternalism

The problem of mutual relations of the state and the citizen has appeared the central theoretical theme during the European New time. Especially accurately it was showed in ideological fight of two giants — T. Hobbes and J. Locke.

T. Hobbes has appeared the supporter of the unlimited rights of the state which arise in the course of “delegation” of unlimited natural human rights. Hobbes underlines the dual nature of the state: it both protects, and punishes. According to Locke, the sovereignty remains behind the people which can be released from state guardianship if the last does not carry out the obligations.

State paternalism is formed historically and manifests itself to varying degrees at various stages of state evolution once. Its essence lies in the fact that a paternalistic state makes decisions *for* citizens, either in an open form — in the form of strict requirements and prohibitions, or in a latent form — in the form of instructions on the desired actions of citizens.

There is a research position according to which the paternalism is an organic part of relations in any community. In this sense the state paternalism is collectivism “from above”; the collectivism “from below” is a form of self-organizing of a society [6].

As supporters of the ideas of behavioral economics, paternalism, state custody of a citizen is necessary “in the vast majority of cases”. The patronized individual simply needs to be “nudged” by the state in a situation of choice when the acts he performs have a delayed effect, are difficult, are infrequent and involve poor feedback, and also when his experience is ambiguous [13, p. 84].

It is necessary to underline rather an important point: as object of the state paternalism (a policy “nudge”) the separate individual or social group and a *society as a whole* acts not. From here the thought that *all* members of a civil society need social support from the state logically follows, to whatever social group they belonged.

Supporters of the “new” paternalism either openly or implicitly present the idea that today there is a change in the classical, traditional “welfare state” with its new form, such as the “paternalistic state”. For example, J. Saint-Paul is consistently pursuing the idea that, in order to solve their problems, citizens need the intervention of “third parties”. Only the state can best fulfill such a role [12].

A “welfare state” is being formed as a result of the growing maturity of civil society trying to free itself from state guardianship. Briefly describe its evolution, it will look like this: two centuries of the dominance of Locke liberalism, then its crisis at the beginning of the last century. How to overcome the crisis — New Deal, Keynesianism, statism. As T. Sidorina notes, then “the spiral turns — the neoliberalism of the London, Freiburg, Chicago schools” [8, p. 127].

All diverse models of the state of general welfare which exist today, differ on several key parameters: the nature and a limit of the state intervention, degree of a social inequality, stratification.

Since the 70s of the last century, the welfare state in all its various models has been experiencing a systemic crisis that has covered all areas - the economy, ideology, and the social sphere. It was the symptoms of state disease that gave rise to the ideas of a “new paternalism”.

Social support, models and measures

It's clear that different models of the welfare state give rise to different types of social support for citizens.

Social policy of the states, measures of social support differ extreme variety. However, with a view of the analysis it is possible to speak about several models of social support, which differ with degree of responsibility of the state for the decision of social problems *of all* its citizens.

In the *paternalistic model* of social support, the state fully assumes responsibility for solving social problems of citizens. As the researchers note, the state as such seeks to predetermine all problems, paint all conditions and results, save a person from the “burden of individual freedom” [11, p. 15].

In *liberal model* of social support the state role, on the contrary, is minimum. The state provides support to a citizen only in exceptional cases when the intervention (resources) of all other *non-* state institutions (family, business, nonprofit organization, etc.) is clearly insufficient to solve the citizen's vital problems. As a matter of fact, this support has extreme and situational character.

The *institutional model* of government “takes care” of citizens not directly, as in the paternalistic model in through a system of specialized institutions, the purpose of which — insurance against various social risks: poverty, unemployment, occupational diseases, etc. This model is also called insurance.

At present, one can see the formation of a new *neopaternalistic* model of social support. State neopaternalism lies in the fact that the state, providing assistance to citizens, encourages them to responsibility for the state of their affairs; calls for intensifying “strong” connections in the system of social support (from the side of close relatives and friends), making greater use of “weak” connections (through real and virtual acquaintance, through various institutions that expand contacts).

A form of such an incentive (or “pushing”, in the terminology of supporters of the ideas of a “new” paternalism) can be a social contract.

The social contract as the agreement and technology

The idea of the social contract far is not new in the public theory. As a matter of fact, all theories of a civil society are based on idea of the social contract, or the social contract. As marks A. A. Auzan, the civil society is always the voluntary multilateral arrangement of people concerning achievement and the statement of any rights and interests. In this sense the society is a model of the agreement. There, where the civil society has appeared more strongly, there was a horizontal scheme of the social contract. The society has extended the device to the relations with the power and on relations of an entrepreneurial activity with the power. There, where the civil society has appeared more poorly, the state has extended the principle of hierarchy to relations with economy and with a society — there was a vertical social contract.

As the Russian history testifies, in the country forms of the vertical social contract always dominated. So, for example, the state “having adhered” the citizen to the earth, has caused occurrence of such specific phenomena of the Russian vertical contract as autocracy and a serfdom [1, p. 7–8].

In modern conditions, the dominance of the vertical social contract is manifested in the fact that on almost all issues you have to turn up. However, processes have already been outlined for strengthening the positions of the horizontal contract, which are manifested in the formation and development of elements of civil society — non-profit organizations, amateur associations of citizens in various fields, etc.

Within the limits of the state neopaternalism the social contract acts as the agreement between the state and the citizen in whom the mutual rights and obligations, restrictions and responsibility of both parties register. Both bargaining parties are equal in rights. By the tradition which are going back to Roman Law, such contract is a source of origin of mutual obligations and corresponds to two necessary conditions: availability of the purpose of the agreement not contradicting the existing law and voluntariness of its conclusion.

With the first condition it is quite clear. The goal of the social state and the goal of an individual citizen do not differ. For example, our Constitution emphasizes that the goal of a social state is “to ensure a decent life and free development of the individual”. Article 7 enshrines the first generations of human rights: “natural and inalienable” rights to life and freedom as the highest value; sufficient level of material support. The rights of the “third generation” already reveal the modern modes and contours of a decent life: environmental protection, reform of the educational process, the labor market, healthcare and medical insurance, access to cultural goods, digitalization and information security, professional retraining and professional mobility of the economically active population etc. [3, p. 25].

The social contract acts as *method* of achievement of the purpose — welfares of all citizens of the state.

With the second condition, everything is much more complicated. We proceed from one of the key provisions of neopaternalism: the state as a guardian, trying to solve the life problems of a citizen, is obliged to take into account the particular behavior of the latter, his position in relation to the state.

There are always people in society who willingly accept the terms of the contract; people who agree to these conditions under the pressure of certain circumstances; people who do not want to accept the terms of the contract. We will deal with these positions.

The first group of people is a significant part of society and is the guarantor of stability. They are distinguished by social responsibility, awareness of their obligations, political activity. However, if state pressure (even in the form of guardianship) intensifies, aggressive adaptive individualism develops, which develops in conditions when an indi-

vidual enters into a struggle with his rivals in a hierarchically structured bureaucratic structure for obtaining certain goods [6, p. 15].

The second group — agrees on the agreement under the pressure of any circumstances, debt comprehension etc. Concerning such persons the state offers a special kind of the social contract. In that case it will be the agreement which consists between the citizen and the state institute (for example, social protection body). Within the limits of this agreement the state institute is obliged to give to the citizen the social support provided by the legislation, and the citizen to the full to implement the obligations provided by the social contract. In this sense the social contract will act as *social technology*, the special tool which gives the chance to the citizen to solve own problems, thereby to promote to purpose achievement — welfare achievement.

However, there is also a flip side to the “coin”. Knowing that in a difficult reality situation the state to take care at least of “fishing tackle” (i. e. all the same something will give), the citizen loses necessary stimulus to search of means to worthy existence, remaining on the verge of a survival.

The third group — people who do not wish to “agree”. They or rise in rigid uncompromising opposition in relation to the state by a principle “to me it is necessary of nothing” and “lag behind me”; or take of a position of a social dependence by a principle “to me all should”.

The Paternalistic state, having done in the history a cyclic coil and having turned in neopaternalism with corresponding system of social support, it is forced to “work” with all three groups of citizens. A trend of a general orientation (irrespective of model of social support) — reducing of a share of the state social services and increase in volume of the services rendered by institutes of a civil society (non-profit organizations, the business, socially focused public consolidations etc.). Participation of citizens in not state pension funds, for example, is stimulated. In our country, for example, the participation of citizens in private pension funds is stimulated by the right to receive a private pension 5 years earlier than the deadline set by the pension law.

The Russian neopaternalism

Paternalism of the Russian state — the phenomenon specific enough. Very many works as classical — N. M. Karamzina, V. O. Kljuchevsky, S. M. Soloveva, Slavophiles, N. A. Berdjajev etc., and modern — A. S. Ahiezer, A. A. Auzan, A. J. Rubinshtejn, S. S. Tsukanova etc. For example, reveals, at least, 4 types of the relation of the Russian citizens to the state — paternal, participative, individualistic and deprived. However, the significant works devoted to forming of the Russian neopaternalism, practically are not present.

Trying to fill this research lacuna, we will note the basic features of the Russian state neopaternalism. If it is short, as follows: a close genetic relation with a traditional Russian paternalism; reproduction of the archaic of Russian paternalism; the inconsistency of this phenomenon, combining the national special and elements of borrowing, etc.

As a matter of fact, the Russian neopaternalism as ideology and sociopolitical practice is in process of formation. Today it is shown in removal on the constitutional level of the social rights and guarantees of their accomplishment as obligations of the social state; the state support of structures of the civil society which are carrying out of a task of social support.

In addition, it manifests itself, on the one hand, as the expansion and specialization of measures of state social support within the framework of its non-paternalistic model (in cash and in kind, in the form of services and social benefits), on the other hand, in the formation of a new attitude of citizens to the state (responsibility, longevity, trust, etc.).

Important value is acquired by the efforts directed on increase of efficiency of all system of social support. In modern Russia considerable means are allocated for social

support of citizens - about 3% of gross national product that more than other countries with transitive economy. According to Rosstat, only in 2019 expenses of the consolidated budgets of subjects of the Russian Federation have constituted about 1,2 bln. rbl. [9]. However, this did not have a significant effect on the poverty level in the country.

Constantly the circle of people social support appears which extends. Today it basically in great need to which the conclusion of the social contract providing the help from the state in employment is offered, conversion training, allocation of the initial capital on business opening etc. we will notice that conditions of the conclusion of social contracts it is strongly separated on regions that too essentially complicates an estimation of their efficiency. The next step should be the unification and standardization of contracts.

It should be noted that the idea of social support of *all* citizens of the state, being a component of ideology of a neopaternalism, gradually makes the way in life. Exclusively as positive it is possible to estimate the offer from the government about creation of the register of incomes of the population. In our opinion, it will help not only to group the population in criterion of security, but also to find out, what sort of a measure of social support are necessary for separate categories, and in the long term (unfortunately, rather kept away) for each individual citizen.

In conclusion, it is worth noting that an analysis of the relationships and mutual obligations of the state and its citizens allows us to see a certain cyclical nature: from state paternalism to a social contract society and to state neopaternalism. It is in this way, as neopaternalism, that one can determine the attitude of citizens to the modern social state. Russian neopaternalism is still being formed, but its features and the contradictory nature of the process of emergence and transformation are already evident. But today we can definitely say — a radical revision of the system of mutual responsibility of both the state and the citizen is necessary.

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The Modern Literary Process as a Factor of the Socialization and Integration of Russia and China

(On the Example of the III Forum of Young Writers of China and Russia)

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ABSTRACT

The article is devoted to the historical analysis of the socializing and integrating role of literature and the justification of the need for systemic socialization management by the state. The thesis on the use of literature as a factor in the state ideology formation in our days is proved. The role of Soviet literature as an important tool of political socialization is revealed, its significant influence on the literary process and the formation of state ideology in China is emphasized. The dynamics of Russian-Chinese relations is considered in connection with the transformation of the literary process of the both countries. The modern stage of literary and political integration is considered on the example of the III Forum of young writers of China and Russia (Shanghai, 2019). The interpretation of the main Forum's cooperation vectors and relevant topics is based on the experience of direct participation in the work of the Forum of one of the article authors. The conclusion is drawn about the integration potential of modern literature, its focus on the restoration of the traditional values of Russian and Chinese cultures, their interpenetration and optimal coexistence.

Keywords: China, Russian-Chinese relations, literary process, Forum of young writers of China and Russia, integration potential of modern literature

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In most modern states, there is a need to manage socialization as a process of entering the individual into the social system, mastering its norms, values and attitudes. Socialization is often seen as a way to form a certain type of citizen. The main tool for controlled socialization is the state ideology, in which the historical destiny of the nation, its place in the world, the problems and prospects of development are understood and the values integrating the nation and specifying, however, the accepted political course are formulated [1]. Fiction that has in its arsenal all the main mechanisms of socialization (encouragement and censure, imitation, reflection, identification), and is both the

carrier and source of the most important means of socialization (such as language and speech, elements of spiritual culture) can act as a significant factor in the formation of state ideology.

As the philologist M. M. Golubkov rightly noted, "it is literature that informs us through decades and centuries about the norms of national life, the system of values accepted in society, the life and moral orientations of its best representatives, shows the ideal and anti-ideal of a person, forms in the public consciousness ideas about what is due and what is not... Literature is the carrier of a peculiar genetic code, without which a person and society lose their continuity in the vertical of time. Through literature, a person receives the accumulated experience of national life, private behavior, manners of feeling and thinking" [2, p. 7]. Literature performs the functions of education and upbringing, setting moral guidelines for the individual, connecting him/her with the past, expanding the boundaries of the present and opening the veil of the future [14]. However, the peculiarity of the socializing influence of literature is that it captures not only the rational, controlled sphere of consciousness, but also acts at times on an unconscious affective level, changing the orientations of the individual and rebuilding his/her identity.

The history of Russia shows that it was often the writer who was considered by the state as a "ruler of thoughts" (an important agent of socialization), able to direct the reader's thoughts in the direction both pleasing and objectionable to the official authorities. In this context, we can recall the examples of A. Radishchev's publication of "Travels from St. Petersburg to Moscow", which led to serious proceedings at the highest state level, the southern exile of A. S. Pushkin for a number of freedom-loving poems (first of all, the ode "Liberty"), the expulsion to the Caucasus for the provocative poem "Death of the Poet" by M. Yu. Lermontov... But no matter how many "instructive" historical examples there are, including the ones in modern history, writers continue to play the role of the voice of conscience, calling for a critical, personal understanding of social problems.

It is not surprising that the state, interested in managing society as conflict-free as possible and maintaining its power over it, has always sought to influence fiction. It was especially evident in the Soviet years, when literature and art were integrated into the state system through the creation of creative unions. At the same time, it was literature that was traditionally given the role of translator and educator of the main spiritual values of the Soviet citizen.

As early as 1905, in the article "Party Organization and Party Literature", V. I. Lenin wrote: "...it will be a free literature, because it is not self-interest and not a career, but the idea of socialism and sympathy for the workers will recruit new and new forces into its ranks" [4]. According to Frants S. V. and Lubutin K. N., there was no question of any "true freedom of literature" at that time — it was only imposed the role of a "servant" of the new state with a clearly defined set of functions: propaganda, artistic illustration and interpretation of Marxist and later Leninist ideas [5]. However, we should note that this view of Soviet literature began to spread actively at the end of the XX century in the wave of the struggle against the Soviet system.

Reflecting on the fashionable trend to scold social realism, the Soviet government and the "nationalization" of literature, Golubkov M. M. notes that not only to the total control and destruction of writers and entire trends reduced the attention of the state to the literature of that time. There was also another (much broader), positive aspect of the development of relations between literature and power, "when literature becomes a state matter" [2]: A Union of Writers is created, A Literary Institute is formed (for the first time in the world history) that trains professional writers, writers' work becomes popular and socially significant.

Commenting on the trend of devaluation of the Soviet literary experience, researchers Kuleshov V. E. and Tsareva N. A. noted that: "...not a bright post-perestroika future still receives justification in the minds of the incoming generation, if the picture of the

past drawn in the information space is terrible” [3, p. 148]. With the decline of the importance of literature as a whole characteristic of modern time, they also note a rethinking of educational standards of literature as a discipline (“harmful” works are excluded from the school curriculum, and the number of hours allocated to study the subject falls). This shows not a forced “cooling” of the state focused on solving difficult economic problems to the literature, but its active desire to form the worldview of a new type of an individual / a person — a conformist consumer. For this purpose, the literary content “must be indifferent in its views on the current socio-political reality” [3, p. 148]. However, as N.A. Yagodintseva rightly noted, the project of the human consumer has already suffered a crushing collapse, since “it leads to the complete destruction” of everyone, because it begins to directly contradict the laws of nature, the psyche, and the viable human community” [14, p. 10]. “The Saving role in this disastrous process”, according to the Professor, is again assigned to literature: “with its help, we gain spiritual experience and, while remaining free in our actions, we are guided not only by personal egoistic interests, but also by higher considerations of collective experience, the common good, and higher justice. Needless to say, these principles create the people as a unique national and cultural community...” [14, p. 4].

Similar thoughts are voiced today by the head of the Russian state. Speaking at the Congress of the Society of Russian Literature, Vladimir Putin said: “...preserving the Russian language, literature and our culture is a matter of national security and preserving our identity in the global world. Russia has repeatedly experienced radical changes in traditional cultural foundations and has always found strength in returning to its spiritual and historical values, and Russian literature and the standard Russian language have always been and still are the foundations of these values”¹. According to the President, the problem of national identity crisis can be solved only through consistent work, appeal to the best world traditions, to the best world practice in promoting national languages and culture abroad (the experience of the Spanish Cervantes Institute, the German Goethe Institute and the Chinese Confucius Institute) and the implementation of large-scale cultural projects. One of these promising projects is the Forum of Young Writers of China and Russia, held in December 2019 in Shanghai.

Traditionally, Chinese readers and writers’ interest to Russian literature is great. After the May 4 1919 Movement, there was a period when Russian literature, according to the Chinese writer Lu Xin, was “the torch of a new Chinese literature”, was its “good teacher and good friend” [6]. According to the statistics of the “New Chinese literature — bibliography of the translated literature series”, during 1917–1927 the number of Russian books was one-third of the total number of foreign literature translated into Chinese. Russian translated literature was an active participant in the cultural life of China [15]. Chinese writers saw in it a high sample of foreign literature that could inspire them to promote the ideas of national liberation, and sometimes resorted to open imitation of Russian writers. Vivid examples: “Notes of a Madman” (1918) by Lu Xin in continuation of the work of the same name by N.V. Gogol; the play “Thunderstorm” (1933) by Cao Yu, created under the influence of “Thunderstorm” by A.N. Ostrovsky [15]. However, the most popular during the “honey decade” of Soviet-Chinese relations (1949–1960) was the so-called “red classics”: “How Steel Was Tempered” by N.A. Ostrovsky, “Chapaev” by D.A. Furmanov, “Iron Stream” by A.S. Serafimovich, “Rout” and “Young Guard” by A.A. Fadeev, “Forty-first” by B.A. Lavrenev, and others. For historical and political reasons, the literature of the socialist “big brother” became the only choice for Chinese readers of that time [15]. According to Jia Mingzhi, during the formation of the new

¹ Speech by Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Plenary Session of the Congress of the Society of Russian Literature on May 26, 2016 // Vera and Vremya Portal [Electronic resource]. URL: <http://www.verav.ru/about.html> (accessed: 20.04.2020).

China's own "red culture", the Soviet "red classics" integrated social values and moods bringing them in the rank of state ideology into a given orbit through the literary forms available to ordinary people [9].

In the recent period (after the reform policy in China), the content and role of Russian literature began to be rethought [6]. Lei Sun connects it with two parallel processes: firstly, thorough and in-depth analytical analyses of Russian literature by Chinese writers of the twentieth century (before the formation of the People's Republic of China), which previously had either a negative or simply inattentive attitude due to historical and political reasons, became open. Second, new books were published in which the authors turned to the study of national codes of Russian literature [6]. With the decline in the ideological significance of Russian literature in China, interest in it has not weakened.

At the same time, we can also observe a counter movement — the increasing interest of Russian readers in Chinese prose. According to Maria Semenyuk, the coordinator of the "Russian-Chinese Library" Programme, the novels "Brothers" by Yu Hua, "Predestined by Fate" by Feng Jikai, "Song of Endless Longing" by Wang Anyi, "The Plot" by Mai Jia, "Chinese Massage" by Bi Feiyu and "Old Ship" by Zhang Wei, and the children's book "I Will Be a Good Girl" by Huang Beijia have already received high praise in Russia. And this new trend for the Russian book market is only gradually beginning to gain strength: more and more Russian readers are immersed in Chinese literary works, "in order to better feel and understand modern China"¹.

The mutual penetration and interest of Russian and Chinese literature undoubtedly serve as proof (and at the same time as a factor) of the rapprochement of the two states. Today, the high intensity of contacts is characterized not only by the state of Russian-Chinese economic ties. On a regular basis, delegations are exchanged through specialized committees and commissions, as well as Deputy Groups of Russian-Chinese friendship established in both parliaments [13]. Cooperation in the humanitarian-social sphere remains one of the most important areas of bilateral relations. Thus, Vladimir Tolstoy, the Russia President's cultural adviser, who took part in the opening ceremony of the four-day Forum of young writers of China and Russia, pointed out that cooperation between the two countries in the humanitarian sphere is currently of particular importance, and expressed confidence that the partners need to know each other well, and "to get to know each other is best through modern literature, because it reflects the processes that take place within the society of each of the countries"². Designated by V.I. Tolstoy, focus on the cultural integration of Russia and China is reflected in the composition of the organizers and participants, the programme of events and the selection of topics for discussion [8].

The forum was organized by the Shanghai University of Foreign Languages, the Institute of World Literature among the members of which there was Vice-President of the International Association of Teachers of the Russian Language and Literature Professor Zheng Tiu, as well as the Shanghai Writers Union and the Union of Writers of Russia. The participation of professional writers' communities in international literary contacts ensures a high artistic level of works and their translations, as well as the re-creation of traditional national literary values in them at the present stage of historical development. The Union of writers as a form of organizing a literary community combines the functions of developing aesthetic and ideological values, organizing labor, and ensuring the rights of writers. This principle was first applied in world history in 1934 (the creation

¹Cankao Xiaoxi (China): What Chinese writers do Russian readers like? // Online publication — an Internet project of InoSMI.RU [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://inosmi.ru/social/20200112/246578574.html> (accessed: 24.04.2020).

²Young writers of Russia and China discuss issues of creativity and interaction in Shanghai // TASS: News in Russia and the world [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://tass.ru/kultura/7433821> ((accessed: 20.04.2020).

of the Union of Writers of the USSR), and the Soviet experience was later used in China. The fact that writers unions, rather than PEN-clubs or commercial publishing houses, participate in literary meetings between Russia and China nowadays shows that they are guided by a long tradition of cultural exchange.

Holding a meeting of young writers reflects the orientation of the forum organizers on the long-term perspective of cooperation and the perception of literature as an important factor of socialization. Both in China and in Russia, young writers are considered to be authors younger than 40 years old — who have been realized in literary creativity relatively recently, in the modern socio-cultural situation.

The issues of the reports presented by young writers reflected the integration potential of modern literature, its focus on recreating the traditional values of Russian and Chinese cultures, their mutual influence and optimal coexistence. For example, Hou Lei and Gu Wenyan devoted their reports to the influence of Russian literature on their oeuvre/works. Alena Belousenko revealed the theme of the mythological path of the literary hero on the example of Mo Yan's work. Evgenia Dekina highlighted the problems of modern Russian literature caused by the orientation to American schemes of writing "hit" works and the rejection of the author's reflection of the surrounding reality. Yuri Lunin dedicated his speech to the general trends in the search of Russian and Chinese writers.

Other reports also had a social and cultural integration orientation. For example, Irina Ivannikova shared her impressions of the previous II Forum of Young Writers of Russia and China, which was held in Moscow. This topic was continued by the Chinese participant of the Moscow Forum, Teng Xiaolan. Dmitry Lagutin and Ekaterina Ignatieva spoke about the significance of cultural tradition for a modern writer. At the end of the plenary session, the authors moved to a free discussion of literature issues through translators. The conversation was also attended by senior colleagues from the Russian and Chinese Unions of writers and guests of the forum, in particular, Li Weichang, a publisher and organizer of the literary events in Shanghai.

The writers' conference showed that many modern Chinese writers are concerned with the problem of finding relevant forms of national identity in the modern cultural space. For example, when discussing the prospects of Chinese poetry, Xiao Shui voiced his own concept of "From China to China", according to which literature should not obey the trends of modern culture, but should form them. According to the author, Chinese poetry needs to "return from "China", where Chinese and foreign cultures are mixed, to "China" where Chinese cultural traditions and values come to life" [8, p. 79]. However, the return to Chinese national values in literature does not negate the need for dialogue with other national traditions. Modern Chinese literature is "an open system that is included in the world culture and interacts with other literary traditions" [8, p. 80]. As Professor Zheng Tiu noted, modern Chinese literature is closely related to translated one, and their separation is unthinkable [12, p. 160]. At the same time, the most priority foreign-language reference point for the development of the current Chinese literature in the modern world is still Russian literature.

Representatives of the host country during the forum noted the special importance of Russian literature for the Chinese one. According to Li Jingze, Vice-Chairman of the Union of Chinese Writers, "there is a spiritual connection between Chinese and Russian literature. The works of all Chinese writers reflect the spirit of Tolstoy, Dostoevsky and Pushkin." The fact that the main models for the development of Chinese literature are Russian authors was stressed by the Deputy Chairman of the Shanghai Writers Union, Wang Wei. Arisen and developed in the XX century, the continuity of Chinese literature in relation to Russian literature is still relevant today.

The works of modern writers of the two countries are characterized by similar problems, reflecting the spiritual and psychological background of the relationship of the individual with the surrounding world. For example, the theme of understanding

the historical experience and national fate is characteristic of the work of Karina Seidametova [7, p. 36–38] and Miao Kegou [7, p. 69–73], the motives for understanding and transforming the world through creativity are revealed in the prose of Yuri Lunin [7, p. 147–180] and Li Hongwei [7, p. 207–211], in the poetry of Zhang Qingzhu [7, p. 91–92] and Roman Kruglov [7, p. 10–11]. The main point of contact in the approach to literature in Russia and China is the perception of the art of words as a search for truth and service to society; writers and scientists of the two countries do not tend to treat literature, art and science as a way to earn money or a way of entertainment.

The general trends in the work of writers participating in the forum, as well as the work of Chinese literary critics, allow us to specify the existing Chinese demand for modern Russian literature as a traditional type of literature. Russian literature, according to Sun Lei's generalization, draws Chinese readers' attention to the world of the human soul, the spirit of repentance, and the idea of the freedom of the human person, which is characteristic of Russian literature in historical perspective [6]. As Zhao Xue noted "tradition as a kind of presupposition plays the role of a criterion in the mind of the Chinese reader" [11, p. 58].

The past events were widely covered by the Chinese media¹. The result of joint work of young Chinese and Russian authors was the publication of translations of their works in literary journals of both countries. The forum has become a platform for professional communication, finding common ground in creativity and discussing topical issues of concern to Russian and Chinese writers². Undoubtedly, the forum contributes to the strengthening of relations between the two countries.

There is a huge interest in Russian literature in China, and if the classical literature is well known, then the modern literature is either unknown at all, or presented one-sidedly. The forum initiated by the Chinese side is not enough to solve this problem. To understand its causes, it is necessary to focus on the negative trends in the literary process and self-representation of Russia through literature.

As it was mentioned earlier, the cultural integration of Russia and China is promoted by literature that has a socializing function, reflecting traditional values in the modern world, while "often the break with tradition is seen as a defeat, a mistake, a dangerous trend" [11, p. 58]. Of all the variety of post-Soviet literature, postmodern literature that denies or ridicules the core of Russian culture is being actively popularized today. The popularization of such works harms Russia's international prestige, as their translations come to the attention of foreign readers and critics, creating the impression of cultural decline and making the prospect of integration unattractive. Naturally, according to the researcher of post-Soviet literature Zhang Jianhua, "the multiplication and variation of boundless cultural plurality have led to the crisis of traditional culture, the cultural elite have become marginal" [10, p. 109]. The lack of state support for the Union of Russian Writers that currently operates as a public organization reduces the effectiveness of Russia's foreign cultural policy. As a result, the existing request in China for translations of new works of traditional Russian literature remains largely unsatisfied.

¹ "走了那么远的的路", 中中青青家家家在 [Electronic resource] // 新 新民. URL: https://www.360kuai.com/pc/95603c5016c7317c5?cota=3&kuai_so=1&sign=360_e39369d1&refer_scene=so_54 (date accessed: 13.04.2020), 中俄文学交流悄然升温, 当下如何重读经典“金库” // WHB.CH [Electronic resource]. URL: <http://www.whb.cn/zhuzhan/xinwen/20191228/311104.html> (accessed: 20.04.2020).; 重温俄罗斯“白银时代”: 理解它的璀璨和美 // 新浪新闻 [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://news.sina.cn/2019-12-29/detail-iihnzakhk0754166.d.html?pos=3> (accessed: 20.04.2020).

² Forum of young writers of Russia and China is held in Shanghai // Electronic portal of the Russian World Foundation [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://russkiyimir.ru/news/267118/?ut> (accessed: 20.04.2020).

The current stage of relations between the two states and cultures is characterized by the fact that for China, which has the opportunity to freely choose partners in accordance with its goals, the focus on cultural exchange with Russia remains a priority. It is due to both the course of history in the twentieth century and the similarity of traditional values of the Russian and Chinese peoples (the primacy of the general over the individual and the assessment of the individual in terms of his service to others). The need for axiological understanding of modern reality that exists in Russian and Chinese society can be met to a large extent thanks to the support and development of literature and, in particular, international writers' forums.

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Russia, China: Poverty Alleviation (Comparative Analysis)

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ABSTRACT

Goal and objectives. The article analyzes the state policy of Russia and China on poverty alleviation, conducted a comparative analysis of the strategy of the two countries in solving the problem, basic areas, social programs, measures, measures of social support for poor categories of citizens. The general and specific approaches of each. The results achieved are considered, as well as the objectives set by each country in this direction for the near and far term.

Methods. The study uses a set of general scientific methods, such as analysis, synthesis, generalization, comparison, system-functional and integrated approach. Within the framework of the stated theme, theoretical provisions and modern approaches were systematic on the basis of the study of the works of various authors, federal and regional regulatory documents, official statistics.

Results. The theoretical and practical significance of the study is to specify and organize the modern strategic approaches of the state policy of Russia and China, both in the sphere of poverty alleviation and in the provision of state social assistance to poor categories of citizens. These areas of state social policy of each country are not sufficiently researched by national science. The analysis provides an opportunity to identify the state of poverty in Russia and China, actualizes the importance of state policy to reduce poverty in each country, justifies the need for its further improvement in this direction. The findings highlight the positive results achieved by countries to date and identify the ways that have led to them, which can further promote public social policies to overcome poverty in each country and the system of state social assistance to the poor.

Scientific novelty. The scientific novelty lies in the study of the state policy of Russia and China to reduce the poverty level of the population, as one of the most acute problems of both countries. The article shows the characteristics of poverty in each country, the scale and concentration of poverty, the trend of changing poverty in recent years as a result of the efforts of states and new strategies in public social policy. Weaknesses and strengths in the state social policy to overcome poverty in Russia and China have been identified. The lack of effectiveness of the organization of state social assistance to poor categories of citizens is justified. The conclusions are drawn on the versatility of ways to overcome poverty, the need to unite the efforts of all countries in this direction, the fruitfulness of the exchange of experience accumulated by different countries.

Keywords: poverty, social problems, minimum poverty, minimum social standards, poverty allowance, anti-poverty programmes, poor citizens

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Introduction

Poverty has always been one of the main socio-economic problems in all periods of society from ancient times to the present. 736 million, this is 10% of the modern population of the planet are poor people, their spending is less than one dollar per day, which

is below the official minimum poverty line set by the World Bank at 1.9 dollars¹. The poverty level in the country is an indicator of its socio-economic development.

The reduction of poverty in the world, as a primary goal, was set by the UN in the framework of the Millennium Development Goals programs for several decades. The program “17 goals of sustainable development”, adopted by the UN on September 25, 2015 for the period until 2030, considers the problem of poverty as the most significant at the present stage².

The problem of poverty remains in the focus of both public attention and public policy of different countries; discussions in the scientific community on the issue of poverty reduction; new poverty reduction concepts are being developed; a search is underway for forms of assistance to poor citizens.

Current state of the problem of poverty in Russia and in China

Poverty undoubtedly remains one of the main contemporary social problems in Russia. The measurement of poverty statistics in Russia is based on statutory (absolute) approach. He comes from a comparison of the actual income of the family (citizen) officially established at the Federal and regional levels, the cost of living. The living wage acts as a minimum level of income required to sustain life and maintain health. If family income is below the subsistence minimum, the family is poor (poor). A living wage for the fourth quarter of 2019 per capita amounted to RUB 10 609 (approximately \$ 170) per month³. “In Russia today almost 19 million people who are poor”, stated Dmitry Medvedev in the government Report to the State Duma 2019⁴. In the second quarter of 2019, according to Rosstat, the number of citizens living below the poverty line, amounted to 12.7% of the total population⁵. Describing the Russian poverty for the structure, I should mention its feature — enter the number of poor, primarily families with children and working but receiving low wages, parents. The appearance of a second child dramatically reduces its income and leads to poverty line⁶. The poverty of a large number of Russian families, as an acute social problem in Russia and as a direct threat to the demographic future of the country, said Vladimir Putin in the Message to the Federal Assembly in 2020⁷.

Russian poverty is heterogeneous, it has no regional color, the number of poor varies significantly depending on the region of residence. If, in Tatarstan the number of

¹ As the World Bank estimates the level of poverty [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://tass.ru/info/7525997> (accessed: 06.03.2020). (In rus)

² Technical report by the Bureau of the United Nations Statistical Commission (UNSC) on the process of the development of an indicator framework for the goals and targets of the post-2015 development agenda — Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform. United Nations (19 March 2015) [Electronic resource]. URL: [https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/6754Technical%20report%20of%20the%](https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/6754Technical%20report%20of%20the%20) (accessed: 06.03.2020). (In rus)

³ The new size of the subsistence minimum for the Russian Federation for the 4th quarter 2019 [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://socprav.EN/prozhitochnyy-minimum-za-4-kvartal-2019-goda/> (accessed: 06.03.2020). (In rus)

⁴ The report of the government before the State Duma, 2019 [Electronic resource] URL: <http://duma.gov.ru/news/44588/> (accessed: 06.03.2020). (In rus)

⁵ Statistics of poverty in Russia to 2019: Rosstat [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://zen.yandex.ru/media/id/5b9ba35cc3cbc000ab140b83/statistika-bednosti-v-rossii-v-2019-godu-rosstat-5d777b-41028d6800a> (accessed: 06.03.2020). (In rus)

⁶ The paradox of the Russian poverty: a painted group portrait of the poor [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://www.mk.ru/social/2017/03/28/paradoksy-rossiyskoy-nishhety-narisovan-gruppovoy-portret-bednyakov.html> (accessed: 06.03.2020). (In rus)

⁷ The President’s address to the Federal Assembly 2020 [Electronic resource]. URL: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62582> (accessed: 06.03.2020). (In rus)

poor is 7.2%, while in Ivanovo region — 14.7%, in the Tomsk region — 15.0%, in the Pskov region of 17.5%. Poverty is concentrated mostly in rural areas and small towns. For example, if, in Tomsk, the number of poor is only 5.9%, in the villages of the region is 26%¹.

Thus, the level of poverty in Russia remains high. This poverty is concentrated in certain regions, and its carriers are mostly families with children.

For China, poverty is also one of the most acute problems of social problems. In 2018, according to the State statistical office, the poor in the country had 110 million people, which is 8% of the total population [1]. To determine the level of poverty in the country, as well as in Russia, Chinese statistics uses the standard (absolute) approach. In the number of poor are occupied by persons whose income is below the subsistence level in China, a single living wage level is set for the whole country, and each region sets its own level. The size of the living wage in the regions can vary significantly. This approach to assessing poverty in China is consistent with the Russian approach. This circumstance makes it possible to obtain objective data on the level of poverty, as a whole, across the country and its regions, to compare it with the poverty level as a whole in Russia and its regions. The poverty threshold at the end of 2018 in China was 6.33 yuan per day per person, which corresponds to 1 dollar or 65 rubles².

A particularly high level of poverty in China, as well as in Russia, is inherent in remote regions with a predominance of rural population, such as the Tibet Autonomous Region, Sichuan, Gansu, Yunnan, Shanxi. Poverty in China has a geographical distribution. The western and northern provinces are the poorest compared to the eastern and southern provinces. More than 250 million people live in these regions, the percentage of the poor in them reaches 18.0% [2]. It can be concluded that for China the main problem is precisely the regional poverty of the rural population.

State assistance to the poor in Russia and in China

In the social policy of Russia one of the directions of the fight against poverty is the provision of public assistance to needy categories of citizens. State social support regulates special law. In accordance with this law, representatives of this population are eligible to receive targeted lump-sum or monthly benefits on poverty. The amount of this benefit and the procedure of its receipt is established at the regional level. If in a low-income family has minor children, then such a family will receive an additional allowance for children. All services in the system of social services for the poor citizens receive free. They also have the right to obtain social housing. The poor categories of the citizens having the status of unemployed, receive financial assistance under regional legislation.

In order to prevent contact with citizens in the category of the poor, social policy of Russia is significant social support for the families through social benefits. Russian families with children receive benefits: maternity, the birth of a child, to care for a child until the age of one and a half years. For families in which the birth or the child is adopted, formed the maternity capital, which can be used for the improvement of living conditions of families on the education of children and mothers on supplementary pensions for mothers. For pregnant wives and children of conscripts in the age of three have special benefits. Social benefits are financed from the Federal budget, and for employees subject to compulsory social insurance, benefits are paid from the budget

¹ In the Russian regions, compiled a “portrait” of poverty [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://www.gazeta.EN/business/2019/07/25/12534061.shtml> (accessed: 06.03.2020). (In rus)

² The level of people below the poverty line in China [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://visasam.ru/emigration/asia/bednost-v-kitae.html> (accessed: 26.04.2020). (In rus)

of Fund of social insurance of the Russian Federation. Unemployed citizens have the right to receive unemployment benefits. The regions have the right to Supplement this list and provide additional benefits.

The system of mandatory medical insurance in Russia covers the entire population. All citizens of Russia upon the occurrence of objective social risks: old age, disability and survivors pensions are entitled to pension benefits. The Russian pension legislation includes a wide range of insurance types of pensions: old-age, disability, survivor benefits, which are financed from the budget of the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation. Military personnel, civil servants and citizens, not acquire the right to insurance pension, receive a pension through the public pension system financed from the Federal budget. Pensions in Russia cannot be below the level of the subsistence minimum established in the region of residence. In 2010 was introduced a social Supplement to pension, the size of which is below the subsistence level in the region. Thus, the most socially vulnerable categories of the population, limited in their ability to provide for themselves, due to old age, disability, and loss of a breadwinner, do not currently fall into the category of poor people with a normative approach to poverty assessment.

State support of the poor, taking the form of social payments from the budget, and social policy in China, in contrast to the policy of Russia, are under-represented. Subsistence benefit (dibao) exists, but as a temporary and limited measure to assist families whose income is below the minimum traits — 2,3 thousand yuan per year (about \$ 340) that is installed in force in 2019, the state standard. The poorest categories of the population are rural inhabitants. However, in 2018 the average annual income of rural residents increased to 10 of 371 yuan (about 1530 dollars), compared with 2017 year increased by 8.3% adjusted for inflation¹. It is intended to purchase essential goods, food, medicines. But it's difficult because of the bureaucratic procedures of decision-making. Cost budget for this allowance is insignificant, amount to only 0.2% of GDP.

Pension provision in China so far does not apply to all older people, a significant portion of the elderly it lacks. According to statistics, in 2019, the lowest pensions get the villagers is 50–100 yuan (\$ 1000). The average state pension in the cities of 1,500 yuan (about 14,000 rubles). The average for the country in 2019 was 900–1300 yuan (5000–9000 rubles)². This creates objective prerequisites for falling into the category of the poor, primarily the elderly. In this regard, we note the difference in the demographic composition of poor in Russia and China. However, the pension system old-age insurance in China is still under development, a number having retired is growing and currently stands at 66% of the total number of older people, which is key to a positive Outlook in reducing the number of poor among the elderly. The system of social insurance benefits, compulsory health insurance also are poorly developed and do not cover all the population. Currently, the majority of older people do not have the opportunity to receive free medical care. Not all the unemployed can receive benefits for loss of employment³. At the same time, in order to stimulate an active positive civic position of the population, aimed at law-abiding and respectable social behavior, at self-development in 2014, a number of regions of China experimentally introduced a system of social loans (social rating indicators). In this system, the provision of social security or the refusal of it to a particular citizen is associated with the level of his social rating,

¹ The expert assessed the prospects of escaping poverty in China [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://ria.ru/20190926/1559141278.html> (accessed: 06.03.2020). (In rus)

² Tikhonov V. Pension in China: who and how to pay [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://1migration.com/kitaj/pensiya-po-starosti.html> (accessed: 26.04.2020). (In rus)

³ The Chinese social credit system — what is it [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://www.fondsk.ru/news/2018/12/29/kitajskaja-sistema-socialnogo-kredita-cto-eto-takoe-47371.html> (accessed: 06.03.2020). (In rus)

which indicates a contradictory way of development of social security and its insignificant role as a direction in reducing poverty¹.

The government strategy of poverty overcoming in Russia and in China

The solution to the problem of overcoming poverty is related to the most important priorities of modern state policy of Russia. The Decree of 7 May 2018, the President has set the task of providing sustainable income growth, and achievement by 2024, reduce the level of poverty in the country twice². New approaches to the solution of this problem consist in making the implementation of the five Federal projects aimed at improving the lives of Russian families who are currently classified as poor, and those who may fall into this category, for example, in connection with the birth of a child or job loss. The law established additional state financial support for families with children.

New in the fight against poverty, through the provision to low-income families, state social assistance is the focus of social protection to eliminate some families have the position of social dependency to overcome, they have a passive behavior in the solution of their problems, for the formation of the desire to independently change their difficult situations. To enhance the efforts of families in this direction is the technology of the social contract, held since 2013 pilot tested in several regions and demonstrated social impact. The social contract is between the poor family and on social protection. Each of the parties to the contract assumes certain obligations, the provision of state assistance to a poor family is associated with the fulfillment of its obligations. Social protection authorities provide assistance to such families by developing an individual program for them to overcome the crisis and achieve a socially adaptive result. In addition to providing cash benefits, the program may be provided for different events such as: the treatment of alcoholism; help in finding employment and opening small businesses; the direction on retraining or further training; subsidizing the purchase of vehicles, machines, raw materials; provision of seeds; the purchase of livestock. The duration of support in each region is determined differently and depends on a difficult situation of a particular family.

Technology is a social contract recognized by the government promising in solving problems of poverty, to increase family incomes and improve their quality of life. Vladimir Putin in the Message to the Federal Assembly 2020 emphasized the necessity of improving the technology of the social contract, the implementation in practice of social protection in all regions of the country, expansion of financial support of regions for the implementation of this innovation³.

Social strategy of China's anti-poverty differs from the model of Russia. The reduction of poverty in all regions, raising the living standards of the population, building a society of universal medium prosperity — these tasks formed the basis of policy reforms implemented in the country in the last forty years. A sharp jump in traffic in this area is associated with the adoption and start of implementation in 2010 special programs and establishing a special Fund to combat poverty. In order to implement the program, the government also entered into cooperation agreements with a wide range of private companies on the basis of public-private partnerships.

¹ Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of May 7, 2018 N 204 "On national goals and strategic objectives of the development of the Russian Federation for the period until 2024" [Electronic resource]. URL: <http://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/71837200/ixz5bFGQAE-dk> (accessed: 06.03.2020). (In rus)

² The level of people below the poverty line in China [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://ria.ru/20190926/1559141278.html> (accessed: 26.04.2020). (In rus)

³ The President's address to the Federal Assembly 2020 [Electronic resource]. URL: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62582> (accessed: 06.03.2020). (In rus)

For the program of fight against poverty and, primarily, with regional poverty, from the state budget allocated funds, the amount of which increases every year. The same amounts invested for these purposes and private companies. These funds went primarily to regions with high levels of poverty. Moreover, they were not dedicated to the payment of benefits to poor families, and was for the creation of conditions for socio-economic development of regions and rural settlements, to stimulate small business on providing the rural population with work. Creation of conditions for socio-economic development of regions and rural settlements, to stimulate small business on providing the rural population with work. Each poor family was taken on record, recorded the income sources of families and their size, tracked the dynamics of changes in these parameters. Families helped in the organization of agricultural production, gave interest-free loans for the purchase of agricultural machinery, stimulated the creation of agricultural cooperatives. Funded the construction of roads, social infrastructure, housing, water and electricity supply, carried out agricultural support, trained people to farm and new skills in the field of logistics, ecology, planting, forestry. Great attention was paid to the development of health and education in rural areas.

Policy for the elimination of poverty in China is regarded as an important fundamental prerequisite of economic growth as the key to improving the welfare of the population and the extension of its solvency. It is managed purposefully and systematically with the concentration of financial resources, both the state and business representatives. Over the years, the social reforms China has achieved impressive results in reducing the level of poverty in the country, 740 million people were pulled out of poverty. The level of poverty in the whole country during the reform years decreased by 95%; the income of the population grew by 6.5%. Moreover, in the near future they plan to reduce the poverty level to 2%.

China has shown the highest rates of poverty eradication and the undoubted effectiveness of the chosen path. According to UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, the Chinese strategy is the most effective in solving the problem of poverty eradication, it is suitable for many countries of the world¹ [17].

Conclusion

Elimination of poverty, reduction in poverty for any country is extremely challenging, because it lies at different planes. It is directly linked to level of economic development of the country and its ability to Fund programs aimed at overcoming poverty. It depends on existing disparities in the economic development of individual regions, from the presence in them of industrial production, the development or lack of development of social infrastructure.

On formation of incomes of the population significantly affects the current wage system, regional disparities in the wages of workers of budgetary sectors, the level of minimum limit of wages in the country, the mechanism of its indexation. Not less important and measures of social policy, of its targeted focus, the focus on poverty reduction.

It should also be emphasized that the fight against poverty, poverty, hunger requires cooperation and coordination of efforts of all countries, exchanges between our experiences and achievements in this field, strategies, technologies. In this regard, for all countries, including Russia, of course, an important experience of China, the most successfully solve the problem. The adoption of a special program aimed at eliminating poverty, directing significant state efforts to the socio-economic development of regions,

¹ The Chinese way to solve the problem is relevant for the whole world [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://rg.ru/2019/10/04/kitajskij-put-resheniia-problemy-bednosti-aktualen-dlia-vsego-mira.html> (accessed: 06.03.2020). (In rus)

stimulating public-private partnerships for these purposes is a path that is undoubtedly promising for Russia. China can be an interesting experience of Russia to establish a universal guaranteed constitutional system of social security of the population. The underdevelopment of this system in China, the controversial path of its development in the longer term creates barriers to reducing the level of poverty in the country, primarily among socially vulnerable categories of the population.

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Comparison of Old-age Pension Policy in China and Russia: the Common and the Specific*

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ABSTRACT

In the process of transforming from planned economy to market economy, both China and Russia faced the issue of pension reform. There are similarities in the reform and development process and the system model of the pension security system in China and Russia. Transition from planned economy to market economy and aggravation of population aging are main reasons for the reform of pension system in both countries. Under the influence of the World Bank and other international organizations, China and Russia have gradually established a multi-tier pension system, with the state, enterprises and individuals sharing the pension costs. Differences also exist in the old-age security system of China and Russia.

Keywords: Old-age Pension, China, Russia, Comparison

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1. Introduction

Both China and Russia transformed from planned economy to market economy in the 1990s. During this process, both countries had reformed the old-age insurance system in order to adapt to the social and economic situation. This paper analyzes the reform process of establishing multi-tier old-age insurance system in these two countries and the current situation of major old-age insurance programs in the second part and third part of this paper. The fourth part of this paper compares the commonness and differences of old-age insurance system in these two countries.

2. Multi-tier old-age insurance system in China

China had started the theoretical exploration and practice of the multi-tier old-age insurance system since 1990s. At the beginning of the reform, it was set as a goal to establish a multi-tier old-age insurance system. Before this reform, the responsibility to provide pension benefit was only borne by the basic old-age insurance program, which was funded by national finance. On one hand, this reform can reduce the benefit level of the basic old-age insurance program and the burden of national finance. On the other hand, multi-tier pension system means a new institutional approach has been found to cope with the pressure of aging population in China.

¹ This paper is funded by *Research on Multi-tier Old-age Insurance System in Guangdong Province*, project of Guangdong Institute of Public Administration in 2018 (project number: XYB201808).

The multi-tier old-age insurance system in China is consisted of basic old-age insurance system, supplementary old-age insurance program and private commercial old-age insurance program. In this part, development process and major characteristics of main old-age insurance programs are analyzed.

2.1. The first tier – basic old-age insurance system

The basic old-age insurance system in China is highly fragmented, with different groups of people covered by different programs [1, p. 108]. The basic old-age insurance system is consisted of several old-age insurance programs, such as basic old-age insurance program for government workers, the Urban Employees' Pension Program, National Rural Pension Scheme and Urban Residents' Pension Program. The fragmentation in old-age insurance programs, including fragmentation within programs, results in large differences in the way people are treated concerning social security benefits [1, p. 113]. The fragmentation is also a cause of social inequality. Thus, Chinese central government has implemented reforms to unify basic old-age insurance programs. For instance, government employees and public institutions' workers were covered by separate pension program, paid for out of general revenues. Since 2015, basic old-age insurance program for government workers and other public institutions' workers was gradually reformed. The old-age insurance system for government workers and other public institutions is consisted of two programs, one is the Urban Employees' Pension Program, and the other one is the Occupational Annuity. Besides, the National Rural Pension Scheme and the Urban Residents' Pension Program were merged into one program — the Basic Old-age Insurance Program for Urban and Rural Residents.

2.1.1. Urban Employees' Pension Program

Urban Employees' Pension Program provides old-age benefits to urban employed workers. The pilot to establish Urban Employees' Pension Program was started in 1995, with a regulation issued by the Central Government in China. Urban Employees' Pension Program contains a social account and an individual account, and is contributed by employers and employees together. This is quite different from the program before this reform, which was paid by state-owned enterprises only.

Contributions. The contribution rate by employers for this program varies across regions in China. The central government recommends a total contribution rate of 28 percent of wages, of which the employee contributes 8 percent to an individual account, which is the same across China. The 20 percent rate the employer contributes to the social account for the basic pension is a standard suggested by the central government. The exact contribution rate for the social account can be decided by local government, and can be higher or lower. A regulation was issued in 2019 to unify contribution rate of social account to be 16% step by step. Currently, the contribution rate of social account differs in different areas in China. For instance, due to different degrees of population aging, the contribution rates for the social account in Guangzhou city and Shanghai city are 14 percent and 16 percent in year 2020, respectively.

Eligibility. Workers must have contributed 15 years to be eligible for monthly benefits when they retire. The retirement age is 60 for men and women working in certain professions, 55 for female managers, and 50 for other women. Retirement age is reduced for those working in hazardous occupations or who are seriously ill or disabled because of work.

Benefits. The retirement benefit consists of two parts — a basic benefit financed by the employer's contribution and an individual account benefit financed by the employee's contribution. The basic benefit from the social account pension is calculated by multiplying the following two elements. The first element is a percentage determined by total contribution years, where one contribution year equals 1 percent. The second

element is a number obtained by adding the social average wage of the year prior to the employee's retirement age with the average indexed monthly wage of the employee and then dividing by two. The social average wage used in this calculation is the average wage for the pooling area where the worker resides at the time of retirement. The average indexed monthly wage of the employee is adjusted for wage increases for every year of work before the person retires.

The monthly benefit based on the individual account is the credited balance in the worker's individual account at retirement divided by 139, for both males and females retiring at age 60. The divisor depends on the age at which the person collects benefits, but not on gender, with it being higher at lower ages. It is 195 for those retiring at age 50 and 170 for those retiring at age 55 in the urban pension system. This calculation does not vary across regions.

Once benefit payments have started for a worker, initial retirement benefits are adjusted to take into account changes in wage and price levels and the financial health of the program.

2.1.2. Basic Old-age Insurance Program for Urban and Rural Residents

Starting in 2009, the National Rural Pension Scheme is a voluntary program for people with rural registration aged 16 or older, who are not students and who do not participate in another pension plan. Starting in 2011, the Urban Residents' Pension Program, is a voluntary program for people with urban registration aged 16 or older, who do not have a job. As both programs provide old-age benefits for those who do not have formal jobs in urban areas (depending on whether they have urban or rural registration), the contribution regulation, government subsidy mechanism, eligibility requirements and benefits are quite similar. In the central government policy of establishing the Urban Residents' Pension Program in 2011, local governments are allowed to unify the National Rural Pension Scheme and the Urban Residents' Pension Program, which is a change that reduces fragmentation in old-age benefit provision. In 2014, these two programs were merged into one program — Basic Old-age Insurance Program for Urban and Rural Residents.

Contributions. As participants in the National Rural Pension Scheme and the Urban Residents' Pension Program do not have a formal job, anyone meeting the age requirements can contribute to these programs regardless of earnings, and the amount of the individual's contributions is not a fixed amount related to earnings. In the National Rural Pension Scheme, the contribution level regulated by central government is 100 to 500 yuan per year, divided into 100 yuan increments¹. Similarly, in the Urban Residents' Pension Program, yearly contribution amount varies from 100 yuan to 1,000 yuan, divided into 100 yuan increments². Participants can choose their contribution level within this range. But as both programs are managed by the county (district) or municipal government, the range of choice of contribution levels differs between different areas.

Local governments subsidize, through a matching contribution, the contributions of participants in the National Rural Pension Scheme and the Urban Residents' Pension Program. The lowest matching contribution, set by the central government, is 30 yuan per participant per year in both programs. Local governments, however, can raise the matching rate according to the financial ability of the government.

Eligibility. In both programs, to receive benefits, the person must have contributed 15 years and be at least 60 years old (the eligibility age for retirement). People aged

¹The Central Government of China. (2009) [Electronic resource]. URL: http://www.gov.cn/zw-gk/2009-09/04/content_1409216.htm (accessed: 20.04.2020).

²The Central Government of China. (2011) [Electronic resource]. URL: http://www.gov.cn/zw-gk/2011-06/13/content_1882801.htm (accessed: 20.04.2020).

60 or older before the start of the system can receive the basic benefit from government without having contributed.

Benefits. Both the National Rural Pension Scheme and the Urban Residents' Pension Program provide benefits to two different groups of people. The first is people who are currently age 60 or older, both for men and women. The basic benefit is 55 yuan a month in both programs and is financed by the central government in the central and western parts of China, but in the more prosperous eastern provinces it is financed half by the central government and half by the local governments [2, pp. 49–70]. Localities can increase the benefit amount above 55 yuan a month if they have the financial resources to do so.

The second group of people in these two programs is participants who are younger than age 60 and must contribute in order to receive benefits when they reach age 60. This benefit is provided based on the accumulation in the participant's individual account from the participant's contributions, accrued investment returns and non-contributory basic benefit amount.


2.1.3. Coverage and fund accumulation of basic old-age insurance program

The basic old-age insurance system develops fast in terms of participants and fund accumulation. For instance, the number of participants in the Urban Employees' Pension Program was 257.07 million in 2010, and it grew to 434.82 million by the end of year 2019. The number of participants of Basic Old-age Insurance Program for Urban and Rural Residents was 102.77 million in 2010, this number increased to 532.66 million in 2019 (as show in graph 1). It should be noticed that the National Rural Pension Scheme and the Urban Residents' Pension Program were established in 2009 and 2011, respectively. So the number of participants of the Basic Old-age Insurance Program for Urban and Rural Residents in 2010 only referred to participants of the National Rural Pension Scheme. Total number of participants in the basic old-age insurance program was 967.48 million by the end of 2019. It demonstrates that the participation rate of basic old-age insurance program in China is quite high.

With the continuous development of basic old-age insurance system and the increasing number of people participating in it, the income, expenditure and accumulated balance of the basic old-age insurance system have all increased greatly. As show in Table 1, Fund income, fund expenditure and accumulated balance of the Urban Employees' Pension Program in year 2010 were 1342 billion, 1055.5 billion and 1536.5, respectively. These numbers increased to 5206.3 billion, 4878.3 billion and 5418.1 billion, respectively. By the end of 2019, fund income, fund expenditure and accumulated balance of the Basic Old-age Insurance Program for Urban and Rural Residents were 402 billion, 311.4 billion and 815.6 billion, respectively, which were much smaller than that of the Urban Employees' Pension Program. This is because the contribution level of the Urban Employees' Pension Program is correlated with wage and is much higher than the contribution level of the Basic Old-age Insurance Program for Urban and Rural Residents. As it is showed in Graph 1, by the end of 2019, total number of participants in the Urban Employees' Pension Program (434.82 million) was lower than participants in the Basic Old-age Insurance System for Urban and Rural Residents (532.66 million).

2.2. The second tier – supplementary old-age insurance system

Enterprise Annuity and Occupational Annuity jointly constitute the second tier of China's old-age insurance system. These two programs are supplements to the Urban Employees' Pension Program and are provided to different groups of people. Enterprise Annuity is a voluntary old-age insurance program for enterprise employees and is contributed by enterprises and employees together. Occupational Annuity is kind of a mandatory program and is provided to government workers and other public institutions' workers. The Enterprise Annuity program was started in 2004 and the Occupational Annuity in 2015.



Graph 1. Number of participants in basic old-age insurance programs in China (Unit: Million)

Sources: Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the People's Republic of China; *Statistical bulletin on the development of human resources and social security undertakings* [Electronic resource]. URL: <http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/SYRlyzhshbzb/zwgk/szrs/tjgb/> (accessed: 20.04.2020).

Contributions. Both Enterprise Annuity and Occupational Annuity are jointly contributed by employers and employees. The total contribution rate of Enterprise Annuity cannot be higher than 12% of wage, and the contribution rate of the employer cannot be higher than 8%. The contribution rate of Enterprise Annuity can be negotiated and be settled down by employers and employees. The contribution rate of the Occupational Annuity is 12%, with the contribution of employers and employees being 8% and 4%, respectively. The contributions of Enterprise Annuity and Occupational Annuity are put into individual accounts.

Eligibility. Participants of the Enterprise Annuity and the Occupational Annuity can receive benefits when they arrive at retirement age or when they lose work ability entirely. When participants of these two programs migrate to other countries, they can apply for lump-sum payment of accumulated benefits of the individual account. Balance of these two programs is inheritable.

Benefits. Both Enterprise Annuity and Occupational Annuity are defined contribution programs. Benefits of these two programs are related to accumulation of contributions. Participants of Enterprise Annuity can choose to receive benefit monthly, in installments or in a lump sum. Participants of Enterprise Annuity can also use all or part of the funds in the individual account to purchase commercial old-age insurance products. In this case, participants receive benefits from commercial old-age insurance program according to the insurance contract regulations. Participants of Occupational Annuity can receive benefits monthly, or use all of the funds in the individual account to purchase commercial old-age insurance products and receive benefits according to insurance contract regulation.

Participants. Total number of participants in the Enterprise Annuity increased from 2008 to 2018. In graph 2, total number of participated enterprises was 33,100 in 2008,

Fund income, expenditure and accumulated balance of basic old-age insurance system, from 2010 to 2019 (Unit: billion)

Year	Urban Employees' Pension Program			Basic Old-age Insurance Program for Urban and Rural Residents		
	Fund income	Fund expenditure	Accumulated balance	Fund income	Fund expenditure	Accumulated balance
2010	1342.0	1055.5	1536.5	45.3 ^a	20.0 ^a	42.3 ^a
2011	1689.5	1276.5	1949.7	111.0	59.9	123.1
2012	2000.1	1556.2	2394.1	182.9	115.0	230.2
2013	2268.0	1847.0	2826.9	205.2	134.8	300.6
2014	2531.0	2175.5	3180.0	231.0	157.1	384.5
2015	2934.1	2581.3	3534.5	285.5	217.7	459.2
2016	3505.8	3185.4	3858.0	293.3	215.0	538.5
2017	4331.0	3805.2	4388.5	330.4	237.2	631.8
2018	5116.8	4464.5	5090.1	383.8	290.6	725.0
2019	5206.3	4878.3	5418.1	402.0	311.4	815.6

Sources: Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the People's Republic of China; *Statistical bulletin on the development of human resources and social security undertakings*[Electronic resource]. URL: <http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/SYrlzyhshbzb/zwgk/szrs/tjgb/> (accessed: 20.04.2020).


^a Note: The National Rural Pension Scheme and the Urban Residents' Pension Program were established in 2009 and 2011, respectively. So the fund income, expenditure and accumulated balance of the Basic Old-age Insurance Program for Urban and Rural Residents in 2010 was corresponding number of the National Rural Pension Scheme.

and it increased to 87,400 in 2018. We can see from the increase rate curve in Graph 2 that the increase rate of enterprises was higher than 10% during 2010 to 2014. It arrived at the highest level in 2012, being 21.83%. Then it decreased to the lowest level in 2016, being 1.06%. Since 2016, it had increased a little bit, and it was still lower than 10%, being 8.71% by the end of year 2018.

In Graph 3, total number of participated employees of the Enterprise Annuity was 10.38 million in 2008, and it was 23.88 million in 2018. The increase rate curve in Graph 3 shows that the increase rate was higher than 10% during 2008 to 2014. Since then it decreased tremendously, and the increase rate in 2017 was as low as 0.26%.


Data in Graph 2 and Graph 3 indicate that China's Enterprise Annuity has entered a low growth range, with the number of newly participated enterprises and the number of insured employees continuing to decline. How to improve the enthusiasm of enterprises to establish the Enterprise Annuity system and the motivation of employees to participate in the insurance system is an urgent problem.

Accumulation of funds. The development of Enterprise Annuity is uneven in different regions of China. The number of participated enterprises and employees in developed provinces along the east coast of China are higher than those in central and western regions and less developed provinces and cities. For example, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shanghai, Guangdong and Shandong and Beijing have more enterprises providing Enterprise Annuity than other provinces in China. In terms of accumulated funds, Shanghai, Beijing, Guangdong and Jiangsu have higher fund accumulation than other provinces. Detailed information on participated enterprises and accumulated funds in each province of China is provided in Table 2.



Graph 2. Participated enterprises of Enterprise Annuity, 2008 to 2018

Sources: Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the People's Republic of China; *Summary of business data of Enterprise Annuity fund in 2018* [Electronic resource]. URL: http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/shbxjjjds/SHBXJDSgongzuodongtai/201904/t20190402_313705.html (accessed: 20.04.2020).



Graph 3. Participated enterprises of Enterprise Annuity, 2008 to 2018

Sources: Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the People's Republic of China; *Summary of business data of Enterprise Annuity fund in 2018* [Electronic resource]. URL: http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/shbxjjjds/SHBXJDSgongzuodongtai/201904/t20190402_313705.html (accessed: 20.04.2020).

Participated enterprises and accumulated funds in each province of China in 2018


Province	Enterprises	Accumulated funds (billion)	Province	Enterprises	Accumulated funds (billion)
Zhejiang	15,077	36.7	Shaanxi	979	23.8
Fujian	13,473	29.6	Jiangxi	944	11.0
Shanghai	9,358	73.1	Shanxi	917	30.2
Guangdong	4,855	50.9	Hebei	876	14.8
Shandong	3,577	34.5	Xinjiang	836	8.7
Beijing	3,472	54.5	Chongqing	700	7.5
Guangxi	2,888	8.5	Hunan	675	13.9
Jiangsu	2,835	39.9	Neimenggu	599	12.0
Liaoning	2,355	17.9	Jilin	520	7.9
Tianjin	1,493	10.4	Gansu	475	10.6
Anhui	1,455	28.3	Guizhou	389	10.6
Yunnan	1,343	19.3	Ningxia	341	3.1
Sichuan	1,224	19.2	Hainan	216	0.8
Henan	1,212	19.6	Qinghai	203	3.1
Heilongjiang	1,059	8.7	Xizang	34	0.5
Hubei	1,010	21.7			

Sources: Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the People's Republic of China; *Summary of business data of Enterprise Annuity fund in 2018* [Electronic resource]. URL: http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/shbxjjds/SHBXJDSgongzuodongtai/201904/t20190402_313705.html (accessed: 20.04.2020).

Funds investment. Enterprise Annuity funds is invested in the capital market. By the end of 2018, the number of enterprise annuity portfolios was 3,929, and the amount of funds invested was about 1,450.2 billion yuan. The weighted average return on enterprise annuities in 2018 was 3.01%. Data in Graph 4 demonstrates that the weighted average rate of return of enterprise annuity fund fluctuated greatly from 2009 to 2018. For instance, the highest return rate was 9.88% in 2016, and the lowest return rate during these ten years was minus 0.78% in 2011. Data from *Summary of business data of Enterprise Annuity fund in 2018* shows that the return on assets of 42.66% of enterprise annuity fund was between 2% and 4%, the return on assets of 21.88% of enterprise annuity fund was between 0 and 2%, the return on assets of 33.51% of enterprise annuity fund was higher than 4%.

2.3. The third tier – Individual Tax-deferred Commercial Pension Insurance Program

Individual Tax-deferred Commercial Pension Insurance Program is the third tier of the multi-tier old-age insurance system in China. Commercial pension insurance is the main undertaker of individual pension plans. It can provide diversified and differentiated pension services for families and individuals, and meet the differentiated needs of residents in wealth management and risk control. Commercial old-age insurance program has developed for more than ten years in China. In 2007, a regulation to pilot commercial pension insurance in Tianjin city was issued by China Insurance Regulatory Commission. However, this experiment was stopped soon, as the tax preference rate was too high. On April 12, 2018, the Ministry of Finance, the State Taxation Administration, the Min-



Graph 4. Return rate of Enterprise Annuity funds' investment, 2009 to 2018

Sources: Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the People's Republic of China; *Summary of business data of Enterprise Annuity fund in 2018* [Electronic resource]. URL: http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/shbxjjjds/SBHXJDSgongzuodongtai/201904/t20190402_313705.html (accessed: 20.04.2020).

istry of Human Resources and Social Security of the People's Republic of China and several other departments in China jointly issued the regulation on the pilot project of Individual Tax-deferred Commercial Pension Insurance Program. This pension insurance program was piloted in Shanghai city, Fujian Province and Suzhou city in China.

By March 2019, a total of 23 insurance companies had obtained the qualification of carrying on tax-deferred commercial pension insurance business. By the end of December 2018, the pilot provinces and municipalities had covered a total of about 35,800 cases, with a total premium income of more than 60 million yuan and an average per capita premium of about 1,680 yuan¹. The insured personnel are mainly ordinary wage earner. It can be concluded that the development of Individual Tax-deferred Commercial Pension Insurance Program during the pilot period was not as good as expected and the scale was not large. This is mainly affected by the following reasons.

First, due to the reform of individual income tax policy in China, the preferential intensity of Individual Tax-deferred Commercial Pension Insurance Program is weakening and the target group of the pilot program is shrinking. According to regulation, during the pilot period, the limit that deducts before tax is 6% of monthly income or 1000 yuan, according to which is lower. Due to the increase of the individual income tax threshold (from 3500 yuan to 5000 yuan) and the implementation of the individual income tax special additional deduction policy, the pre-tax deduction standard of up to 1000 yuan is too low, which is not very attractive. Besides, even a few participants stop paying for the wait-and-see situation².

¹ Guo Gang. Suggestions on the pilot policy of tax-deferred endowment insurance[EB/OL]. 2019-01-22 [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://finance.ifeng.com/c/7jgn8WKWTtM> (accessed: 20.04.2020).

² Guo Gang. Suggestions on the pilot policy of tax-deferred endowment insurance[EB/OL]. 2019-01-22 [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://finance.ifeng.com/c/7jgn8WKWTtM> (accessed: 20.04.2020).

Second, the tax credit process is complex. The method of determining the pre-tax deduction according to the principle of which is lower is inconvenient and too complex to deal with in the process of specific business operations. In addition, according to the current regulations, when individuals purchase the tax-deferred commercial pension insurance by themselves, they need to log on to a designated platform to download the tax-deferred commercial pension insurance deduction certificate and to provide the certificate to the enterprise employer. Then the enterprise employer deducts the number provided in the certificate before counting the individual income tax. This operation process is complex.

3. Old-age insurance pension system in Russia

At first, the pension system in Russia worked under the Soviet-era distribution scheme. The pension budget was made of deductions from the total wage bill of enterprises, which was in harmony with planned economy system. China adopted the same old-age security system as that of Soviet-era. The Declaration of Russian State Sovereignty was adopted on June 12, 1990. A new period of history of the country and reorganization of its every state institution began at that time. Notably, social security was one of the first testing ranges for drastic modernization of the socioeconomic structure of new Russia. The shift to a market economy which was accompanied with high unemployment rates and bankruptcies of many large enterprises in the early 1990s made it impossible to support the consolidated pension system.

The Federal Law “On State Pensions in the Russian Federation” was adopted on November 20, 1990. That law set forth the formation of a new type of the pension system in Russia, fully autonomous from the union budget. The new Pension Law of Russia was quite radical for its time, considering the acute political and socioeconomic crisis that took grip of the entire post-Soviet space. The entire system of personal, sectorial, regional and other social benefits and differentiated pension supplements was terminated. A single pension system of Russia was established in its place. Article 1 of the Law “On State Pensions in the Russian Federation” declared “labor and its results” as the main criterion for differentiated terms and norms in the pension system. Hence, only two types of pensions — labor and social — were established to replace the former multifaceted and multilevel pension system.

In order to meet its social commitments, the government had to find better fiscal mechanisms adjusted to the new economic realities. A new financial institution, the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation (PFR), founded on December 22, 1990, was entrusted with those tasks. The country created its first autonomous off-budget system to fund social benefits and to provide sources of pensions. PFR money was formally separated from the federal budget but remained property of the Russian Federation. Such a structure of pension funds management was uncharacteristic of foreign pension models but it played an important role in the development of the social security system in Russia. Inter alia, it provided a certain degree of security to pension funds during periods of financial and economic instability.

Plummeting macroeconomic indicators and a surge in inflation rates in the first half of the 1990s drastically reduced purchasing capacity of the population. Seeking to prevent poverty amongst pensioners, the Russian government decided to regularly increase pensions, prioritizing support to disadvantaged citizens. A fixed-rate compensation for all pensions comparable with the minimal old age pension was introduced in November 1993. Real incomes of pensioners grew as a result. Pensions in Russia were growing more rapidly than wages already in the beginning of 1994, and an average pension was higher than the pensioner’s subsistence minimum. Besides, holders of labor and social pensions for the first time ceded their “leadership” amongst poorest Russian citizens to single parents and families with many children.

Modernization of the social security system and a rise in living standards of the most disadvantaged citizens became a primary objective of social reforms held by the government with the direct participation of the Pension Fund of Russia.

At present, Russia pays the following types of pensions: (1) Insurance pension (including old age; disability; loss of breadwinner) and funded pension; (2) State pension (including long service, old age, disability, loss of breadwinner); (3) Social pension¹.

(1) Insurance pension and funded pension. The Insurance pension program in Russia is compulsory and is the most common form of old-age security for citizens in Russia. A monthly payment compensating for the wage or another type of income citizens were receiving in the period of their work or compensating for the income unemployable members of the family of the insured person lost after his or her death. This program is contributed by employers. The contributions are divided into two parts: insurance part and deposit part. The premium rates for the insurance and savings sections have changed several times. The insurance part is a Pay As You Go program and pays benefits to existing retirees. A fixed-rate payment is established for the insurance part and the payment is subject to annual compensation according to inflation rates of the previous year. The deposit part provides funded pension. This is a confined contribution program and accumulates fund for individual retirement benefit. This is a lifelong monthly payment of pension savings formed with insurance contributions of employers and return on their investment.

An old age insurance pension is the most widely spread type of pension in Russia. Men older than 60 and women older than 55 qualify for this pension on the condition of the required labor record and the minimal amount of pension points (with due account of transitional provisions of the pension laws). Some categories of citizens can qualify for an insurance pension earlier. The lists of works, industries, professions, positions, occupations and institutions (organizations) that qualify for early retirement are approved by the Russian government.

A disability insurance pension is assigned to people with disabilities of the first, second and third groups on the condition of a labor record irrespective of its duration and irrespective of the cause of disability and the time of its appearance. Whether or not the person with disability is employed at the moment of the assignment of pension is not important.

A loss of breadwinner insurance pension is assigned to unemployable members of a dead breadwinner's family for whom the deceased breadwinner was providing. The exception is made for persons whose felony causing the death of the breadwinner is established by court.

(2) State pension. The State pension depends on the state budget allocation and provides benefits to state officials and special social groups. A monthly state payment to citizens compensating for their wage (income) lost upon the end of their federal public service due to old age (disability) retirement, or compensating for the lost income of cosmonauts or test pilots upon the end of their long service and retirement, or compensating for health damage suffered in the course of military service, radiation or man-made accidents, or compensating for disability or loss of breadwinner, or paid upon the achievement of the pension age, or paid to unemployable citizens as subsistence means.

A long-service state pension is assigned to federal civil servants, servicemen, cosmonauts and test pilots.

An old age state pension is assigned to citizens who suffered health damage in radiation or man-made accidents.

¹ Pension Fund of the Russian Federation [Electronic resource]. URL: http://www.pfrf.ru/en/pens_system/ (accessed: 20.04.2020).

A loss of breadwinner state pension is assigned to unemployable family members of killed (deceased) servicemen, citizens who suffered health damage in radiation or man-made accidents, cosmonauts.

A disability state pension is assigned to servicemen, citizens who suffered health damage in radiation or man-made accidents, WWII veterans, holders of the Besieged Leningrad Resident badge, and cosmonauts. The current employment is irrelevant for the assignment of a disability state pension.

(3) Private pension. If citizens choose private pension funds, this part of the funds will be included in the category of private pension. Private (supplementary) old-age security is a flexible form of old-age security, which exists as a supplement to the state pension and compulsory insurance pension. Private (supplementary) pension security includes a variety of private pension funds to which employers or employees themselves can contribute.

After years of reform, Russia now basically has a multi-tier pension system: state pension, mandatory social insurance pension and private supplementary pension. In 2017, the pension and social security system in the Russian Federation involved over 43 million pensioners or 56.58% of the economically active population of the Russian Federation (over 76 million people). Approximately 16 million people joined the state pension co-funding program. More than 7 million families with children received family (maternity) capital certificates, and over 90% of them used the lump-sum payment (equivalent to approximately \$10,000) on the improvement of their living conditions.

Table 3

Number of pensioners and pension amount in Russia, 2017(as of December 31)

Pension type	Number of pensioners (thousand)	Average value (ruble)
Insurance pension:	39 786	13 306
Old-age	36 311	13 762
Disability	2069	8530
Survivor	1406	8564
State pension:	3702	9400
Old-age	415	11 688
Disability	45	12 654
Survivor	6	9987
Long service	76	19 956

Sources: 2017 Annual Report of Pension Fund of the Russian Federation [Electronic resource]. URL: http://www.pfrf.ru/en/about/annual_report/ (accessed: 20.04.2020).

4. Comparison of old-age insurance system in China and Russia


In the process of transforming from planned economy to market economy, both China and Russia faced with major issues of pension reform. Transition from planned economy to market economy and aggravation of population aging are main reasons for the reform of pension system in both countries. Besides, worldwide professional organizations, such as the World Bank, had influence on both countries in the process of pension reform. In 1994, the World Bank published the report "Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and Promote Growth". This report pointed out that the sustainable development of the old-age insurance system was facing the challenge of population ageing and recommended three-tier old-age insurance as a possible solution

(namely public pension plans, occupational pension insurance and individual savings plans) [3]. In 2005, the World Bank published the report “Old Age Income Support in the 21st Century: an International Perspective on Pension System and Reform” [4]. The new report extended the three-tier old-age insurance system to a five-tier old-age insurance system. The first tier is the national pension or social pension that provides a fixed type of pension. The pension at this level comes from the state finance, and the citizens do not pay for it, aiming to provide the minimum level of living security for the citizens. The second level is contributive pension system, which is linked to income level to some degree, aiming to replace part of income. The third level is the mandatory individual savings account, which mainly adopts the contribution-determined (DC) fund accumulation mode managed by the pension company. The fourth level is flexible and diverse voluntary insurance. The fifth level is informal support among family members for the elderly, such as transfer payments, medical and housing expenditures within the family.

China and Russia have gradually established a multi-tier pension system, which is quite similar to the structure of the World Bank’s suggestion. Multi-tier old-age insurance system can balance the responsibilities of the government, enterprises and individuals. The real essence of multi-tier old-age insurance system is to adjust the structure of the whole pension system and the structure of the pension benefit. It means that multiple old-age insurance programs should be established to share the responsibility and burden of providing old-age benefit.

However, development of multi-tier old-age insurance system in China is uneven and the structure of multi-tier old-age insurance system is out of balance. The system is constituted with three tiers and with several different programs for different groups of people (Graph 5). It can be seen that the primary old-age insurance at the first level is developing rapidly in China, and the participation rate of Urban Employees’ Pension Program and Basic Old-age Insurance System for Urban and Rural Residents is relatively high, while the supplementary old-age insurance at the second and third tiers lags behind, resulting in the situation of “the first tier being dominant, and the second and third tiers being weak”.

First of all, in terms of participants, the number of people participating in the basic old-age insurance (Urban Employees’ Pension Program & Basic Old-age Insurance System for Urban and Rural Residents) is much higher than the number of people participating in the Enterprise Annuity and private commercial old-age insurance program. The coverage of the second and third tiers of old-age insurance is extremely limited. At the national level, 942.94 million people had participated in the basic old-age insurance



Graph 5. Multi-tier old-age insurance system in China

system by the end of 2018, including 523.92 million Urban Employees' Pension Program participants and 420.02 million participants of Basic Old-age Insurance Program for Urban and Rural Residents. By the end of 2018, only 23.38 million people had participated in Enterprise Annuities. According to the data from the National Bureau of Statistics of People's Republic of China, the number of urban employees was 434.19 million in 2018. Thus the participation rate of Enterprise Annuity was estimated to be about 5.5 percent, which is much lower than the participation rate of basic old-age insurance system. By the end of December 2018, the pilot provinces and municipalities had covered a total of about 35,800 cases of individual tax-deferred commercial pension insurance program. This program is underdeveloped.

Secondly, from the perspective of fund scale, the income and expenditure scale of basic pension fund is much larger than that of Enterprise Annuity fund and individual tax-deferred commercial pension insurance program fund. By the end of 2018, the accumulative balance of the basic pension fund for Urban Employees' Pension Program was 5090.1 billion yuan, the accumulative balance of the basic pension fund for Basic Old-age Insurance System for Urban and Rural Residents was 725 billion yuan, and the accumulative balance of the Enterprise Annuity fund was 1,477 billion yuan. The accumulative balance of the Enterprise Annuity fund accounted for about a quarter of the accumulative balance of the basic old-age insurance fund. Among the life insurance assets of commercial insurance companies in China, excluding related financial products, the accumulated old-age insurance assets are about one trillion yuan, which is far less than the scale of basic old-age insurance fund.

Differences also exist among old-age insurance system in China and Russia.

First, the pension system in Russia is far more comprehensive than the system in China. The pension system in Russia provides comprehensive and synthetic benefits to different groups of people. A series of drastic pension and social security reforms implemented in Russia over the past 30 years significantly broadened functions of the Pension Fund. In addition to paying labor and social pensions, the Pension Fund of Russia collects insurance contributions to the mandatory pension insurance system, pays all types of benefits to benefit holders and poor citizens, issues state certificates of family (maternity) capital to every family giving birth to a second child or more, implements the program of state co-funding of pensions, forms, invests and pays funds of the pension cumulative part to social security system participants and executes many other functions.

By comparison, the old-age insurance pension system in China only provides old-age benefits to participants to meet their basic life needs during retire period. The old-age insurance system in China is more targeted. No spouse benefits and disability benefits are provided in the old-age insurance system in China. Disability benefits are provided by another social insurance program — Work-Related Injury Insurance, in China.

Second, the participation rate of multi-tier old-age insurance system in China is much higher than that in Russia. In China, 942.94 million people had participated in the basic old-age insurance system by the end of 2018, including 523.92 million Urban Employees' Pension Program participants and 420.02 million participants of Basic Old-age Insurance System for Urban and Rural Residents. In 2017, the pension and social security system in the Russian Federation involved over 43 million pensioners or 56.58% of the economically active population of the Russian Federation (over 76 million people)¹. The participation rate of old-age insurance program in Russia was lower than that in China. Several reasons can explain for this. In China, central government and local governments provides financial subsidies for participants of Basic Old-age Insurance System for Ur-

¹ Data from *2017 Annual Report of Pension Fund of the Russian Federation* [Electronic resource]. URL: http://www.pfrf.ru/en/about/annual_report/ (accessed: 20.04.2020).

ban and Rural Residents. This is a strong and effective motivation for improving the participation rate of this program in China.

The Russian government often changes its pension policy for budgetary reasons, and the premium rates for the insurance part and deposit part have changed many times. As the insurance part is used directly to pay pensions to existing retirees, the government adjusted the policy and expanded the insurance part when the budget was tight. In 2005, because of the budget deficit of the Russian Pension fund, the deposit part of all citizens born before 1967 were cancelled, and these funds transferred to the insurance part. In 2013, citizens born in 1967 and after could chose a 2 percent deposit and 10 percent insurance or a combination of 2 percent savings and 14 percent insurance. By 2015, the deposit part became a voluntary part, and citizens can choose to participate or not participate at all. Many changes to the pension policy had also brought confusion to Russian citizens and to some extent had affected the credibility of the government [5, p. 109–120].

5. Conclusions

Both China and Russia had gone through similar process of economic reform and old-age insurance system reform. Multi-tier old-age insurance system has been established in these countries. This kind of system can balance the responsibilities of the government, enterprises and individuals. However, old-age insurance system reform has far from being finished. Both countries face the problem of low income and flexible employment groups having little incentive to participate in voluntary pension system. As the social and economic situation of these two countries is changing, both countries need to adjust the old-age insurance system. For instance, both countries are facing decreasing birth rate and increasing percent of old-age population. Population ageing puts pressure on sustainability of old-age insurance program and financial subsidies for old-age insurance system. Besides, economic downturn also puts pressure on old-age insurance system.

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Social Policy Transformation and Business Environment Improvement: a Comparative Analysis Based on China and Russia

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ABSTRACT

Over the past four decades, the economy and society of China and Russia have undergone transformation. Relevant social policies and business environments have constantly changed. So have the ways of interaction among governments, enterprises and citizens. In the relationship between government and citizen, China and Russia have walked different paths in choosing and adjusting social policies, but both have steadily improved people's well-being. In the relationship between government and business, both countries have achieved significant improvements in business environment through supply-side reforms of public goods and institutions. The theoretical relationship between government and citizen and that between government and business are embodied in social policy and business environment in reality. However, the two are not parallel, but interact with each other and are nested in each other. The government plays a leading role, and its interaction with enterprise and citizen tests the governance systems and capabilities of Beijing and Moscow.

Keywords: social policy, business environment, China, Russia, government-business relationship, government-citizen relationship

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I. Introduction

Over the past four decades, China and Russia have gone through major changes in the political, economic and social sectors and are in transformation, during which process, the government has been playing a leading role. Generally speaking, the government plays its role mainly in two ways — one is that the government adjusts its relationship with citizens through social policy modifications, and the other is that it modifies its relationship with enterprises through business environment changes, both of which are done simultaneously. In other words, the interaction between government and citizen and that between government and enterprise constitute the main part of institutional changes in the two countries, which are also an important perspective for scholars to observe the institutional and economic transformation in China and Russia. In recent years, it has been an impressive fact that the two countries have made the fastest progress in the World Bank's Rankings on Doing Business, and they have sustained stable social development. Globally, it is not easy for countries in transformation to achieve rapid amelioration of business environment as well as social order and harmony at the

same time. China and Russia are comparable in many aspects, both in terms of business environment and social policy, for the two nations used to have similar state-planning management systems, they have experienced the transformation from planned economy to market economy, and are both faced with the problem of how to formulate appropriate social policies to match the country's social development with its economic advancement.

The differences between China and Russia are undoubtedly stark. In the mode of evolution, China's reform has two basic characteristics. First, China takes the reform of economic system as its major task — that is, through reforms, China has transformed itself from a planned economy into a market economy and achieved the combination of socialism and the market economy, and thus promote the reform of social policies, turning citizens from “unit men” into “social men”. Second, it has carried out reforms gradually, starting with areas where there were fewer obstacles and strong consensus, and progressively extending the reforms into other areas, and beginning trials in frontier areas and gradually scaling them up nationwide. In this process, the political structure of the country has remained basically stable with its administrative system and reforms existing side by side. China has explored a unique path of reform and development since 1978, which is not the paradigm of western theories, but has enabled China to continuously improve its business environment, boost rapid economic growth and citizens' welfare, and guarantee long-term social stability over the past 40 years. In comparison, Russia's institution has evolved in a very different manner. Beginning in the early 1990s, Russia has embarked on radical, shock-like political and economic reforms, promoting an institutional transformation in a fairly short period of time. In this process, there was clear theoretical guidance and implementation plans at the beginning with continuous adjustments and improvements, gradually bringing order out of chaos, getting its economic and social development back on track, and leading to the establishment of the market economy system, with social policies sustaining a high level of guarantee.

Social policy and the business environment should be judged on the satisfaction of businesses and people, not by some developed countries or existing theories. The paths of reform in China and Russia differ greatly in the ways they manifest themselves and in the results they have produced. It is not fair to simply decide who is better or who is not, because an identical best option doesn't exist for countries with different political, economic, social, historical and cultural foundations. China's reform and development model has greatly enhanced both the country's overall national strength and its people's quality of life. There is no doubt that it has been very successful. However, the model is also prone to path dependence, and subsequent reforms will thus be more difficult. Russia's all-round subversive institutional transformation has made coordinated advancement of various supporting systems, but the short-term economic and social shocks require a long recovery. At present, the economic and social transformation in China and Russia is still under way.

Through the analysis of social policies and business environment, the main contexts of institutional changes in China and Russia can be observed. The key lies in the government and its role, and the play of the government's role mainly depends on the one-way relationship between the two groups — government-business relationship (government → business) and government-citizen relationship (government → citizen). The former is embodied in the business environment, while the latter in social policies. According to the World Bank Group's *Doing Business 2020*, China's business environment continues to improve significantly and it is now ranked 31st in the world, up 15 places from last year. Russia has moved up to 28th place from 31st last year, and has been climbing for years. It should be noted that in the World Bank's 2012 rankings of 183 economies on doing business, China ranked 91st, while Russia ranked 120th. At the same time, under the influence of social policies, the social security and public welfare

levels of China and Russia have also been continuously increasing. The employment, medical care, education and old-age security of the Chinese people have gone from “a low level and wide coverage” to “a higher level and full coverage”. Social policies have been increasingly functioning as support for those most in need. Significant progress has been made in poverty alleviation, and the minimum standards will be kept at “having enough to eat and to wear, and ensuring compulsory education, basic medical care and housing”. Compared with China, Russia had better social security and welfare systems from the start. Relatively high standards have been maintained in public services highly relevant to people’s lives, such as housing, water supply (both tap water and hot water), heating, power supply, gas supply, health care and education. A large number of free and low-charge services have greatly eased the financial burden of the people, but the excessive social welfare policies have also brought an albatross for the Russian government, and reform is hence imperative.

This article will study the changes in “government-business” and “government-citizen” relations in China and Russia based on the comparison of social policy changes and business environment improvements in the two countries, so as to shed light on the economic and social transformation they have been going through. Hopefully, this analysis offers experience and inspirations so that the two nations can learn from each other and make up for each other’s shortcomings to further promote economic and social development.

II. Analytical Framework

This paper intends to study the social policies and business environments in China and Russia from the perspective of the complex relationship among governments, enterprises, and citizens. A basic consensus has been reached that the relationship and interaction between governments, businesses, and citizens vary across countries. There are no two identical patterns in any two different countries in terms of the relationship between the three above-mentioned parties. Despite the fact the three parties are interacting with each other, researchers, for the sake of practicality, often focus on one specific relationship (i. e. government-market relationship, government-citizen relationship, and market-citizen relationship). It is worth noting that such a research method is bound with limitations as the interplay of different relationships may exert more impacts than one single relationship. For example, the government-market relationship is often investigated in the field of economics. However, whether it is reasonable and effective depends largely on the order of the society, such as the stability and harmony of the society, and the accessibility of development achievements. Many countries have been stuck in the “middle-income trap”, a phenomenon where economies stagnate when their per capita income reaches between 5,000 and 10,000 US dollars but the economic development results have not benefited the general public. It is characterized by intensified social conflicts and political unrest, as well as government and market failure.

As shown in the analytical framework (Fig. 1), the study will only probe into the unidirectional relationship between the government and market players as well as the government and citizens. The government-market relationship is conceptualized as the government-business relationship and presented as the business environment, which includes the governance competence and the government-business relationship. The government-citizen relationship is realized by social policies and manifested in the public goods and social well-being available to citizens. Besides, social organizations (e. g. NGOs) are another non-profit structure independent of government organizations, market players, and citizens. They can be categorized under “the institutional space between government and private enterprises”. Since they do not have a major bearing on citizens’ social well-being and business environment, they are excluded from this study.




Fig. 1. Analytical Framework

1. An Analysis of Business Environments from the Perspective of the Government-market Relationship

Market players are decentralized decision-makers that operate according to market mechanisms. Profitability is the most essential characteristic of market players. Another feature of market players is independence, mainly including the independence of property rights and the independence of the management right. The discussion on market-based resource allocation can be traced back to Adam Smith, who argued that the market is an “invisible hand” that can make the optimal allocation of various resources through price signals. Therefore, governments should not interfere with business practices and other economic activities, and the government that interferes least is the best government. Many subsequent economists have developed, through their research, a set of systematic theories of the efficient allocation of resources through market mechanisms. Those theories of classical liberalism have injected a great impetus to the development of capitalism. As time went by, however, the “myth of the free market” has been hit hard by reality, especially by the massive economic crisis that erupted in the capitalist world in the 1930s. The economic crisis seriously undermined the then existing economic order. And classical liberalism was no longer able to explain the problems of massive unemployment and product surplus, nor was it able to offer effective countermeasures. Against this backdrop, Keynesian Economics, based on state intervention and demand stimulation, was developed. It covers an array of aspects, including natural monopolies, externality, public goods, inadequate information, inequitable distribution, and economic fluctuations. In the face of market failures, governments must provide adequate institutional supply and guarantees for the policy implementation. Institutional supplies can be understood as the business environment for enterprises and social policies for citizens.

For enterprises, the business environment is the institutional supply of the government, whose role is mainly reflected in four aspects, namely organizing the supply of public goods, protecting enterprises’ property rights, formulating laws and macro decisions as well as rectifying the market order, resolving enterprise disputes, and supervising the implementation of laws to maintain market fairness. These four aspects are the major building blocks of the business environment. Compared with the market, the

government enjoys several unparalleled advantages such as the rights of taxation, prohibition and penalty imposition. By making the government responsible for certain tasks, transaction costs can be reduced. Besides, the absence of government will result in the free-rider problem, inadequate information, and adverse selection in the market, which would raise transaction costs. However, these costs can all be saved by the government through the provision of public goods and the establishment of social welfare systems.

However, the role of the government is limited. One of the representative theories for the study of government failure is the public choice theory, which was developed by Nobel Laureate James McGill Buchanan [1, p. 464]. It's different from Keynesian Economics and can be generally summarized into three aspects, that is, the inefficiency of government policies, the inefficiency of government institutions, and the rent-seeking of government. The public choice theory has put the shortcomings of government under the spotlight despite its efforts to improve the business environment as an institutional supplier.

It should be pointed out that a conducive business environment does not necessarily lead to economic prosperity, because economic development is also contingent on other factors, such as market structure, market size, factor characteristics, and resource endowment. Yet, the unfavorable business environment will certainly result in poor economic performance. Capital flight, lack of innovation, and brain drain are inevitable consequences of the deteriorating business environment.

2. An Analysis of Social Policies from the Perspective of the Government-citizen Relationship

Social policies are the most direct embodiment of the government-citizen relationship. They are also the most important livelihood issue in every country. Specifically, social policies cover such aspects as social security, culture, and education, health, urban planning and housing, population, employment, etc. In short, social policies refer to policies that are provided by the government and have a direct impact on the welfare of citizens. At present, social policies worldwide almost have formed a spectrum. In light of the difference in development stages, countries are faced with different social problems and thus have developed different understanding of social policies. In the face of diverse social problems, different principles of social policies and policy systems can be observed in different countries. Even one country's perception of social policies (i. e. connotations and value) may vary across different development stages. Although markets, families, and other social organizations may offer some public goods in modern society, the pivotal role of the government in social policies remains unchanged.

In addition to its leading role in formulating social policies, the government is also responsible for the development of other policies, such as economic policies, which are an important part of the business environment. In light of the complex relationships between the various types of policies, the trade-off between different policies is a test for governance competence. For example, in some developing countries, social policies are introduced to address social and livelihood issues that arise in the course of development. Therefore, they are seen as an adjunct to economic policies. Since the redistributive function of social policies is to shift resources from the productive sector to the non-productive one, the decline in the productive investment will have a negative impact on economic development. Then when the welfare states are faced with the economic recession, their governments are often criticized by the people because they think the bloated social spending has dragged down the economy. Therefore, social policies and economic ones are often seen as incompatible with each other during the period of economic downturn [2, p. 163].

Obviously, such opinion is one-sided as it fails to realize that social policies also perform the function of social investments. Social policies, such as education and

health ones, can help people to realize their potential, which can be deemed as the investments in human capital. By investing in production factors, social policies can improve the total factor productivity. At present, social policies and economic policies are no longer considered to be incompatible but interactive. For example, the close alignment of social policies with the labor market can improve social productivity and boost economic development. Accordingly, economic growth can also promote social stability.

In reality, appropriate social policies can enable the citizens to fully enjoy the public goods at a given level of national economic development, such as the increased quantity and quality of education services, health care, pensions, and unemployment protection. More often than not, they are major indicators used by the general public to evaluate the performance of the ruling party and its leaders since they can be easily observed and felt. Such personal feelings will in turn be translated into votes at elections. Thus, in an electoral democracy where “the vote comes first”, leaders or the candidates tend to make over-the-top promises on public services so as to meet the public expectations. Such social policies, with a lack of rigorous reasoning, will incur enormous fiscal pressure if implemented to the ground.

3. The Evolution of the Government-market Relationship and Government-citizen Relationship in China and Russia

As China and Russia are currently in transformation, the government-market player relationship, and the government-citizen relationship in the two countries exhibit different patterns. But both countries are steadily moving toward greater optimization in terms of the business environment and social policies. Moreover, their goal orientation is highly similar, which is to build an enabling government, an effective market, and an ordered society.

Since the implementation of reform and opening up, China's economic system has transformed from the planned economy with the unitary public ownership to the market economy with diverse forms of ownership, leading to rapid industrialization and urbanization. China has basically realized the transformation from an agricultural country to an industrial one, with the share of agricultural output falling to 7.1% and the resident population in rural areas to 39.4%¹. As a result, China's social structure has witnessed a dramatic change. People who used to be bound by their employers, who was called “unit men” have become “social men”. The relaxed household registration system has greatly improved the freedom of population movement. At the same time, the accumulation of capital and the “Matthew effect” of the market economy has broadened the gaps in income and wealth between the rich and the poor. The above-mentioned changes in the economic base and the superstructure, as well as the large-scale population movement between urban and rural areas and between regions, have led to a fundamental change in the relationships between the government, market players, and citizens. China has continuously explored the transformation of government functions through economic system reform, so as to clarify the boundary between the government and the market. Government leaders have repeatedly stressed on many occasions that the transformation of government functions is to solve the problem regarding the relationship between the government and the market and that between the government and society. It aims to further leverage the fundamental role of the market in resource allocation through streamlining administration and delegating powers, thus unleashing the creativity of market players and enhancing the internal forces powering economic growth. The government needs to focus on creating a sound development environment, providing quality public services, and maintaining social justice [3, p. 293].

¹ http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/202002/t20200228_1728913.html

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has been in the process of economic transformation. And in the 1990s, the imperfect domestic laws and regulations and economic system, as well as frequent problems such as corruption, and abuse of power, made Russia an unfavorable investment destination. The abrupt turn to the market economy by the government marked radical approaches in pursuing privatization. With a lack of supporting regulations to restrain illegal activities, the management of state assets was stuck in chaos. As a result, appropriation of state assets as well as the corruption of government officials and businessmen occurred frequently. It not only discouraged the inflow of foreign capital but also led to the outflow of domestic capital. Since the beginning of the new century, the government of the Russian Federation has been committed to improving the market economy system, increasing administrative efficiency, and law-based governance, leading to an improved business environment. Although Russia is renowned for its “radical” reforms in the political and economic fields, public policies related to people’s livelihood are in many respects consistent with those in the era of the Soviet Union. The essence of some policies remains unchanged. It is clear that there is an inevitable connection between the public policies on housing, health care, employment, and education during Russia’s political and economic transition period and its smooth social transition. It is precisely those public security policies, which remain fundamentally unchanged, that have weakened the impact of the radical social transition and enabled Russia to survive multiple crises.

III. A Comparative Analysis of China and Russia in Social Policy Transformation

1. China’s Social Policies: From Economy-driven to Science-based

Under the planned economic system before the reform and opening up, two sets of social policy systems respectively for urban and rural areas were established in China. In rural areas, farmers received basic security in various fields through collective economic organizations, mainly including product distribution, medical and health services, basic education, and other social relief and aid. In urban areas, citizens and employees received basic livelihood services mainly through government and state-owned institutions, which covered employment, rationing of basic daily necessities and low-cost supply, medical and health services, education services, housing, and relief for employees in difficulty. This set of social security systems and policy systems was inclusive and comprehensive, but due to the limited financial capacity at that time, the supply of basic daily necessities was in shortage, the level of livelihood security was low, and there was a significant urban-rural gap and regional imbalance.

Since 1978 when the reform and opening up started, China’s social policies have developed and improved. By now, this process can be roughly divided into three stages.

Stage One: The economic social policies for rural areas alleviated poverty, while those for urban areas helped in stabilizing. The household contract responsibility system with remuneration linked to output implemented in China in the early 1980s delegated power to rural areas, which motivated farmers and lifted more than 300 million of them out of absolute poverty. This reform benefited farmers and improved their basic living conditions. It was an economy-oriented social policy and did not feature the welfare and redistribution of general social policies. However, such an economy-oriented social policy increased farmers’ income by giving them autonomy and providing them with development opportunities, which made also it a social policy. In the mid-1980s, the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in urban areas promoted the efficiency of corporate operations, but it also caused problems such as unemployment and loss of pensions for employees. At that time, the government introduced a series of social security policies, with the ultimate

goal to change the existing practice of “SOEs undertaking social security” to reduce the burden on SOEs. Specifically, it was about implementing market- and society-oriented reforms of the original social security system. Those reforms promoted the development of urban communities, which started to undertake the settlement of the unemployed, the assistance to impoverished households, and pensions. Social services relying on urban communities eased the impact of the SOE reform.

Stage Two: Social policies complemented social transformation under the accelerating marketization and urbanization. Entering the 21st century, marketization, industrialization, and urbanization accelerated in China. During the transformation of social structure, more social conflicts escalated. A large number of social problems caused by the one-sided emphasis on economic growth concentrated in urban communities. Since 2003, the government has formulated a large number of social policies to solve the most pressing and immediate problems of interests that concerned the people most, including measures for the administration of relief, legal aid services, urban medical insurance, rural cooperative medical insurance, minimum subsistence allowance, and social pension insurance. In 2006, the agricultural tax in place for thousands of years was cancelled. The promulgation and implementation of these social policies improved people’s well-being by satisfying people’s basic needs. But at the same time, to a certain extent, those social policies still lagged behind economic development, serving only as complements and remedies. They made up for the social problems caused by the one-sided emphasis on economic growth and the neglect of social transformation and played a role in promoting social progress [4, p. 71].

Stage Three: Social policies are more scientific, standardized, and institutionalized, which satisfy people’s needs for a better life. With the social and economic development in China, people had higher demands on material and cultural life, and more demands on democracy, rule of law, fairness, justice, and environment, while the supply of institutions and services from the government in this realm was relatively insufficient. After the forming of the new Central Government in 2012, in response to the changing social needs, the formulation and implementation of social policies have become more scientific, standardized, and institutionalized. For example, social assistance, social security, and poverty alleviation policies have been more targeted so that everyone who is entitled to such allowances receives them. Medical care and old-age care have shifted from “a low level and wide coverage” to “a higher level and full coverage”. At the same time, deviations in the implementation of policies have been corrected for greater social justice. In the resolution of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, it was pointed out that to secure and improve people’s living standards in development, we should do everything in our capacity; we should see basic needs are met, prioritize key areas, improve institutions, and guide public expectations. ¹ The reformed social policies have greatly improved people’s well-being, seeing the gains of economic development benefit all our people in a fairer way, and the people’s sense of fulfillment has been greatly improved.

Over the past 40 years of reform and opening up, China’s social policies have grown from ambiguous and subordinate to clearer and independent. In the first 20 years of reform and opening up, social policies were mixed with economic policies, which can be called economy-driven economic policies. At the beginning of this century, the concept of social policies gradually became clearer under a deeper understanding of the importance of social issues. In practice, a large number of social policies were issued in a short period, which were complementary or compensatory. In recent years, social policies have become more scientific and institutionalized, when policy makers have recognized the dialectical relationship between economic and social policies, as well as

¹ http://www.gov.cn/zhuanti/2017-10/27/content_5234876.htm

the mutual support between economic growth and social progress. Appropriate social policies have promoted the political identity of the people and increased their sense of fulfillment and happiness. Comparatively, the current social policies are better adapted to the economic structural reform and social transformation. However, compared with developed economies, China's social policies and security capabilities are still in the initial stage at an overall low level. There is huge room for quality improvement and field expansion.

2. Russia's Social Policies: From a Stabilizer to a New Round of Reforms

Russian social policies have run through the entire process of its political and economic transformation. Paragraph 1, Article 7, Chapter 1 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation states, "The Russian Federation is a social state whose policy is aimed at creating conditions for a worthy life and a free development of man"¹. This is the most important definition from the constitution for the form of government of Russia and the practical legal basis for Russia's social policies. The Russian government believes that ensuring social welfare and security for residents to maintain a decent life and dignity is an important guarantee for economic transformation. After the start of the transition, Russia has not made significant changes to the social security system of the Soviet Union. Despite the difficulties in the transition process, the Russian government has never legally abdicated the fulfillment of the state's basic obligations to the society and insisted on the continuation of the free education and healthcare for all. Although there was a large gap of wealth in the Russian society at the time, the basic life of the majority in the society was guaranteed, adding with the mainstream unwillingness to return to the Soviet era, the society could well afford the high cost of the transition. In the Yeltsin era, despite the lack of fairness and efficiency in the nation's development, the society was still in order, which probably had much to do with the preservation and inheritance after the radical transition of the social security system established during the socialist period.

In the post-Yeltsin Russia, the government made huge investments in social security and improvement of people's living standards. The improvement of social security and welfare, including the increasingly improved social development indicators in education, medical care, health, and environment, partially flattened the political and economic fluctuations and cushioned the impact of changes in the internal and external development environment on the Russian society. When taking office, Putin further strengthened Russia's social policies, specifically, first to raise the income of residents, and second to improve and better implement the existing social security system. During the 2008 financial crisis, Russia transformed the gains of economic growth into welfare for the people. Those coping strategies endowed social policies with special missions, which not only eased the strong impact of the crisis, but also played a role as a social stabilizer. During that time, social policies promoted the development of the nation. To be specific, firstly, it promoted the accumulation of human capital for the long-term development of the nation; and secondly, it helped the society to expand reproduction. In this sense, Russia's social policies started to shift from maintaining social stability to promoting economic growth [5, p. 82].

In 2018, Putin was re-elected as President of Russia, which signaled that Russia's domestic and foreign policies were more stable. However, against the backdrop of overall stability, the social dissatisfaction accumulated by the negative economic conditions and the low living standards of the residents has not been released, and the effectiveness of the federal government in domestic governance is showing a trend of diminishing marginal effects. In addition to rising commodity prices and overall poverty in the eco-

¹ <http://www.ksrf.ru/Docs/Constitution/Pages/Chapter1.aspx>.

nomic aspect, the inefficient operation of the Russian social security system, increasing spending on housing and public utilities, and the polarization between the rich and the poor are also prominent social issues. Reform of social policies has now become the consensus of the entire Russian society. The major groups supporting the reform are young people, low-income groups, middle class, retirees, and civil servants, who almost form the backbone of the Russian society. In the view of Russian people, “the field most in need of reform” was people’s livelihood, which meant increasing wages and pensions, and improving living standards, as showed in the public opinion follow-up survey for the past two years by Levada Center, a Russian polling organization. In addition, reducing the cost of housing and public utilities, monitoring the prices of necessities, and facilitating medical treatment were also reforms that Russian people thought necessary [6, p. 78]. Were the reform of social policies slow or unsuccessful, people’s demands for social and economic reforms would spread to the political realm. Considering this, in recent years, Russia has taken maintaining social and economic development and improving people’s well-being as the main direction of the work of the government. In his State of the Union Address 2020 released in January 2020, Putin also pointed out that “our society is calling for change”. Again, focusing on issues such as the economy and people’s livelihood, he proposed a series of specific policies on stimulating childbirth, increasing residents’ income, and optimizing the medical care system.

Russian people generally pin the hope of social policy reform on the government. They expect that the state power, symbolized by President Putin, can come forward to solve the existing social and economic problems. This attitude can be found not only among the middle-aged and elderly people, those with low-income and less-educated population and residents in small and medium-sized cities, who usually make positive comments on the current regime, but also among young people who are critical of the current regime and most of the high-income and well-educated groups. This is because, in Russia, the relationship between the state and society is understood differently from that in the West. The state power of Russia acts as a “parent” of the society, instead of an institution that establishes equal contractual relations with different social groups. This role of the government is manifested by both the state’s control of social spheres and the corresponding responsibilities and obligations that it assumes. This reflects the pragmatic attitude of the public towards the state power, that is, the state power has the responsibility and obligation to meet the needs of the people, while the people are not willing to sacrifice personal interests for reforms. At the same time, there are still some people who want to solve their personal problems through active civic actions, including participation in elections, charity, volunteering, and opposition-organized protests.

IV. A Comparative Analysis of China and Russia in Improvements of Business Environment

1. Business Environment and the World Bank’s Doing Business

The business environment is perceivable to companies. The decision of a company to invest in a certain place, in fact, is determined by two major factors, the market environment and the business environment. The former mainly includes market-related factors, such as industrial chain support, labor cost, transportation cost, etc. The latter is mostly about the government, such as the legal and policy environment, the administrative environment, fair competition, intellectual property protection, etc. In the above-mentioned analysis framework of the relationship between government and market players (enterprises), there is a clear logic lying in that the government improves the business environment through supplying public products (including both institutional

supply and the supply of specific public products such as electricity and roads), but in real economic operation, the relationship between the government and the market is not only unclear, but also changeable, possibly according to time, causes, places, and even people. This is especially common in economies in transition. Both China and Russia are economies in transition, where the relationship between the government and the market is still relatively unstable. The key to improving the business environment is essentially to handle the relationship between the government and the market. In short, the government must first achieve the “three noes”, namely no absence for necessary administration, no redundant intervention, and no misplacement of authority. “No absence for necessary administration” means that the government must do its job well, such as maintaining macroeconomic stability, optimizing public services, strengthening market regulation, ensuring fair competition, promoting common prosperity, and boosting eco-friendly development. “No redundant intervention” means that the government never does what it should not do, such as the intervention in the decision-making and operation of micro-entities. “No misplacement of authority” means that what the government should and should not do shall be very clear without any vagueness.

It is gratifying that in the past decade, governments of both China and Russia, two large economies in the process of institutional transformation, have provided high-quality public products and institutional supply to enterprises through comprehensive and in-depth institutional reforms, seeing great improvements of their business environment. It can be said that governments of both countries have reshaped the relationship between the government and enterprises, which provides the most solid institutional guarantee for the two countries to attract foreign investment and stimulate vitality in the future. To compare the business environments and their changes in China and Russia under the same framework, this article refers to *Doing Business*, a World Bank's report.

Doing Business is a flagship product published by the World Bank since 2003. *Doing Business 2020* is the 17th issue in this series of annual reports. Based on a set of methodologies and evaluation systems specifically designed and established by the World Bank, the report compares and evaluates the ease of doing business in 190 economies worldwide by collecting and quantifying policies and data under 12 key topics of business regulation that affect the life cycle of enterprises, including starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting minor investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, resolving insolvency, labor market regulation, and government procurement. Among them, the data of ten indicators (excluding labor market regulation and government procurement) are calculated to determine the score and ranking of the ease of doing business. This set of indicators is comparable, with more data collected from enterprises, which is designed in a scientific manner. Promoting reforms according to this set of indicators can help the government to improve the efficiency of work and facilitate business activities of companies. Thus, the report is considered to be the most authoritative evaluation system for the business environment in the world.

2. Performance of China and Russia in *Doing Business 2020*

China has a doing business (DB) score of 77.9 (which means that China has made 77.9% of the best of the world), up by 3.9 compared with that of last year; and a DB rank of the 31st, up by 15 places, according to *Doing Business 2020* (Table). Under the evaluation standards of the World Bank, the Chinese government has benchmarked developed economies and international norms, formulated special standing books for reform tasks, clarified reform goals, responsible departments, and time nodes, and completed over 130 reform measures. In China, recent years have seen significant breakthroughs in the reform of institutions and mechanisms such as protecting medium and minor investors and dealing with construction permits. Except the “getting

credit” indicator, which remains unchanged, the other nine indicators have all improved. Due to its vigorous advancement of the reform agenda, China ranks among the top ten economies with the largest improvement in the global business environment for the second year in a row. The performance in the indicators of paying taxes, getting credit, and trading across borders is still lagging behind. However, with the implementation of tax cuts and fee reductions since 2019, the ranking of “paying taxes” should further move up. There are also the “Regulations on Optimizing Doing Business Environment” formulated by the State Council, which came into force on January 1, 2020. Aiming at the prominent shortcomings of China’s business environment and the problems, difficulties, and obstacles reported by market players, the regulations set rules to improve systems and mechanisms, benchmarking developed economies, which will encourage China to intensify its efforts to deepen reforms and expand opening up, adhere to the principles of marketization, rule of law, and internationalization, and continue to advance toward the goal of building a world-class business environment.

Russia’s business environment was ranked the 28th, up by three places from the 31st last year, as showed in *Doing Business 2020*. In the past year, Russia undertook three important reforms, namely faster access to electricity, simplified taxation requirements, and increased requirements for company transparency to protect of the rights of minor investors. Russia business environment was ranked the 120th in 2012. In May of the same year, President Putin issued a decree, instructing the government to take measures to improve the ranking of Russia’s business environment. In 2017, Russia’s ranking rose to the 40th. In 2018, it further made it to the 13th, thanks to the improvement of the regulatory environment for small and medium-sized enterprises

Table

World Bank’s DB Rankings and Scores of China and Russia

Item	Ranking in 2020		DB Score 2020		DB Score 2019		DB Score Change (%)	
	China	Russia	China	Russia	China	Russia	China	Russia
Overall	31	28	77.9	78.2	74.0	77.4	3.9	0.8
Starting a Business	27	40	94.1	93.1	93.4	93.0	0.7*	0.1
Dealing with Construction Permits	33	26	77.3	78.9	65.2	78.4	12.1*	0.5
Getting Electricity	12	7	95.4	97.5	92.0	94.0	3.4*	3.5*
Registering Property	28	12	81.0	88.6	80.8	88.6	0.2	0
Getting Credit	80	25	60.0	80.0	60.0	80.0	0	0
Protecting Minor Investors	28	72	72.0	60.0	62.0	58.0	10*	2*
Paying Taxes	105	58	70.1	80.5	67.9	79.6	2.2*	0.9*
Trading across Borders	56	99	86.5	71.8	83.4	71.8	3.1*	0
Enforcing Contracts	5	21	80.9	72.2	79.0	72.2	1.9*	0
Resolving Insolvency	51	57	62.1	59.1	55.8	58.4	6.3*	0.7

Note: “*” indicates significant reforms of business environment to make it easier to do business. The cities covered in China are Shanghai and Beijing, while those in Russian Federation are Moscow and Saint Petersburg. Weight allocation is adjusted according to population.

(SMEs). It is not easy to achieve this result. It may be easy to improve the ranking from the bottom position, but going up, all countries are trying to improve their business environment, which makes it more difficult to improve the ranking every year. Compared to the more mature markets of developed economies, the Russian market still has certain problems and hidden dangers in terms of security. Nevertheless, in recent years, the government of the Russian Federation has made continuous efforts to ameliorate the business environment, for example, by formulating laws and regulations that are in line with the interests of corporate development. Improving the business environment has become an important part of Russia's development goals. These efforts have brought remarkable improvement to its business environment, which is recognized by the World Bank.

3. Shared Features of the Business Environment Improvement of China and Russia

The sample cities evaluated by the World Bank on the business environment are the two largest business cities in a country, which means that this index may not fully represent the business environment in all regions of the country. China has a large population and huge regional development differences. Russia is vast and has a large number of federal entities. For both countries, it is obviously not enough to improve the business environment for just the two largest cities. The practice to improve the business environment in the two cities shall be duplicated and popularized in other regions, which requires the governments to summarize experience (mainly from Shanghai, Beijing, Moscow, and Saint Petersburg). This article summarizes and refines these highly practical shared features into the following two "environments". To some extent, they are also the best form of the government-enterprise relationship.

Firstly, a good administration environment makes enterprises more "comfortable" and "easy". The core of a good administration environment is to create a transparent and efficient government and to strive to provide regulated, convenient, and efficient government services for market players. It is necessary to break policy restrictions to create a fair and just market environment for enterprises in terms of market access, approval and licensing, management and operation, as well as tenders and bidding. With a focus on the full life cycle of market players, it is necessary to comprehensively facilitate starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting water and electricity, getting credit, registering property, and paying taxes, and realize "one-off procedures handled quickly at a nearby agency" for the whole process from registration to cancellation, which will release most enterprises in the market environment from unnecessary formalities. For example, in China, deepening the reform of streamlining the government, delegating power, and improving government services and accelerating the construction of the e-government have played a critical role in the comprehensive implementation of "handling at one window, through one network, with one certificate and one code, one-off at one place". China vigorously promotes the transformation of government functions and make efforts to create a service-oriented, efficient, and transparent government, so that enterprises and the people can deal with government-related affairs quickly and get them perfectly done without interpersonal networking, "back-door" deals, or bribery.

Secondly, a good environment for the rule of law is more "reassuring" and more "relieving" to enterprises. The rule of law makes the best business environment. Optimizing the business environment requires the security of the rule of law to consolidate the fundamentals, stabilize expectations, and benefit in the long run. It is necessary to adhere to the mindset and approaches of the rule of law in considering issues, doing things, making decisions, and tackling difficult problems. Governments shall perform the functions that have been prescribed by law while refrain from acting where the law has not authorized them to act. We should strive to create the most open, transparent, just

and fairest, world-class environment for the rule of law. At the same time, we should crack down on crimes to ensure social safety.

V. Conclusion

This article analyzes social policy transformation and business environment improvements in China and Russia focusing on the government-enterprise and government-citizen relationships and their changes. The common ground in logic is that appropriate social policies ensure the basic needs of the people to be satisfied, including infant care, education, employment, medical care, aged care, housing, and aids for the vulnerable. This is not only what people yearn for, but also makes a more harmonious and resilient society, guaranteeing people a life with dignity. Moreover, only by creating a stable, fair, transparent, and predictable business environment can we release the momentum of innovation and entrepreneurship in the whole society, make the society more dynamic, and guarantee free and comprehensive development for the people. Forming a harmonious, resilient, and dynamic society is the goal of countries in transition in promoting reforms and pursuing development. The comparative analysis above leads to the following conclusions.

Firstly, in countries in transition, which need to take into account reforms, development, and stability, the government still leads the transformation of political systems, economic development, and social policy changes. A powerful, effective, and capable government is the most critical element in the triple transformation of politics, economy and society, whose institutions and systems and governance capabilities determine the improvement of the business environment (economic development) and social policy changes (social development). China and Russia are typical cases. However, it is worth noting for the government that social policies centered on the improvement of citizen's welfare is fairness-oriented, while the improvement of the business environment centered on the convenience of business operations is efficiency-oriented. In the government-market relationship, enterprises are recipients of the business environment, who receive investment protection, contract enforcement, provision of public facilities, and other "public goods" provided by the government. In the government-citizen relationship, citizens are recipients of social policies, who receive education, medical care, pension, and other "public goods" offered by the government. The relations between citizens and enterprises are established through the market system. Citizens and enterprises make two-way selection to achieve job matching (Fig. 2). However, in countries with systems in transition, the establishment and improvement of the market mechanism are inseparable from government governance and the business environment. For example, in China, the improvement of the business environment is the transformation of government functions as well as the improvement of the market-oriented economic system. Moreover, a well-functioning market system also contributes to the implementation of social policies. It provides financial support for social policies. Besides, some market-based services introduced in social policies help to improve the efficiency of implementation and effects of the policies (such as the market-based supply of non-essential medical, education, and pension services).

Secondly, the government, enterprises, and citizens interact with each other constantly. Social policy changes and improvements in the business environment are only the results of this interaction. The first is the effect of enterprises and markets on the government. Only with economic growth, can citizens' needs for high quality products be met. Moreover, enterprises and markets are the main source of financial funds for the government. Only when the government has its financial capacity secured, can it provide better public goods and services and maximize the positive function of social policies. Also, market players can participate in the production of public services and




Fig. 2. Business Environment and Social Policies Led by the Government

take some load off the government. A good operating system or mechanism can further reduce the shortcomings in the implementation of social policies and lessen the difficulty of government management. The second is the effect of the government on the market. The government improves the business environment, conducts macro-control, and maintains stable and healthy development of the economy. At the same time, it carries out market regulation and improves the system of social security policies to lower business costs and enhance citizen welfare. Thus, the interaction in these relationships is not static, parallel, or unidirectional, but dynamic, nesting with each other, and bidirectional or multidirectional.

Thirdly, the government shall perform the functions that have been prescribed by law while refrain from acting where the law has not authorized it to act. It shall improve the business environment to allow enterprises to create wealth more efficiently and optimize social policies to allow people to share social wealth more equitably, ultimately achieving a good situation of an effective market, a capable government, and a well-ordered society. A good business environment requires the government to do something by facilitating business operations and reducing institutional transaction costs, while not to do something — not to interfere with the micro-operations of enterprises, allowing the market to play a decisive role in resource allocation. At the same time, the government must take the initiative in social policies. The market improves the efficiency of resource allocation, which, however, may lead to a widening disparity between the rich and the poor. The imbalance of distribution will ultimately affect the efficiency of economic development, which is not conducive to the smooth progress of social reproduction, even resulting in increased cyclical fluctuations in the economy. Therefore, in countries in transition, especially those with stable governance conditions, the government needs to improve citizens' welfare with appropriate social policies, promote the improvement of citizens' income and consumption capacity, avoid the periodic ups and downs in economic operation, and ensure the long-term stable development of the society and economy.

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Innovative Exploration of Township Government in constructing a New System of Rural governance

(Based on the Survey Report of the Squatting Research in Hengli Town, Dongguan city, Guangdong Province, China)

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ABSTRACT

Township governance is the foundation of national governance, related to the vital interests of ordinary people, affecting the stability and development of the country. At present, China's economic growth are entering adjustment after transformation, the development and changes of the economic foundation needs a new concept of social governance, grassroots governance must focus on the new era of new requirements, from a strategic height to grasp the law of development of the township governance, governance from the Angle of practice innovation, promote social governance system construction needs to insist on the guidance, this article through to the horizontal drain in the town of Dongguan city, Guangdong province in grass-roots community diversity co-government everybody is responsible for building, everyone is responsible for all the analysis of the community of social governance of exploration and practice, put forward to further improve township government countermeasures for establishing a new system of rural governance. In Hengli Town, positive measures are explored to improve the township level administrative management system and promote collaborative innovation of rural social governance in township governance capacity, providing reference for building a new system of rural governance and exploring the township level administrative management system.

Keywords: township government; rural governance; coordinated co-governance; institutional innovation; social governance community

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I. Investigation background and problem analysis of the Squatting Research in Hengli Town, Dongguan City

National governance involves institutional arrangements in multiple fields and dimensions, including politics, economy, culture, society and ecological civilization. The social governance system is an important part of the national governance system. The third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee clearly proposed to “promote institutional innovation in the social field and accelerate the formation of a scientific and effective social governance system”. On April 4, 2017, the party central committee and the State Council issued “on the strengthening and improvement of urban and rural

community governance of opinion” pointed out that to strengthen and improve the urban and rural community governance to the grass-roots party organization construction as the key, guided by the demands of residents, improve urban and rural community governance system, enhance the level of urban and rural community governance and swallow the urban and rural community governance, promote the party under the leadership of the government governance and social regulation, positive interaction pattern of residents autonomy, improve urban and rural community governance under the rule of law, scientific, fine level. The report to the 19th National Congress of the COMMUNIST Party of China (CPC) pointed out that we should strengthen the construction of social governance system, improve the social governance system featuring party committee leadership, government responsibility, social coordination, public participation and rule of law, and build a social governance pattern featuring joint contribution, joint participation and Shared benefits.

(I) The investigation background of Hengli Town in Dongguan city

In recent years, Dongguan vigorously strengthen social management system and modernization of the social governance ability of practice and exploration, in January 2017, Dongguan city, introduced the Dongguan about raising the ability of social governance action plan, put forward to in 2018, to strengthen the village (community) working committee leadership role as the core, promote the reform of “political and economic separation”, perfect the pattern of diversity in subject collaborative work. Horizontal drain town in grass-roots community diverse work in recent years has made certain achievements, in Dongguan to enter “much starker choices-and graver consequences-in development plan” period, under the background of social economy enters the new normal, horizontal drain town in further explore in perfecting the township administrative system, deepening rural social governance collaborative innovation of rural grassroots governance ability to promote positive approach, to build a new rural governance system, explore the township administrative system to provide reference to the significance of which can be promoted.

Hengli Town is located in the east of Dongguan city. It covers an area of 50 square kilometers and governs 16 villages and 1 community. Hengli Town has a total resident population of more than 200,000, of which the registered population is only 39,000. The 17 villages (communities) in Hengli Town are generally characterized by large number of migrants, different residents’ backgrounds, different occupations and lifestyles, and low homogeneity of groups. In 2018, Hengli town’s gross domestic product (GDP) is preliminarily predicted to be 13.987 billion yuan, with a year-on-year growth of 7.8%. Hengli Town ranks 80th in the 2018 national comprehensive strength evaluation of 1,000 strong towns, ranking among the top 100 for three consecutive years. The basic conditions of Hengli Town are analyzed as follows¹.

1. Have a good foundation of grassroots social governance

In recent years, Hengli Town has been committed to promoting the innovation of social governance system and mechanism at the grassroots level, and implementing the collaborative innovation project of social governance. It has led at the level of the town government to drive social forces such as professional social organizations, public welfare businesses and universities to participate in the multi-governance, and accumulated practical work experience with initial results. In 2017, Hengli Town Social Governance Collaborative Innovation Center, a hub platform in the field of social

¹ 2018年全镇发展保持稳中有进 各项工作有序推进 · 2019-01-23. <http://zwgk.Dg.Gov.cn/007331531/0802/201901/b9c0921f2ece4d25a29b03759fad0ca9.shtml>

governance, began to operate. The Center launched the project of social business Alliance, providing a diversified resource link platform for further promoting community construction.

2. Having a certain number of community social organizations

The development of community social organizations in Hengli Town provides strong organizational support for community building. There are 117 community social organizations registered for the record. The 15 surveyed villages have community social organizations such as the disabled Persons' association, family planning Association, women's home, and volunteer service station. The women's Federation, The Commission of Customs and Work, the Youth League Committee and other departments have set up village-level organizations in each village, providing the community with an organizational foundation from town to village.

3. Has its own cultural foundation

The century-old Niuxu culture of Hengli Town serves as the common cultural foundation of all villages in the community construction of Hengli Town. Through the in-depth exploration of historical buildings, cultural traditions and historical stories, the identity of people in Hengli Town to niuxu culture is enhanced, and its influence is expanded through various means and forms of publicity.

4. Have hardware facilities for community activities

This is mainly reflected in the existing community sites, facilities and equipment, community service centers, activity centers for the elderly, and villagers' parks in each village. In particular, the village housing project in the village has formed a certain highlight. This provides necessary places for community construction, which can carry out corresponding cultural and community activities on a regular basis, and can serve as the reconstruction basis for community construction, integrating various representative village cultures and elements.

(II) The Proposal of the Investigation of the Squatting Research in Hengli Town, Dongguan City

Horizontal drain township government in jinping new era the ideas of socialism with Chinese characteristics as a guide, fully implement the party's 19 big spirit, carry out Xi jinping visited Guangdong general secretary and other important speech spirit, according to the Dongguan 14th party congress and the 12th congress of the town of decision deployment, closely around the goal of full vigor town ecological civilization construction, carry out all work solidly. However, due to diverse residents' backgrounds, lives, cultures and needs, service resources are difficult to integrate and connect effectively, and most communities show obvious characteristics of "looseness" and "alienation". Learn basic management system of public administration of Guangdong province observation points of Dongguan horizontal drain research group (Mr. Cheung Tsing professor team leader) to "improve the township administrative system, deepening rural social governance collaborative innovation" the theme of the research, the horizontal drain 16 village, a community in the town of field visits and local village, village groups for discussion, the villagers, migrant workers.

Chose for a preliminary investigation, research group of horizontal drain town village, garden district, communities and society governance deeply on casing research collaborative innovation center, in order to understand the town of Dongguan horizontal drain the government organization structure, the village (house), observe the horizontal drain township government down to four of the specific content of social management

and public service items, horizontal drain township governments and organizations at all levels are discussed respectively in the work sharing pattern of social governance role.

From September 13 to 14, 2018, the town of horizontal drain (street or village) to carry out the “perfect the grass-roots government functions, establish a new system of rural governance sea-front research, mainly on the horizontal drain town village, garden district, collaborative innovation center communities and social governance research, understand the town of Dongguan horizontal drain the government organization structure, the village (house), observe the horizontal drain township government down to four of the specific content of social management and public service items, horizontal drain township governments and organizations at all levels are discussed respectively in the work sharing pattern of social governance role. A lot of basic information has been collected in the investigation and preliminary consideration has been given to the establishment of observation points.

Based on the observation of the current governance situation of Hengli Town, this paper continues to discuss the setting of observation points and the follow-up work, namely: First, the hierarchical management mechanism of Hengli Town government needs to be further rationalized, and the decentralized authority needs to be further improved to enhance the vitality of grassroots level; Second, the village committee (community work Committee), which is supposed to undertake the functions of village (community) management and service, is restricted by numerous administrative affairs and cannot extricate itself from a large number of affairs and guide the village to conduct village autonomy. Third, Ruikang Garden, as a model of Hengli Town Huayuan community, explores the solution to the problem of the owners of the community, the interests of the property companies and the government; In Hengquan Community, a large number of migrants and wealthy local villagers have put forward more and more demands for public services in the village (community). Fifth, the Collaborative Innovation Center for Social Governance is an innovative approach in fully integrating various resources, improving the effectiveness of social governance, and exploring a new path of multi-governance.

In the middle stage of the survey, a total of 1,608 questionnaires were issued and effectively collected from villages (communities). The proportion of male and female participants in this questionnaire is balanced, and the proportion of young, middle-aged and old people is appropriate. Besides, the participants are familiar with the situation of their village (residence), so it is believed that the data of this questionnaire survey is objective and can be used as reference.

Combined with the actual needs of the research, and the comprehensive consideration and comparison of various research methods, the research team adopts the observation method, interview method, literature analysis method in qualitative research, as well as the questionnaire survey method and data analysis method in quantitative research to carry out this research. The application of each research method is as follows:

So, based on the horizontal drain township, village (fortuneteller mountain village), garden district (Rui Kang garden), communities (community) constant spring preliminary investigations, collaborative innovation center and social governance, and feedback the results of questionnaire survey, the following research questions: horizontal drain town and township administrative system and administrative organizations how to adjust the responsibility of the relationship between higher and lower make it adapt to the new era of grass-roots management system requirements? Explore the town level party and government offices to promote the reform of streamlining administration and strengthening town powers? How should the operation mechanism of township administration in Hengli Town provide effective support for grassroots social governance in transforming the functions of township government, strengthening social management and public services? In the rural governance system of Hengli Town, as the main body of govern-

ance center, what is the relationship between the township government and the governance bodies of all parties? How to realize the benign interaction between grassroots government governance, social adjustment and villager autonomy under the leadership of grassroots Party organizations? The respective roles of Hengli Town government and organizations at all levels in the social governance pattern of co-construction, co-governance and Shared benefits and how to further promote collaborative innovation of social governance?

(III) Investigation and analysis of the Squatting Research in Hengli Town, Dongguan City

Developed towns in the Pearl River Delta have a high density of population and industries, and their economic and social size is equivalent to that of county-level cities in the central and western regions. They have a large number of service objects, mixed services and great difficulty in service. Although around the pearl river delta have already began to explore the strong town expansion, and has obtained certain achievements, formed some experience, but in the construction of simple and efficient basic level administrative management system, form the social governance pattern of work sharing as well as the basic management system and management ability of modern established these three aspects is not yet perfect, can not fully meet the needs of the people for a better life, embodies in the following five aspects of problems:

1. Insufficient supply of resources in public services

One is the shortage of human resources. Although public service halls have been set up in the town and village (community), which basically accomplish door-to-door service and town center service, they are generally reported to be understaffed. For example, Banxian Mountain Village has a total registered population of more than 1,900 and more than 3,000 migrants, but there are only 7 service staff in the service hall, who are responsible for 97 matters such as family planning, social security, civil affairs, land and municipal administration, among which dozens are related to the people and have large business volume.

Second, the shortage of financial resources. In recent years, Dongguan has made great efforts to reduce the burden on villages (communities), by subsidizing the public security, sanitation and administration funds of villages (communities) at both municipal and municipal levels, and integrating auxiliary police and sanitation workers, but the financial burden at the grass-roots level is still heavy. In Hengli, the government is responsible for 70% of the funds for public security, sanitation and administrative management, and the village level is responsible for 30%. In some villages, the internal security and sanitation and other links need to be arranged by special personnel, which requires a total expenditure of 400,000–500,000 yuan. In addition, the burden on the collective economy has not been fundamentally eliminated with the addition of expenditures such as the salaries of village cadres, social security subsidies for rural residents, and the operation of service centers. The public service fund input mechanism of community system has not been established completely. In Huayuan Community of Hengli Town, unstable factors such as public resources, space, facilities and equipment maintenance are frequent, and the property management cost is single and the use is tight. Constant spring community is horizontal drain of city community, the town or foreign household fall in this community, but in systems and mechanisms are still present rural characteristics, public service provision is not completely by the government investment, want to rely on 20 acres of collective economy property income as a source of self-raised, equal public service quality and has a big gap compared with the full community of urbanization. This is a common phenomenon in Dongguan and even the whole Pearl River Delta region, that is, from the perspective of landscape form and infrastruc-

ture, urbanization has been achieved, but in terms of organizational structure, administrative system, operation mode and public service, it is still the dual characteristics of urban and rural areas, and the fundamental urbanization has not been realized. The financial expenditure at the town level is also relatively large. The shortage of community staff, grid staff and hired staff is largely due to the limitation of funds. The salary of employees is maintained at a low level, which does not reflect equal pay for equal work and affects their work enthusiasm.

Third, the shortage of power resources. The evaluation of rural public services adopts the mode of “superior evaluation and self-evaluation”, while the villagers who serve as the service objects lack the right to evaluate. Villages (communities) express their demands through the way of “direct connection of residence points”. They lack formal supervision and evaluation power over public services at the town level, and they cannot observe and manage illegal phenomena such as environmental protection and safety supervision within their jurisdiction, so they can only report instead of dispatching relevant departments. In urban garden community, there are many internal management problems, and the functions of multiple subjects such as property management company, business committee and Party branch are not clearly defined, resulting in no response to the demands of residents in the community and difficulties in the reconstruction of harmonious neighborhood relationship.

2. Insufficient effectiveness of administrative law enforcement

First, the coordination between horizontal departments is not smooth. Hengli Urban Management Branch is an agency of Dongguan Urban Management Comprehensive Law enforcement Bureau. The law enforcement against illegal phenomena often needs the support and cooperation of relevant departments. However, the examination and approval are separated from the law enforcement. It can be seen that from the inside of the government to the public awareness, there are unclear rights and responsibilities of administrative law enforcement, behind which is the failure to give full play to the core functions of party organization leadership and the dysfunction of government institutions.

Second, the power and responsibility of the vertical upper and lower levels are unclear. The organization that must want to establish cannot be established, if the construction project quality safety of town area supervises an organization, the town level can grasp the situation most, but have no organization and function. Part of the business volume is very small, and has little to do with the “convenience for the masses”, the technical requirements of the higher authority, devolved town street is very unreasonable, such as highway engineering related law enforcement business, originally all concentrated in the traffic bureau, the volume of business is very appropriate, now once decentralized, matters are scattered, may not be in the town for two or three years.

3. Lack of motivation under limited career development

In the developed town economy, grassroots cadres and staff have heavy tasks and many jobs, but they are subject to the institutional constraints of small staffing and low level, so they are easy to meet the occupational ceiling and have unclear development prospects. Their status and salary are difficult to be equal to that of the municipal level, and there are also differences between different towns and streets. The assessment and promotion mechanism of town and street cadres is still very lack, the enthusiasm and initiative to participate in the work is not strong, the endogenous power is insufficient.

4. Insufficient autonomy under the Township Governance System

As the collective economy is relatively developed and the cultural tradition is well preserved, the village level autonomous cultural activities are relatively rich. However, as

the focus of government management continues to move downward, village (neighborhood) committees still undertake a lot of administrative services and social management work. The responsibilities of village (neighborhood) committees are “administrated” and autonomous responsibilities are “marginalized”. Residents in urban garden communities are limited in their sense and ability of autonomy, and are susceptible to other social elements. At the same time, party and autonomous organizations are too busy dealing with administrative affairs to do mass work and cannot focus on their political functions and play their role as the core of leadership.

5. Insufficient participation under the growth of foreign population

There are a large number of migrants in Dongguan and the Pearl River Delta region, who form a huge group and have various public service needs and rights protection demands. Some towns, streets and villages (communities) in Dongguan have tried to select members of the “two committees” of non-household residents to carry out management services on behalf of the “two committees” of villages (communities). However, at present, the migrant population still lacks institutionalized and organized channels for participation. Although they live in villages (communities), they lack platforms for discussion and do not enter into the system of grassroots autonomy.

Anyhow, grassroots governance in the face of people, goods, content, lack of power, such is not smooth, power and responsibility does not match, such universal problems as the function is not complete, it's hard to say is evaluated integratedly and village (community) cadre's personal thoughts, are behind the grassroots administrative system, the structure of the economic and social reasons as well as the deep vertical relationship between the government. Therefore, we must seek solutions from the institutional mechanism.

II. The Government of Hengli Town of Dongguan city promotes the innovative exploration of social governance community

Hengli Town has made some achievements in the multi-governance of grassroots communities. The establishment of Hengli community construction model has pushed the focus of grassroots social governance downward, which has produced good results in enhancing Hengli Town's social governance capacity and building a new social governance pattern of joint contribution and sharing by the whole people. This case and its successful practice are the epitome and exploration sample of grassroots social governance moving down the center of gravity, guiding and promoting community democratic autonomy, and providing “Hengli experience” for giving full play to the core role of grassroots Party organizations and building a pattern of social governance featuring co-construction, co-governance and Shared benefits. Hengli Town has mainly made the following innovative explorations:

(I) Establish a collaborative innovation Center for social governance. In 2014, the township party committee and the township government set up a collaborative innovation platform for social governance, coordinated with all social forces, integrated all resources, and promoted social co-governance and good governance. Since 2015, Hengli Town has innovatively implemented the collaborative innovation project of social governance, built a platform for the integration and docking of social resources, combined the support and guidance of the government, the vitality of social organizations, the thinking concept of professionals, and the power from the people and the masses, and took the lead in exploring a new path of multi-governance. With the construction of collaborative innovation center for social governance as the carrier, we will build “three sub-centers and four platforms” for social governance.”Three sub-centers” are wisdom center, resource center and coordination center of horizontal social governance. The “four platforms” are social governance talent training platform, social organization

cultivation and enhancement platform, social resources integration and docking platform and innovative social governance project platform.

(II) Implementing the policy of social integration of floating population. We strengthened policy support in terms of naturalization and improving the supply of public services, and initially formed a policy system for managing the floating population that includes services such as household registration and education, effectively promoting social integration and social integration. Through the targeted implementation of policies, to improve the quality of the floating population and promote social integration, the town's economic transformation, cultural development and social harmony have played an important role.

(III) Encouraging social forces to participate in grassroots governance. Horizontal drain town in guidance and management on the basis of the existing civil organizations and associations, targeted to support a batch of, foster a batch of, introduce a batch of, will the cultivation and development of social organization under the concept and category of "public interest", a clear public interest is a industrial chain, continuously activate new social organization, guiding support for its characteristic service, effectively meet the demand of residents different species in different levels. As a famous Hong Kong food enterprise rooted in Hengli, Jie Rong Group has long been committed to participating in various public welfare charities and fulfilling social responsibilities. In terms of innovative participation in social governance, the two sides agreed to cooperate in the field of social welfare and charity, to build an innovative and exemplary new model of government-enterprise cooperation by pooling the strength of the government, enterprises and society, to jointly promote the concept of public welfare and promote harmony and friendship in Hengli Town.

(IV) Cooperate with colleges and universities to establish an off-campus comprehensive practice platform for teaching, scientific research and talent training, carry out in-depth cooperation in the construction of community demonstration sites, collaborative innovation platform for social governance, social work service model and mechanism, and study new mechanisms of social governance at the grassroots level.

(V) Take the lead in exploring township-level community foundations to create a good situation in which "everyone participates and everyone is responsible". The purpose of community Foundation is to create a new pattern of social governance by co-construction, co-governance and Shared benefits. In accordance with the idea of "government guidance + social operation", the foundation is established by local residents to serve local private non-enterprises based on the most fundamental needs and concerns of the community. Governance in today's society, community foundation in response to the party and the government's advocacy plays a positive role in guiding, how to promote community involvement, stimulating community public welfare, integration of community resources, foster community social organizations, support community governance project, solve the problem of the community, and promote the harmonious development of community, has become an essential part of the community governance innovation path. Starting from 2018, Hengli Town will learn from the experience and practices of Shenzhen and Shunde and take the lead in exploring the participation of community development foundation in rural revitalization and driving diversified forces such as enterprises to participate in collaborative innovation of grassroots governance.

(VI) To build the "small town big love" urban spirit brand. Guide and attracted businesses, communities, social organizations, social celebrities such as the participation and support of social from all walks of life force, make the city spirit "small big love" brand, embodies social forces from Germany to carry forward the good social governance mechanism system innovation, formed based on love, dedication, responsibility, multivariate co-governmnet, collaborative management, self service social structure. Love concept to ensure the sustainable development of "Friendly Project".

(VII) Promoting the construction of “dynamic cross-linking”. Stimulate the town’s social organizations, the broad masses of the vitality of common development. Through a series of activities, it has strengthened the awareness of party members, cadres and masses in the town to be the first to strive for excellence and the passion of work dedication, formed a joint force to promote development, and better created a harmonious, stable, dynamic, and common development of a good situation;

(VIII) Make every effort to promote civilization. Hengli Town regards civilization creation activity as an important content of social governance, and takes “renovation work coverage, promotion work coverage, mechanism construction coverage, and all parties’ participation coverage” as the target. It highlights “linkage of towns and villages, linkage of cadres and the masses, and interaction of the outside world”, pooling strong working force. Through the participation of all parties in the joint governance, Hengli Town Zhenrong street appearance to achieve a fundamental change, civilization to create a new level;

(IX). Integrating market supervision into social governance Taking the reform of business system as the breakthrough point, Hengli Town has actively explored the construction of a new market supervision system, upgraded demand-oriented services, created an open and transparent business environment, boosted the venture investment of the migrant population, and promoted “mass entrepreneurship and innovation”. Through high-quality government services and market supervision, we have organically integrated the concept and thinking of innovating community-level social governance, further integrated community-level resources, and achieved new breakthroughs in breaking departmental limitations and improving administrative efficiency, so that the majority of venture investors can get, stay and develop well.

III. Suggestions for improving the grass-roots government to build a new system of rural governance

Build a simple and efficient administrative management system at the grassroots level should be guided by cracking problems, with basic management system and management ability of modern general objective, to strengthen the overall leadership of the party as the core, such government based system design, implementation specifications division of labor, responsibilities matching, coordinated operation, information support, the pattern of the rule of law guarantee.

(I) Clarify the longitudinal relationship between towns and villages

First, it is based on the establishment of the Qing Dynasty. Take laws and regulations as the criterion, form a very specific and clear list, implement the access system of grassroots affairs, and define the responsibilities and powers between towns and villages in accordance with the principles of first-level administrative power, first-level financial power and first-level service. As for the developed areas in the Pearl River Delta, the functions and tasks of towns and streets are very complete in terms of economic development and social management. It is suggested to explore the full empowerment of towns and streets by referring to counties or county-level cities and to strengthen the coordination of major issues such as politics, economy, society, culture and ecological environment by the municipal government.

Second, it is to take profession as safeguard. For those functions with strong professionalism, obvious economies of scale, and the need to maintain a higher degree of coordination and unity, considering the small business volume of a single town and street, concentrated in the urban area and unable to radiate coverage, it can be considered to be set in a district-level under the municipal overall planning in a trans-administrative manner.

The third is to strengthen the town street as the focus. Evaluated integratedly party organization as the core, giving evaluated integratedly for city functional departments, head of the local agency personnel Kao He Quan and consent rights, planning, participation, comprehensive management, key projects and decision-making power, promote evaluated integratedly internal departments coordination and cohesion, and the government at a higher level of mutual evaluation, mutual supervision, and how, freely crisscross, fusion of complementary mechanisms.

Fourth, grid and information support. At the grassroots community partition size moderate, easy to management, leave blank geographic grid, based on grid member team, informatization technology to support, using the “+” Internet technology, build a unified party e platform, strengthen the leading role of grass-roots party building in the village governance, further enhance the level of grass-roots community public service, in the form of grid, the informatization reform the system of administrative law enforcement mechanism, can be in the public service, public administration, public security more refinement and Xiao Neng Hua.

(II) Straighthen out the horizontal relations within the village (community)

With the focus on improving organizational strength and giving play to political functions, the village Party organization’s core leadership role is strengthened to straighten out the four relations: first, the relationship between the party organization and the service center. After being elected by villagers, members of the village (community) two committees are employed as leading members of the community service center and enjoy the salary treatment under the overall financial planning. Second, the relationship between party organizations and collective economic organizations. At present, there are different modes of collective economic reform in Guangdong province, such as “separation of government and society” in Shunde, “separation of government and economy” in South China Sea, and “trinity” in Dongguan. All localities should be encouraged to continue to explore experience, but the core is to strengthen the leadership of party organizations and the right of supervision of rural residents. The third is the relationship between the party organization and villager autonomy. The village (community) shall guide and coordinate the work within the jurisdiction as well as various organizational activities, and guide the village (neighborhood) committee and the village (neighborhood) council to perform their functions. Fourth, different public affairs are governed by different categories. Public welfare and cultural affairs play an autonomous role and are directly organized by villagers. Collective economic affairs shall follow the principles of professional management, scientific decision-making, market priority and guarantee distribution. Party organizations play their political and service functions and effectively integrate all kinds of affairs and organizations in villages (communities).

(III) Improving the assessment mechanism

To improve the assessment mechanism as the core, change the pattern of more responsibility to the top than to the bottom, for the construction of simple and efficient grassroots administrative system to provide the baton. Gradually abolish the veto system; Reduce unnecessary assessment items, so that township officials have more time to serve the masses, change the “nothingness” to “pragmatic”; To establish a mass evaluation system, the satisfaction of the masses with the implementation of policies can be assessed by the evaluation scores of the masses, and the trust of the masses to the cadres can be assessed by delivering a vote of confidence to the grassroots leading cadres.

(IV) Resources, services and management should continue to sink

We will strengthen social coordination, encourage multiple actors to participate in community governance, and develop new ways and methods for community-level governance. We will promote community autonomy and co-governance, and encourage resources to be distributed at the community level. We will make sure that community-level governments, communities and society fully interact with each other, so as to make the rural governance system more effective, more orderly, and better built.

First, the government coordinates basic public services in villages (communities). In the Pearl River Delta developed areas, it is suggested to continue to improve the public financial system. Further reduction of public expenditures borne by the collective economy can be considered, and the basic public services provided by grassroots governments will be covered by all villages (communities) on the principle of equalization.

Second is to clarify the resources sink channels. The superior supports the grassroots project fund resources, carries on the effective integration centralization, the bundle package to devolve, and implements in place with the grassroots party organization and the main channel, the overall plan USES, enhances the work effectiveness.

Third, we will strengthen the capacity of grassroots organizations. With the focus on resource conservation and information sharing, we will integrate village-level public service places, facilities and other resources, optimize their functions, focus on investment, and plan the construction of village-level public service facilities as a whole. To further enhance the power of grid, improve the mechanism of quick response and timely disposal.

Fourth, clear governance framework, the main division of labor, effective and reasonable. Horizontal drain town established residential area, for example, service and management team for the township government internal institutions, the lack of city level in the organizational structure of community governance, Suggestions of grassroots government, the village committee, property companies, the owners' committee, the party branch, etc as the main body of community governance, in accordance with the "big (administrative affairs and public affairs), small (community autonomous transactions and mutual transactions), private affairs (residents' personal affairs and marketing services)", combing the responsibility of the plural list, improve administrative efficiency and the quality of public service supply, ensure that according to individual, effective coordination, many ways.

(V) Guiding governance in multiple ways

First, we will improve the community social welfare service system, expand the pool of public welfare mentors, introduce public welfare organizations and other social organizations to participate in community governance, and cultivate professional community workers.

Second, expand the scope of government purchase of public services. In villages (communities) where conditions permit, relying on community comprehensive service centers, explore the establishment of a public management platform for government purchase of services, and standardize the purchase of old-age assistance, social assistance, cultural services, community correction and other services.

Third, open channels for participation and provide services according to the needs of residents. Relying on information-based means, cultivating residents' participation spirit, soliciting public opinion extensively from the bottom up, and providing targeted infrastructure and public services according to residents' opinions to meet their needs.

Fourth, give full play to the advantages of grassroots Party organizations in mass work and the role of the Party working group of the owners' committee, cultivate community backbone members who actively participate in community management, drive owners to participate in self-management activities in an orderly manner, and establish a community governance pattern of co-construction, co-governance and sharing.

(VI) Encourage the participation of the migrant population

We will encourage migrants to participate in grassroots governance and strengthen rights and interests protection services. We will sum up experience in a timely manner and promote the two-party committee system in the villages (communities) for the non-household population to more grass-roots units. In combination with the reform of joint-stock cooperation in the collective economy, the scope of affairs in which the non-registered population can participate shall be defined. They shall not participate in collective economic management, but shall participate in other autonomous affairs. We will encourage the establishment of social service organizations for migrants, provide them with a platform to integrate into urban society, enable them to enjoy the same rights and obligations as local residents, enable them to participate in the process of local social and economic development, and share the fruits of social and economic development.

In conclusion, to meet the people in the pursuit of a better life, the need to fully activate the community, the more sinking to the community service and management of resources, the resources of the government functional departments accurate subsidence, and bring more social resources in the community residents autonomy the benign interaction, integration of public resources, coordination, promote the modernization construction of the rural governance system of new era.

Appendix: Questionnaire on grassroots governance

Hello! Thank you for filling out this questionnaire on grassroots governance. The questionnaire is anonymous. Please fill in the form according to your actual situation. There is no right or wrong answer. Your privacy and information provided are only for statistical analysis and will not be disclosed or used for other purposes. Check the answers to each question. If there is no explanation, the answers are single. Thank you for your cooperation!

- I. Personal basic information
 1. Your gender:
 - ◆ A male ◆ B female
 2. Your age:
 - ◆ A to 29 years old. ◆ B 30 to 45 years old
 - ◆ C 46 to 60 years old ◆ D 61 years and above
 3. Your education level:
 - ◆ A primary school graduation ◆ B Junior high school graduation
 - ◆ C high school, technical secondary school ◆ D junior college
 - ◆ E Bachelor degree or above ◆ F other
 4. Your occupation:
 - ◆ A Public servant ◆ B Public institution staff
 - ◆ C Enterprise workers ◆ D social organization workers
 - ◆ E self-employed, private owners ◆ F village cadres
 - ◆ G farmer ◆ H retirees
 - ◆ I unemployed / unemployed others

5. Your monthly income is:

- ◆ A less than rmb1000 ◆ B between RMB1000 and RMB2999
- ◆ C ¥3000 to ¥7999 ◆ D ¥8000 to ¥10000

More than 10 000 YUAN

Function orientation of township government

6. In your opinion, the following responsibilities of township governments should be listed in order of importance:

Develop the town economy, do a good job in social management, provide public services

We will maintain social stability, pay close attention to environmental sanitation, and carry out administrative law enforcement

7. In your opinion, the actual role of township governments in carrying out grass-roots governance and promoting rural revitalization and development:

- ◆ A is very good. ◆ B is good. ◆ C is average
- ◆ D is bad. ◆ E is very bad. ◆ F is not clear

8. At present, the work of township governments is mainly focused on: (civil servants, public institutions, please answer)

- ◆ A Developing regional economy
- ◆ B Doing a good job in social management
- ◆ C Providing public services ◆ D Maintaining social stability
- ◆ E To improve environmental sanitation ◆ F to carry out administrative law enforcement
- ◆ G for superior inspection ◆ H other

9. Do you think the towns and villages undertake the authority delegated by the county level? (Please answer if you are a civil servant or a public institution worker)

- ◆ A The delegated authority is urgently needed by the township administration
- ◆ B The devolved powers are urgently needed for township management
- ◆ C None of the devolved powers is urgently needed by township management
- ◆ D is not clear

10. What do you think the township government should delegate to the village residents? (Occupation is for village residents.)

- ◆ A The tasks delegated by A are all required by village administration
- ◆ B The tasks delegated are part of the needs of village housing management
- ◆ C delegated tasks are not required for village governance
- ◆ D is not clear

Third, the public service supply system

11. Your practical role in the provision of public services in township government offices (such as economic development offices and agricultural offices):

- ◆ A is very good. ◆ B is good. ◆ C is average
- ◆ D is bad. ◆ E is very bad. ◆ F is not clear

12. Your practical role in the provision of public services by township public service stations (such as social security centers and animal husbandry and veterinary stations):

- ◆ A is very good. ◆ B is good. ◆ C is average
- ◆ D is bad. ◆ E is very bad. ◆ F is not clear

13. Your practical role of community integrated service stations in the provision of public services distributed in villages (residences):

- ◆ A is very good. ◆ B is good. ◆ C is average
- ◆ D is bad. ◆ E is very bad. ◆ F is not clear

14. What do you think of the management system of township public institutions? (Please answer if you are a civil servant or a staff of public institutions)

◆ A township management as the main, the superior business department business guidance as A supplement

- ◆ B directly managed by the superior business department
- ◆ C is not clear

15. In your opinion, what aspects of public service supply should be strengthened in towns and villages (multiple choices):

- ◆ A education ◆ B Health ◆ C Culture
- ◆ D For the aged and disabled, infant and child care services
- ◆ E Town (Street) village (residence) environmental health
- ◆ F — other

16. How do you express and feedback the public service demands of the masses to the towns and villages (multiple choices):

◆ A The system of direct contact with the masses for leading cadres in towns and townships

◆ B Reports on deputies to the People’s Congresses and members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), and Suggestions on the “through train” system

◆ C suggestion box, WeChat public number

◆ D other

◆ E has no channels for expression and feedback

17. Which problem do you think the current public service supply system needs to solve?

◆ A Poor planning for basic public services in urban and rural areas

◆ B Insufficient financial input in public services

◆ C The diversified supply mechanism of public services is not perfect

◆ D Weak regulatory mechanisms for public services

◆ E Four, the village is in charge of much yuan main body

18. What is the actual role of the village (residence) Party organization in the village (residence) grassroots governance process?

◆ A is very good. ◆ B is good. ◆ C is average

◆ D is bad. ◆ E is very bad. ◆ F is not clear

19. Do you think that branch members can play an exemplary vanguard role in the village governance process?

◆ A Yes ◆ B No

20. In what aspects do you think the branch members themselves mainly play a pioneering and exemplary role? (pops)

◆ A Firm ideal and faith ◆ B Serious attitude towards work

◆ C Good lifestyle ◆ D Good interpersonal skills

◆ E active performance of party obligations ◆ F strong sense of service

◆ G other

21. Village (residence) the party branch in the same level organization’s leadership role?

◆ A very outstanding ◆ B quite outstanding ◆ C general

◆ D is not very prominent ◆ E is not very prominent ◆ F is not clear

22. What is the actual operation of the village (residential) Committee as a mass organization?

◆ A is very good. ◆ B is good. ◆ C is average

◆ D is bad. ◆ E is very bad. ◆ F is not clear

23. What are the specific management tasks undertaken by the village (residence) Committee?

◆ A quasi-administrative management function, the implementation of “top-down” governance carrier

◆ B Social security function is a stabilizer for basic living of residents

◆ C Public management and service functions to maintain the stability and unity of rural communities

◆ D Cultural services to promote community identity and sense of belonging in rural communities

E other _____

24. What do you think is the most important factor affecting the function of the village committee?

- ◆ A Guidance and assistance from grassroots governments
- ◆ B The competence and status of the elites in the village (community)
- ◆ C Identification and participation of village (community) residents
- ◆ D Constraints within the organization of village (residential) committees

E other _____

25. What kind of We Chat groups are usually used by village (residential) committees in their actual work to carry out work or establish contacts?

- ◆ A Village (neighborhood) committee cadre group
- ◆ B town + village (neighborhood) committee cadre group
- ◆ C village (neighborhood) committee + village group cadre group
- ◆ D town + village (residence) + village group cadres group
- ◆ E villagers group
- ◆ F town + village (neighborhood committee) + village group + villagers group
- ◆ G other _____

26. What is the role of grid management in village (residence) governance?

- ◆ A is very effective. ◆ B has A better effect
- ◆ C effect is more general ◆ D effect is poor
- ◆ E does not have any practical use. ◆ F is unclear

27. In addition to village (residential) party organizations, what is the actual role of enterprises in the process of village community governance?

- ◆ A is very good. ◆ B is good. ◆ C is average
- ◆ D is bad. ◆ E is very bad. ◆ F is not clear

28. In addition to village (residential) party organizations, what is the actual role of social service organizations (such as volunteers) in the process of village community governance?

- ◆ A is very good. ◆ B is good. ◆ C is average
- ◆ D is bad. ◆ E is very bad. ◆ F is not clear

29. In addition to the village (residence) Party organization, what is the actual role of the villagers in the village (residence) community governance process?

- ◆ A is very good. ◆ B is good. ◆ C is average
- ◆ D is bad. ◆ E is very bad. ◆ F is not clear

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Research on the Social Impact of Artificial Intelligence and Government's Coping Strategies

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ABSTRACT

"Artificial intelligence" is one of the most popular buzzwords in the society at present, and was selected as the "Top Ten Chinese Media Popularity in 2017". Human society is gradually entering a new era of artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence is not just a scientific and technological innovation, but will bring about a big change in social life. As the State Council's "New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan" pointed out: "The rapid development of artificial intelligence will profoundly change human social life and change the world." In the face of the new situation in the new era, governments at all levels must take the initiative to seek change and change, firmly grasp the major historical opportunities for the development of artificial intelligence, keep abreast of development, research and judge the general trend, actively plan, grasp the direction, seize the opportunities, and lead the world in the development of artificial intelligence. The trend, serving economic and social development and supporting national security, drives the overall leap and leapfrog development of national competitiveness.

Keywords: artificial intelligence (AI), government work report, government response strategy

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The concept and development history of artificial intelligence

1. The concept of artificial intelligence

Artificial Intelligence, referred to as AI in English. It is a new technical science for researching and developing the theory, method, and technology and application system for simulating, extending and expanding human intelligence. A major goal of artificial intelligence research is to make machines capable of performing complex tasks that normally require human intelligence. Artificial intelligence involves natural and social sciences such as information theory, cybernetics, computer science, automation, bionics, biology, psychology, mathematical logic, and philosophy.

From a scientific point of view, there is currently no authoritative unified definition of the concept of artificial intelligence. Scholars in different disciplines and different academic backgrounds have different understanding and understanding of artificial intelligence technology. Generally speaking, there is the following consensus on artificial intelligence: First, in the early stage of the development of artificial intelligence, artificial intelligence is first defined as a branch of computer science, or a cross-edge discipline with computer science as the mainstay. These concepts explain more emphasis on artificial intelligent discipline attributes. Second, the relevant definitions emphasize the

nature of using computers to study and simulate the laws of human intellectual activity. As the social application of artificial intelligence becomes more and more widespread, the interpretation of the concept of artificial intelligence also extends outward from purely disciplinary attributes. At present, artificial intelligence is not only interpreted as a fringe discipline where computer science intersects with other disciplines, but it is also beginning to be seen as a complex system that combines human brain research with epistemology and social practice, with more emphasis on its applicability. Scholars agree that artificial intelligence refers specifically to the ability of computer systems to think and act reasonably like human beings, and to complete the ability that only humans can rely on wisdom to complete complex tasks. However, three different schools have formed: the school of semiotics believes that artificial intelligence is derived from mathematical logic. Through the symbolic operation of computers, it simulates human cognitive processes and builds a knowledge-based artificial intelligence system. The connectionist school emphasizes that artificial intelligence is derived from the bionics modeled on the study of the human brain model. The artificial intelligence system based on the human brain is established through neural networks and inter-network linking mechanisms and learning algorithms. The behaviorist school proposes that artificial intelligence is derived from perception and action. Through the interaction and adaptation of the agent and the external environment, an artificial intelligence system based on "perception-behavior" is established. These statements reflect the basic ideas and basic contents of the artificial intelligence discipline: that is, artificial intelligence is to study the laws of human intelligence activities, construct artificial systems with certain intelligence, and study how to allow computers to complete tasks that previously required human intelligence to be competent. It is to study how to use computer hardware and software to simulate some of the basic theories, methods and techniques of human intelligent behavior.

Since the birth of artificial intelligence, the theory and technology have become increasingly mature, and the application field has also continued to expand. The technological products brought by artificial intelligence in the future will be the "containers" and "amplifiers" of human intelligence. Artificial intelligence can simulate and create the information process of human consciousness and thinking. Artificial intelligence is not human intelligence, it is machine intelligence, but it can think like a human and exceed human intelligence.

2. The origin and development of artificial intelligence

Artificial intelligence comes along with the development of computer science. Since the advent of electronic computing, it has always been the dream of computer experts to make computers as smart as humans. Although the term "artificial intelligence" did not appear until 1956, its roots can be traced back to at least the 1940s, Alan Turing (Alan Turing) published in 1950 the famous paper "Computer and Intelligence" (Computing Machinery and Intelligence) specifically mentioned the concept of artificial intelligence. Trane asked a question in the paper: "Can the machine think?" The paper also provides a test to answer the question and raises the possibility that the machine may be programmed to learn from experience like a child.

Artificial Intelligence AI, as a discipline, was officially launched in 1956. It was first proposed by the "father of artificial intelligence" McCartney and a group of mathematicians, information scientists, psychologists, neurophysiologists, and computer scientists at a meeting held at Dartmouth University in the United States. This two-month symposium officially held in the name of "artificial intelligence" specializes in researching and discussing a series of related problems of using machines to simulate intelligence, and for the first time proposed the term "artificial intelligence". Marked the formal birth of the new discipline of "artificial intelligence".

Since its birth, artificial intelligence has been highly valued by the scientific and technological community. Since the 1970s, it has been known as one of the world's three cutting-edge technologies (space technology, energy technology, artificial intelligence). One of the three cutting-edge technologies of the century (genetic engineering, nanoscience, artificial intelligence).

Since 1956, artificial intelligence has experienced three high-speed development stages: the first development is to achieve problem solving, replacing humans to complete part of the logical reasoning work, such as machine theorem proofs, general problem solving procedures, etc. Represented by the first neural network invented by Rosenblatt in 1957, it entered the first peak. However, due to the limited reasoning ability of the digestion method and the failure of machine translation, artificial intelligence subsequently entered a trough. The second development is that the intelligent system can interact with its external environment, obtain information from the running environment, and replace humans to complete part of the thinking work including uncertainty. In 1986, the BP algorithm achieved a breakthrough in neural network training and led artificial intelligence to its second peak. In 1990, the development of artificial intelligence computer DAPRA failed, and artificial intelligence technology entered another bottleneck period. The third development is the breakthrough progress of the recognition algorithm represented by deep learning, which makes the computer initially have the human cognitive and thinking ability, can discover new knowledge, and form new decisions to complete specific tasks. In May 1997, the "Deep Blue" computer (DEEP BLUE) developed by IBM Company defeated the world chess champion of human beings. It was the first perfect performance of artificial intelligence, a milestone in the history of artificial intelligence development, and made artificial intelligence attract the attention of the world. In 2006, deep learning neural networks were proposed. In 2013, deep learning algorithms achieved breakthroughs in speech and visual recognition rates, and the development of artificial intelligence entered the third peak, which has continued to this day and has continued to achieve breakthroughs.

The development of artificial intelligence technology will go through three stages: "weak artificial intelligence, strong artificial intelligence and super artificial intelligence". "Weak artificial intelligence" is to use the existing intelligent technology to improve some of the technical conditions and development functions required by our economic and social development. Weak artificial intelligence can make intelligent machines that can reason and solve problems, but the machines themselves do not generate autonomous consciousness. The continuous popularization and development of computers since the second half of the XX century has provided a realistic opportunity for the development of artificial intelligence. Weak artificial intelligence technology using computers as a carrier has begun to emerge and grow, especially in the field of industrial automation. Enhancing social production efficiency has provided tremendous assistance. The academic community generally believes that weak artificial intelligence technology has been basically realized. Correspondingly, "strong artificial intelligence" means that the machine is not only good at reasoning and solving problems, but also has corresponding self-awareness. "Strong artificial intelligence" is very close to human intelligence, which requires a breakthrough in brain science. It is generally believed that this stage will not be realized until around 2050. From the perspective of the development of the global artificial intelligence industry, although current human technology still faces many problems in how to evoke machine autonomy, with the continuous development of related technologies, especially the continuous maturity of big data technology, the current generation of artificial intelligence in terms of knowledge learning or human-computer integration, there has been a huge leap forward than in the past, and breakthrough progress is being made in realizing the transition from "weak to strong". "Super artificial intelligence" is the

great development of brain science and brain-like intelligence. Artificial intelligence has become a super intelligent system, greatly surpassing the intelligence of natural people. "Super artificial intelligence" is the ultimate goal of artificial intelligence development, it will help humans to complete many tasks that human intelligence cannot accomplish.

3. Artificial intelligence has entered a new era of rapid development

After more than 60 years of evolution, especially driven by new theories and technologies such as mobile Internet, big data, supercomputing, sensor networks, and brain science, as well as the strong demand for economic and social development, artificial intelligence has accelerated its development, showing deep learning, New features such as cross-border integration, human-machine collaboration, open intelligence, and autonomous control. Big data-driven knowledge learning, cross-media collaborative processing, human-machine collaborative enhanced intelligence, group integrated intelligence, and autonomous intelligent systems have become the focus of artificial intelligence development. Brain-like intelligence inspired by brain science research achievements is ready to go, chip-based hardware. The trend of platformization is more obvious, and the development of artificial intelligence has entered a new stage. At present, the overall advancement of the development of new-generation artificial intelligence-related disciplines, theoretical modeling, technological innovation, and software and hardware upgrades are triggering a chain breakthrough and accelerating the acceleration of various fields of economic society from digitalization and networking to intelligence.

The new generation of artificial intelligence has new features in the new era: one is from artificial knowledge expression to big data-driven knowledge learning technology; the second is from multi-type processing of multimedia data to cross-media cognition, learning and reasoning. "Media" does not refer to the news media, but refers to the interface or environment; the third is from the pursuit of intelligent machines to high-level human-machine, human-computer cooperation and integration; the fourth is from focusing on individual intelligence to groups based on the Internet and big data Intelligence, it can integrate the intelligence of many people into group intelligence. Fifth, from anthropomorphic robots to a broader intelligent autonomous system. It is not just a robot that is called artificial intelligence. For example, smart factories and intelligent unmanned aerial systems are all artificial intelligence.

In this period of rapid development of artificial intelligence technology, artificial intelligence has stepped out of the technical bottleneck and entered the rapid application of industrialization and socialization from the scientific research field. The new generation of artificial intelligence not only exists at a higher level close to human intelligence, but also integrates into our daily life with the main goal of improving human intelligence. The emergence of technologies such as human-computer games, face payment, and driverless driving has aroused great attention. Alpha Go has an absolute advantage in the game against the top human players; face recognition has been widely used in financial banks, local surveillance, and secure payments; and autonomous vehicles have also successfully laid the road.

At present, artificial intelligence technology has been widely used in military, medical, security, image recognition, stock analysis, unmanned, space ship navigation, biological control and many other fields. The application of artificial intelligence technology will accelerate industrial upgrading in various fields such as manufacturing, agriculture, logistics, finance, commerce, and home furnishing, thereby helping the world to transform into a high-end and efficient smart economy. Artificial intelligence technology has a profound impact on human society, and these effects are gradually expanding with the development and progress of artificial intelligence technology. As the futurists Ray Kurzweil and Kevin Kelly's technological predictions: in the near future, artificial intel-

ligence will follow the Internet and become socially structural, global and revolutionary important factor of change.

The impact of the rapid development of artificial intelligence on society

Like all the new technological revolutions in history, the in-depth development and wide application of artificial intelligence technology will greatly change the face of human society and the entire world.

4. Artificial intelligence will reshape the face of economic development

Artificial intelligence will become an important new engine for economic development. Artificial intelligence, as the core driving force of a new round of industrial transformation, will further release the huge energy accumulated in previous scientific and technological revolutions and industrial transformation, and create new powerful engines to reconstruct production and distribution. Exchange, consumption and other economic activities, forming new intelligent needs in various fields from macro to micro, stimulating new technologies, new products, new industries, new formats, new models, triggering major changes in the economic structure and profoundly changing human production and life Ways and modes of thinking have achieved an overall leap in social productivity.

The economic prospects brought by artificial intelligence are very exciting: Accenture's research report estimates that by 2035, artificial intelligence can double the annual economic growth rate of many developed countries and promote new relationships between people and machines. . The report pointed out that artificial intelligence in the business will strengthen the role of laborers in driving business growth, thereby improving labor productivity. As artificial intelligence matures, it will potentially become a powerful solution to the stagnation and shortage of technical labor productivity in recent decades.

5. Artificial intelligence will change people's livelihood

Artificial intelligence brings new opportunities for social construction. Artificial intelligence is widely used in education, medical care, culture, entertainment, pension, environmental protection, urban operation, judicial services and other fields. It will greatly improve the precision and excellence of public services, profoundly change people's daily life and comprehensively improve people's lives quality.

6. Artificial intelligence will change the social structure

With the use of intelligent machines, more and more human labor will be replaced by intelligent machines, and the social structure will gradually change. The social structure of "human-machine" will eventually be replaced by the social structure of "human-intelligent machine-machine". Now and in the future, much of the work that was originally undertaken by people will be done by machines. Therefore, people will have to learn to get along with intelligent machines and adapt to this changing social structure.

7. Artificial intelligence will change traditional thinking patterns

Artificial intelligence can make people break away from ordinary labor and work on a new level, focusing on higher-value analysis, decision-making and innovation. Artificial intelligence can greatly enrich and meet people's material, cultural and entertainment needs, and improve lifestyles. The tremendous changes in production and lifestyle will affect the way of thinking and traditional ideas of human beings and cause them to undergo profound changes.

8. Artificial intelligence will have an impact on employment

Artificial intelligence can greatly improve economic and social benefits, but at the same time it will put pressure on employment. Because artificial intelligence can replace hu-

mans for all kinds of mental work, machines with artificial intelligence can replace humans for heavy and repetitive manual work, which will make many people have to change their jobs and even cause unemployment.

9. Artificial intelligence will cause ethical problems

Artificial intelligence will make some people feel psychological threats, or mental threats. It is generally believed that only human beings have a perceptual spirit, and are thus distinguished from machines. If machines can also think and create, and have a sense of autonomy, then they will feel unacceptable and even threatened. Some people worry that the artificial intelligence of intelligent machines exceeds the natural intelligence of human beings, and will make humans become slaves of intelligent machines and intelligent systems. There has been controversy between philosophers, theologians, and other people regarding the relationship between human concepts (more specifically, human spirit) and machine concepts (more specifically, artificial intelligence). From the point of view of artificial intelligence, it is possible for humans to use machines to plan their own future, and even think of this planning problem as a type of state space search. While some people in society welcome this new concept, others find that these new concepts are annoying and unacceptable, especially when these concepts run counter to their beloved beliefs and concepts.

10. Artificial intelligence has security risks

For now, the development of artificial intelligence still has a large degree of uncertainty in certain aspects. First of all, to make the machine have autonomous consciousness means that the machine has the same or similar creativity, self-protection consciousness, emotion and self-issue as humans. This contains a lot of uncertainty, even dangerous, it may rebel against humanity. The greatest danger of any new technology is that mankind loses control of it, or it falls into the hands of those who attempt to use the new technology to misbehave. Second, we are increasingly relying on artificial intelligence to provide decision-making and operating equipment, which undoubtedly increases the risk of predicting and controlling how complex technologies will behave. Third, the popularization and application of artificial intelligence will cause many problems such as changing the employment structure, impacting laws and social ethics, infringing on personal privacy, and challenging the norms of international relations. It will have a profound impact on government management, economic security, social stability and even global governance. While vigorously developing artificial intelligence, we must attach great importance to possible security risk challenges, strengthen proactive prevention and restraint guidance, minimize risks, and ensure the safe, reliable, and controllable development of artificial intelligence.

11. Artificial intelligence has created new legal issues

The application technology of artificial intelligence not only replaces some human physical labor, but also replaces some human mental labor, and sometimes even performs functions that should be performed by humans, which inevitably cause legal disputes. For example, in the event of an error in the medical diagnosis expert system, leading to a medical accident, how to deal with it, whether the person who develops the expert system should be held responsible, and what responsibility should be taken by the person who uses the expert system. Another example is the traffic safety responsibility problem in intelligent driving, and so on. It can be expected that there will be many legal issues related to the application of artificial intelligence.

12. Artificial intelligence will greatly change the government governance model

The rise of artificial intelligence can provide strong support for controlling government scale, strengthening government efficiency, and improving government service levels.

For example, in social management. Artificial intelligence technology can accurately perceive, predict, and warn of major trends in infrastructure and social security operations, timely grasp group cognition and psychological changes, and proactive decision-making reactions, which will significantly improve the ability and level of social governance and are indispensable for the effective maintenance of social stability. The role of substitution.

Similarly, the development of artificial intelligence has also brought an impact on the traditional administrative management model, requiring the government to change the traditional administrative model, improve decision-making and governance management. For example, promote the construction of smart government affairs, smart courts, smart cities, smart transportation, and smart environmental protection. The impact of artificial intelligence on society is far more than that, there are also violations of personal privacy, challenges to international relations and so on. Just like any other new technology, the impact of artificial intelligence technology on humans is two-sided. As Stephen Hawking pointed out, "The rise of artificial intelligence is not only a promoter of human civilization, but also a terminator of human civilization." How to make artificial intelligence technology bring more positive effects to humans, this is a problem that needs us to think about and solve.

The government's response strategy

1. Governments at all levels must make a difference in the face of the new situation of social development

During the major social transformation period of entering an intelligent society, governments at all levels should make a difference, and they must also make a difference. This is where the duties of governments at all levels are. Artificial intelligence is no longer just a technological phenomenon, but a disruptive social phenomenon. On the one hand, vigorously develop artificial intelligence, seize the commanding heights of world scientific and technological progress, and promote social and economic progress. On the other hand, it pays attention to the security risk challenges that may arise from it, strengthens forward-looking prevention and restraint guidance, minimizes risks, and ensures the safe, reliable, and controllable development of artificial intelligence. Both require government planning and policy guidance. The State Council's "New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan" puts forward the guiding ideology of our government, which is to deeply implement the innovation-driven development strategy to accelerate the deep integration of artificial intelligence with economy, society, and national defense, and to enhance the new generation of artificial intelligence technology innovation. Ability is the main direction of attack, develop a smart economy, build a smart society, maintain national security, build an interactive integration of knowledge groups, technology groups, industrial groups, and a mutually supportive ecosystem of talents, systems, and cultures, proactively respond to risk challenges, and promote human sustainability Development-oriented intelligence, comprehensively enhance social productivity, comprehensive national strength and national competitiveness, provide strong support for accelerating the construction of an innovative country and a world power of science and technology, the realization of the "two hundred years" struggle goal and the Chinese nation's great revival of the Chinese dream.

2. Artificial intelligence strategy in developed countries

Artificial intelligence has become the new focus of international competition. Artificial intelligence is a strategic technology that leads the future. The major developed countries in the world all regard the development of artificial intelligence as a major strategy

to enhance national competitiveness and maintain national security. Trying to grasp the leading power in the new round of international scientific and technological competition. Looking at the world's powers, the deployment of policies on "artificial intelligence" has already set off a race. Developed countries such as the United States, Japan, the European Union, and the United Kingdom have successively introduced artificial intelligence strategies, policies, and plans to respond to the current wave of artificial intelligence. In June 2014, the Cabinet of the Japanese Government revised the adopted "Japan Revitalization Strategy" and proposed to promote "a new industrial revolution driven by robots." In October 2016, the Office of the President of the United States released two important reports: "Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence" and "National Strategic Plan for Research and Development of Artificial Intelligence in the United States." Among them, as a high-level framework related to artificial intelligence research and development, "National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategy Planning" contains seven strategies related to the development of artificial intelligence.

3. Top level design of artificial intelligence in China

In recent years, China has intensively issued a series of policy measures at the national level to promote the development of the artificial intelligence industry. In 2017, "artificial intelligence" appeared in the government work report and the report of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. "Artificial intelligence 2.0" was included in the "Technological Innovation 2030 Major Project". The State Council issued the "New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan", established the "three-step" goal, and made a top-level design of the artificial intelligence industry from the national level, laying a foundation for the rapid development of artificial intelligence enterprises and industries. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology released the "Three-year Action Plan for Promoting the Development of a New Generation of Artificial Intelligence Industry (2018–2020)", proposing the implementation of four major tasks such as cultivating smart products, breaking through the core foundation, deepening the development of intelligent manufacturing, and building a support system, and strengthening organizational implementation, Five measures to increase support, encourage innovation and entrepreneurship, accelerate talent training, and optimize the development environment. China's economic development has entered a new normal. The task of deepening the supply-side structural reforms is very arduous. It is necessary to accelerate the in-depth application of artificial intelligence, cultivate and strengthen the artificial intelligence industry, and inject new momentum into China's economic development.

4. Current status of the development of artificial intelligence in China

After years of continuous accumulation, China has made important progress in the field of artificial intelligence. The number of published international scientific and technological papers and invention patents have ranked second in the world, and key breakthroughs have been made in core technologies in some fields. The world's leading speech recognition and visual recognition technology, adaptive autonomous learning, intuitive perception, comprehensive reasoning, hybrid intelligence and group intelligence, etc. have the initial ability to leapfrog development, Chinese information processing, intelligent monitoring, biometrics recognition, industrial robots, service robots, Unmanned driving has gradually entered practical applications, artificial intelligence innovation and entrepreneurship are increasingly active, and a number of leading backbone enterprises have accelerated their growth, gaining widespread attention and recognition internationally. The accelerating accumulation of technical capabilities combined with massive data resources, huge application requirements, and an open market environment have formed a unique advantage in the development of artificial intelligence in China. At the same time, there is still a gap between the overall development level of artificial

intelligence in China and developed countries, and there is a lack of major original achievements. In terms of basic theory, core algorithms, key equipment, high-end chips, major products and systems, basic materials, components, software, and interfaces, there is a large gap. Scientific research institutions and enterprises have not yet formed an internationally influential ecosystem and industrial chain. Lack of systematic advance research and development layout, cutting-edge artificial intelligence talents are far from meeting the needs, and the infrastructure, policies, regulations, and standard systems that adapt to the development of artificial intelligence need to be improved.

5. My rough thinking about the government's response strategy

The development of artificial intelligence is a complex system project that concerns the overall situation. The State Council's plan for the development of a new generation of artificial intelligence proposes to lay out a plan based on "building a system, grasping dual attributes, adhering to the Trinity, and strengthening the four major supports". A strategic path for healthy and sustainable development. This is the country's general macro strategy for dealing with artificial intelligence development. At the micro level of the government's strategy for dealing with artificial intelligence development, I think we should focus on the following tasks: First, we must improve and implement key policies supporting the development of artificial intelligence. Policy is fundamental, and implementation is the key. It is necessary to effectively implement the fiscal and tax preferential policies for artificial intelligence small and medium-sized enterprises and start-up enterprises, and support the development of artificial intelligence enterprises through policies such as high-tech enterprise tax incentives and R&D expense deduction. Encourage more companies to commit to artificial intelligence, encourage artificial intelligence to enter more industrial fields, and accelerate the integration of artificial intelligence and the real economy. Second, we must increase funding support. It is necessary to establish a financial guidance and market-led funding support mechanism. Make full use of the existing resources such as funds and bases, coordinate the allocation of international and domestic innovation resources, give full play to the guiding role of financial investment, policy incentives, and the leading role of market allocation of resources, mobilize enterprises and society to increase investment, form financial funds, financial A new pattern of multi-party support for capital and social capital. Clear support should be provided for frontier research in artificial intelligence, key common technology research, achievement transfer and transformation, base platform construction, and innovative application demonstration. Third, we must accelerate the cultivation of high-end artificial intelligence talents. Take the construction of high-end talent team as the top priority in the development of artificial intelligence, adhere to the combination of training and introduction, improve the artificial intelligence education system, strengthen the talent reserve and echelon construction, especially accelerate the introduction of the world's top talents and young talents, and form China's artificial intelligence Talent Heights. It is necessary to form a social environment that respects talents, uses talents, attracts talents, and cultivates talents; otherwise, the industrial application of technological innovation will become a nonsense. Fourth, we must vigorously develop the emerging industry of artificial intelligence. Accelerate the transformation and application of key artificial intelligence technologies, promote technology integration and business model innovation, promote smart product innovation in key areas, actively cultivate artificial intelligence emerging formats, lay out high-end industrial chains, and build an artificial intelligence industrial cluster with international competitiveness. This is a new growth point for economic development. Fifth, it is necessary to formulate laws and regulations and ethics that promote the development of artificial intelligence, establish artificial intelligence technical standards and intellectual property systems, and establish artificial intelligence safety supervision and evaluation systems. The construc-

tion of the corresponding system is the basis and guarantee for the rapid and healthy development of artificial intelligence. Accelerating the establishment and improvement of the corresponding system will enable us to occupy the commanding heights of the development and application of artificial intelligence and lead the trend of the world. In short, in the early stages of the development of a new generation of artificial intelligence, if we respond appropriately and effectively, it will enable us to seize this strategic opportunity for major development, promote economic leap-forward growth, and accelerate the overall leap in society.

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Integrated Governance of Scenarized Space and Community — Reform of Beijing Qianggen Community Service Station and Enlightenment

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ABSTRACT

Community governance is significant for the grass-roots governance in China. Micro-governance and micro-reform starting from community service station is a meaningful measure to explore the improvement of grass-roots governance. Focusing on the reform of community service stations in Beijing, this paper, in consideration to the background of service station reform, describes the history, content and characteristics of the reform of comprehensive setting of Qianggen Community on G Subdistrict of Xicheng District, Beijing, in details, and conducts in-depth analysis based on "The Theory of Scenes" and "The Theory of Governance". The author holds that community service stations, with new roles taken, new scenarios created and new mechanisms shaped after transformation and upgrading, are turned into governance centers that connect multiple parties, respond to needs of residents better and improve the effectiveness of community governance. The reform practice is committed to the generating of scenarized social space, promoting the manifestation of the integrated governance pattern. The author is inspired to consider the issues related to grassroots governance further and to put forward several suggestions for deepening reform.

Keywords: community service stations; transformation and upgrading; scenarized space; general social workers; integrated governance

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I. Background of Community Service Stations Reform

Since 2000, community building has been carried out nationwide and has achieved remarkable achievements. However, in the context of accelerated urbanization and social transformation, grassroots social conflicts are prominent and urban residents' demands for community are increasingly diverse and complicated, imposing new requirements and challenges to community building and governance. In 2008, the Social Work Committee and the Social Affairs Office of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee conducted an in-depth research accordingly. The research, from the perspective of community governance, indicates ranges of issues such as single management subject, administrative management mechanism, superficial community autonomy, low-level community participation, weak support system and low-proficient social work force in community building [6, p. 7–104]. Generally speaking, a grassroots community governance structure in line with the governance system of megacity and modernized governance capacity is yet to be formed. According to the research, the crux lies in the confusing functions of residents'

committee and community service station, and the determination and establishment of a practical community service platform setting pattern with accurate positioning and efficient operation is essential. On this basis, Beijing determines the role of boosting standardized community building, especially regulation and construction of new-type community service stations as the sally port and core section to improve the community governance structure. The specific measure is to establish community service platform and community residents' committee in parallel and to build a new-type community governance structure with "one core of leadership (community party organization) and two service systems (self-governing community service system based on residents' committee and capable & efficient public community service based on community service station)". A number of policies have been issued since then, intending to basically achieve the standardized construction of urban communities throughout the city within three years (2009–2011). To be specific, "seven standardized" (including the construction of standardized community service stations) and "seven based" (including the platform based construction of community service stations) of demonstration sites of standardized community construction are required. In 2011, the Beijing Municipal Party Committee issued the "Opinions of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China on Strengthening and Innovating Social Management to Promote Social Construction in an All-round Way", pointing out clearly that community service stations, as professional institutes to undertake public service for the government, play an important role in forming the "three-in-one" working pattern of community party construction, community self-governance and community services. More importantly, community service stations are fundamental for building a comprehensive community service management platform. In 2012, Beijing promulgated the "Beijing Community Management Measures (Trial)" and "Beijing Community Workers Management Measures (Trial)", determining to build a modern community governance structure, in which community units cooperate closely and residents participate extensively, based on community self-governing organization and relied on community service stations, with the community party organization serving as the core of leadership, supplemented by community social organizations; moreover, the general reform concept of "one separation, three fixed and two targets" in community construction is formed, requiring to set up community service stations¹ with functions separated from residents' committee. As a grassroots self-governing organization, the community residents' committee performs its duties in accordance with the residents' committee Organization Law; while the community service station serves as a work station set up by the Subdistrict office in the community to handle various public services. The two organizations performs their own functions in cooperation under the leadership of the party organization.

Since then, standardized construction has been implemented by various districts, streets and communities in Beijing, with the new community governance system put into operation gradually. In practice, although community service stations undertake

¹ Community service station, a public service platform established by the government at the community level, works under the leadership of the subdistrict office and the guidance of the government functional departments, as well as the leadership of the community party organization and the supervision of the community residents' committee. Responsibilities of Community Service Station include: 1. Acting as an agent for the government to provide public services in the community. 2. Assisting community (village) residents' committees in organizing community volunteer assistance services. 3. Assisting community (village) residents' committees in organizing convenience-and-benefit-for-people services. 4. Assisting community (village) residents' committees in cultivating and developing community social organizations actively. 5. Keeping abreast of and reporting social conditions and public opinions. 6. Reporting to the community (village) party organization and community (village) residents' committees regularly, accepting the supervision and evaluation of the community residents.

more administrative affairs and alleviate pressure on residents' committee to some extents, the institutional and deep-seated problems of community remain to be resolved thoroughly and challenges on community governance linger on. In the new community governance system, community service stations serve as the most immediate window for citizens to interact with the government and appreciate public services provided by the government. However, the performance of community service stations in quickly responding to demands from residents and improving the efficiency of community governance is not satisfactory in the following aspects: On the one hand, the orientation of the service station to routine work contributes a lot to the administerization of community works with the service function weakened — service stations, whose principal duty is single government affairs service, are incapable of meeting diversified needs for convenience such as maintenance of utilities and delivery of meals to the elderly; on the other hand, the traditional line-style working approach causes much inconvenience to residents to handle affairs — since social workers have specialized duties, residents have to wait for specific persons to handle affairs and even have to visit the stations for several times. It is also difficult for social workers to provide service door by door if they stay at the counter all the time. In addition, the layout of community service stations is more like an “administrative space” — conventional L-shaped counters are distributed on the side of the hall in nine areas, separating the community from the residents indifferently. These challenges are common for traditional community service stations. The long-term existence of such problems results in slow response to service demands, low service efficiency, dissatisfaction of residents and increase in hotline complaints, making further continuation of reform of community service stations imperative.

As a result of the administerized mechanism of operation, the vitality in community governance is still insufficient even after the establishment of community service stations. As a comprehensive and multi-functional service organization, the community service station not only undertakes various administrative affairs in the community derived from the residents' committee, but also assists the government in providing residents in the community with public services and public welfare services. Essentially speaking, the establishment of community service station, however, is an extended form of bureaucracy in community, as it can only provide residents with monotonous government services while giving priority to administrative affairs. In the face of diverse and enormous needs of the residents, community service station, whose operation approach is restricted by red tape, can barely meet in a timely and flexible manner. It proves that though the establishment of community service station makes effective governance of community possible in the institutional aspect, its service is unsatisfactory for residents in actual operation, leaving the “last mile” of governance to be opened up.

In 2019, Xicheng District, Beijing carried out a comprehensive reform of the setting of community service stations on G Street. In March, the reform of G Subdistrict was officially launched, with Qianggen and Hetaoyuan communities chosen as pilot sites, and the former was chosen as the first target; in November, the Qianggen community service station renovated comprehensively was officially put into use with pilot operation launched. In January 2020, G Subdistrict held a reform advancement conference, on which it was proposed to carry out a comprehensive reform of the setting of 18 community service stations by groups and categories in 2 to 3 years. Subsequently, Xicheng District held a district-wide start-up deployment conference, on which it was announced that transformation and upgrading and reform of comprehensive setting of 30% community service stations in communities of 15 streets would be launched in 2020. As a practically significant exploration and attempt worthy study, the measure intends to follow the trend, respond to demands, improve the grassroots governance system, innovate the governance pattern and win through the challenges of community governance.

II. Characteristics of Reform of Qianggen Community Service Station – New Changes in Transformation and Upgrading

In response to the new requirements and tasks assigned by Beijing, the capital of China, for the new era, the reform of community service station is carried out as a significant measure to deepen reform of “Immediate Response” in aspects of the leadership of party building, community governance, meeting needs of citizens and solving problems encountered by the masses. The reform accords with emergency mechanism to improve grass-roots governance, the response mechanism to serve the masses and the working mechanism to open up “the last mile”.

The leadership of CPC and government and democratic consultation at the community level are given priority to in the advancement of reform. The Party Working Committee and Office of G Subdistrict attach great importance to and supports the reform vigorously. In March 2019, G Subdistrict set up a special working group to launch the reform officially. The group organized six seminars in the Subdistrict and communities and held democratic consultation at the community level for several times, with great priority given to opinions of residents. In order to understand the needs of residents, the Subdistrict distributed questionnaires to residents and collected opinions via Shequtong App online; it held resident forums for several times to discuss with the residents on reform matters, and so on.

Top-level design and meticulous implementation are given priority to in scheming the reform. The reform working group invited Party Committee Reform Office of Xicheng District, Beijing Municipal Party School to instruct and conduct scientific design, especially to clarify the reform concepts and objectives. Specifically, under the guidance of “Seven Guarantees” and “Five Bases” index system, focusing on the pain point of slow response to providing the masses with life services, a mechanism of rapid awareness and dispose of residents’ needs based on the starting point; according to the most urgent and realistic service demands of residents, functions of the service station are defined accurately. The group strives to turn the community service station into an integrated service platform available to all residents, as well as a “public lobby” and a “neighborhood park” for leisure and cultural enjoyment. In the specific implementation, reform deduction meeting is held to analyze and improve the work flow and implementation plan repeatedly; professional design companies are also hired to modify the design drawings seriously to work out the best service scenario.

After eight months of renovation, Qianggen Community Service Station has taken on an entirely new look. On November 21, 2019, the on-the-spot meeting of reform pilot operation of G Subdistrict was held here, marking the official opening of the renewed service station. The main content, features of the reform of Qianggen Community Service Station and changes after the transformation and upgrading are summarized as follows.

1. New Role: A “Multi-functional Socket” that Connects Multiple Parties and Serve Comprehensively

In response to residents’ demands, the transformed community service station provides unprecedented “one-stop” comprehensive services as a platform that integrates service resources from the government, social organizations, surrounding enterprises and communities in connection with relevant subjects. The new service content includes four categories: party-masses services, government services, life services and public services.

Party-masses services are carried out around party-building activities and party-masses services, such as the transfer of membership credentials and “registration at community and residence” of party members. The Party-masses service station is em-

bedded in the traditional service station, embodying that party fits in the masses and creating an atmosphere of serving the people. Government service is dominated by the undertakings of public service for the government and assistance to the functional government departments in handling related public service affairs. In line with the Government Affairs Service Center of Subdistrict, community service station adheres to the principle of “Handling affairs within the reach” and “Handling affairs as required”, ensuring that the government can respond to the demands at hand on people. In terms of life services, with resources such as enterprises, individual business households and social organizations integrated, community service station serves as a service resource platform at both the level of Subdistrict and community, advocating paid consumption and market-oriented operation. At present, the community service station has integrated more than 80 social enterprises within the community jurisdiction, which are sufficient to meet residents’ life needs such as maintenance of utilities and housekeeping services and needs for specialized services such as legal service, psychological consultation and health services, etc.. Public services include volunteer service such as cultural and sports, safety and stability, garbage classification, environmental protection and social welfare, open to residents to participate in voluntarily. These services not only enrich the daily lives of residents, but also encourage residents to participate in community governance actively.

At present, among the 149 on-site affairs undertaken by Qianggen Community Service Station, there are party 8 affairs, 116 government affairs and 25 handy service for the public in seven categories; among the cooperated organizations, there are 54 service agencies, 22 handy help outlets, 11 institutes under the jurisdiction and 12 voluntary organizations. Among the affairs, 48 can be handled directly and 68 need document collection, table filling and submitting.

After transformation, the upgraded community service station plays the role of “multi-function socket”, namely, a comprehensive service platform with a great variety of functions rather than a monotonous provider of government services. Being demand-oriented, the station connects with various subjects including the government, enterprises, social organizations, volunteers and community party members, with governance resources integrated to ensure that residents’ demands are fully accepted and met, so as to promote the formation of a social governance pattern of so-construction, co-governance and sharing.

2. New Scene: A Pro-people, Warm Service-oriented Space with Optimized Layout

The layout and settings of community service stations are innovated. According to the principles of “easy to manage service, easy to perform autonomy for residents and easy to give play to community functions”, the whole area is divided into five functional areas: reception area, waiting area, service area, party-masses workstation, heartwarming station and convenience-for-people tool cabinet. In the setting of functional areas, the “counter” service pattern of traditional community service stations is abandoned, and the office environment is turned into living and service environment with open space prevailing. Scene creation and service experience are given priority to in the service station, as officer would take the initiative to greet, answer questions patiently, guide to enjoy the service actively and provide the butler-style thorough quality service. In every space here, residents will feel as warm as at home, with experience and sense of gain improved greatly. The new service station strives to meet the diverse needs of different people with social and leisure space integrated, as residents can also take a break, play with their children and chat in such a “neighborhood park” with seats, function of leisure and cultural enjoyment in addition to handling affairs. Furthermore, the community service station also prepares a complete emergency kit for unexpected needs.

The community service station, from the administrative hall to the reception hall that “gathers information, wisdom from the people and benefits the people”, is committed to offer a service-oriented space to people with image changed and concepts updated.

3. New Mechanism: “General Social Worker and Full Response” with Reformed Process and Upgraded Service Efficiency

With unnecessary staff reduced and the process optimized, the service adopts general social workers instead of single-function officers to accept all kinds of service affairs. With various services handled in a centralized manner, the station is divided into various functional areas reasonably according the content of service and its personnel allocation is adjusted properly. 2–3 “general social workers” are allocated to accept affairs comprehensively in a “general-acceptance, multi-post of single person and multi-function of single post” manner. The number of staff is “cut off” from 7 to 4. A chief stationmaster which is selected from outstanding backbone party members is allocated to receive residents together with other two officers, and the deputy stationmaster is responsible for the background transfer and coordination of affairs. The service process is simple and efficient with “door-to-door, one-visit and one window” achieved, namely, one window for acceptance, door-to-door handling and residents only visit once. The affair management system is improved in aspects including service appointment, complete commission, service commitment and deadline for completion, etc., making sure that tasks are clear and the division of labor is definite.

Full-response mechanism based on “Immediate Handling-Transfer” and “Immediate Response”. The station applies the mechanism of online appointment for full-response service and offline handling of affairs, with residents’ demands accepted by the station classified into “ready-to-handle affair” to handle immediately and “to-be-transfer affair” to verify by home-visit. To be specific, affairs will be handled immediately upon being reported by residents, and affairs that cannot be handled immediately will be saved to handle by means such as “Immediate Response” (Subdistrict Initiates the Process and Departments Check in) and “hand-off”. For example, at the end of November, upon receiving demands from a resident for dredging the manhole, the service station started the emergency process for “to-be-transfer affair”, with the situation reported to the area-director to visit the resident, and then the community secretary initiated the on-site work to be responded by several departments. The manhole was dredged that day.

Active response system based on “Divide the work on the household basis” and “Internet+”. All staff members other than those receiving at the station are arranged and assigned with tasks by the party committee and the residents’ committee in a mechanism of “Area-fixed for groups of households”. They need to visit the residences to gain information of residents’ needs and solve their problems, changing from passive to active. Moreover, by means of “Internet +” technology, they seek needs from residents actively to identify problems and form a complete chain of problem collection, identification and solution, with problems identified and solved in the community, so that “problems are solved before being reported and immediately upon accepting”.

OTO integrated general response system. With the help of “My Community” section of the “Xicheng Home App” community governance platform, the demands and deliberations of residents posted on the App are transformed into the service content of the community service station after information transfer and transformation of process as an autonomy project for residents; moreover, a general OTO affair-handling platform of the community is built to combine online deliberations and offline negotiation seamlessly.

The effect of the transformation and upgrading of Qianggen Community Service Station is directly reflected in the improvement of service efficiency and rapid rise

of residents' satisfaction. During the formal operation of the station, 356 affairs appealed by residents in four categories were accepted, covering party affairs such as transfer of party membership credentials and party members' "registration at community and residence"; life problems such as utilities issues; government affairs consultation and handling services; public volunteer services such as "Winter Clothes Collection for Welfare"; helping the elderly with disabilities in the community to handle social security, etc... The people-oriented measures of the community service station have been recognized by the community residents. Residents poured their appreciation for the comfortable, relived and happy life in Qianggen Community. For example, a woman often visits the station and chat with others in the community. She feels warm and relieved for the warm reception and considerate service here. The station helps her report failure of switch and answer questions about medical insurance; she thumbed up to the station for this reform when it managed the subsidy for disabled elderly issued in new policies for the trouble and efforts saved. Residents witness the changes in the community, appreciates the concentrated attention to services, as well as the park-like space full of warm and harmony without the indifference caused by the setting of counter. The section for message on information platforms such as "Mobile G" is also full of messages left by residents to express gratitude and praise. A resident of screen name "Blue Sky and White Cloud" in the community wrote: "People are lucky to have such a community to handle affairs and solve problems for them. We feel extremely happy and warm in such a community". A resident of screen name "Xuannan Hanshi" wrote a poem *Xi Jiang Yue-Praise to Qianggen Community Service Station*: "Residents appreciate the warm words in the community, as it helps them in emergency and solve problems for them, making the society harmonious. The public lobby with cultural atmosphere does good deeds for people. It enables people to enjoy a happy life without forgetting the original aspiration. November 22, 2019"

The success in the transformation and upgrading of Qianggen Community Service Station as a pilot sets a good example for and triggers a number of reform in a wider range. At the beginning of 2020, G Subdistrict published the "Plan to Implement the Reform in Setting of Comprehensive Community Service Stations at G Subdistrict in An All-round Manner", and held a reform boosting conference in Qianggen Community, on which it was proposed to carry out a comprehensive reform of the setting of 18 community service stations by groups and categories in 2 to 3 years. The new-type service stations of communities in G Subdistrict take the role of "Urban Home" with open and comprehensive services provided. "Four Service in One" has been realized preliminarily. A service resource platform at both the level of Subdistrict and community and a community governance pattern based on "Six Systems" are built, so as to reach the target of improving the grassroots governance system and strengthening service and capabilities. Subsequently, Xicheng District Community Social Work Community and Civil Affairs Bureau held a district-wide start-up deployment conference, on which the "Program of Promotion of Transformation and Upgrading of Community Service Stations in Xicheng District" was issued. According to the "Program", the reform of comprehensive setting of 30% community service stations in communities of 15 streets would be launched in 2020, with a tertiary working system of "District-Block-Community" built in Xicheng District. "Full Response Service of Community" would be launched throughout the 259 communities in the district. Subdistricts are encouraged to adapt to local conditions, highlight regional and community characteristics and provide several special extensive services in addition to the four types of basic services; to reinvent the service process and improve the intelligence level of community services, so as to turn the service station into a warm home and community governance center.

III. Enlightenment of Reform of the Comprehensive Setting of Community Service Stations

1. *Generating of Scenarized Social Space*

(1) Creating Comfortable Public Space with Philosophy of Scene Building

In the context of knowledge economy, cultural environment and atmosphere are more important for cities, and urban development is also turning to local aesthetics and consumption that highlights quality of space and life. Cultural scenes composed of various comfort objects can provide urban residents with comfort and pleasure. The purpose of scene creation is for creating a more livable living environment [5, p. 92]. In advanced philosophy of scene building integrated in the transformation of space, Qianggen Community Service Station pays much attention to both improvement of soft power of service and artistic design and creation of comfortable public space. The community service stations are of warm and bright color and equipped with complete facilities. The open functional area in the station shows maximum inclusiveness. In addition to the butler-style thorough quality chief-reception service, this series of measures enable residents to feel warm, pleasant and comfortable immediately upon entering the community service station.

(2) Building Cultural Landscape in Public Space and Conveying Value Idea

According to theory of scenes, public space is not only a physical building and concrete facility, but also a space of culture and society, with social relations and cultural practices embodied, full of symbols, meaning and ideology. Urban leisure and entertainment facilities and civic organizations in different combinations form various “scenes”, which are externalized symbols of different cultural values. The scenarized space of the transformed community service station conveys specific values and cultural connotations, such as service, humanity, equality and efficiency, etc., which can be summarized as a philosophy of “socialization” that “everyone can equally enjoy humanized public services”. First, for the comprehensive service content and audience, the community service station provides comprehensive services covering demands of all residents within the jurisdiction of the community service station. Second, for the equal service, without pursuing profits, community service stations provide services for all residents in the community equally rather than provide differentiated services for different people. Third, for people-oriented services, the transformed service station communicates are people-oriented in communication, as the open reception space eliminates the barrier between the staff and the residents, and the officers provide butler-style service with a friendly attitude, greet and guide residents actively in an amiable manner.

(3) Scenarized Space Reconstitutes Social Practice and benefits the Production of Social Capital

The scenarized space influences the behavior of individuals involved while attracting various groups to social practice. The space of community service station is multifunctional. For example, the Party-Masses Activity Center covers G Subdistrict Branch of Xicheng District Committee Party School and G Subdistrict Famous Secretary Studio; the center conference room serves as a multi-functional venue for surrounding units and communities to carry out activities such as the themed party day... In flexible use, the venues in service stations motivate residents to communicate with each other, promote mutual assistance and encourage participation in community construction and governance, so as to cultivate community social organizations. Obviously, the public space of service station is scenarized according to the concept of scene building. The new community service station is not only a place to provide public services, but also a “public lobby” for residents to entertain and improve relationship. What’s more, resi-

dents are also motivated to participate in community building and to form community social organizations here. It reconstitutes social practices in the space and reproduces community social capital.

2. Primary Presentation of the Integrated Community Governance Pattern

(1) Oriented to Residents' Needs and Based on Service Station, the Community Organizations are Reconstructed in Aspects of Function-Space-Process to Provide Seamless Community Services

First, the service content and functions of party organizations, residents' committees, and service stations are integrated to the community service station, which provide multiple services such as party-masses services, government affairs services, life services and public services to meet increasingly diverse needs of residents; the "door-to-door, one-visit and one window" efficient work process is formed by setting up the post of general social workers to enhance the efficiency of serving residents; scenarized spaces are created to provide residents with a public lobby for entertainment and communication.

The purpose of the reform is to meet the needs of residents and serve them better, so as to provide various subjects of community with comprehensive and OTO community services.

(2) Integration, Diversification and Socialization of Service and Governance Subjects of Community

The diversity of community subjects represents the complexity and diversification of social life. The complexity of community subjects was used to be regarded as a key source of the difficulty in community governance, but it also means the richness of potential resources of community the other way around. If the diversified subjects can be integrated into a joint force to be used by the community, it would be quite precious for the community. In the integrated governance pattern, subjects such as government (subdistrict) departments, enterprises, professional social organizations, volunteers and party members are connected by the community service station to get engaged in community governance, and the role of social forces other than the government is highlighted in governance. For example, advantageous resources such as enterprises and professional social organizations can be used to provide professional and colorful life services and public services [3, p. 21].

(3) Operation of the Integrated Governance Mechanism

"Integration" is reflected in two aspects. On the one hand, organizational relationships are integrated, focusing on the definition of responsibilities of governance subjects and the reconciliation of cultural concepts. To be specific, based on public interests and community identification, community subject such as party organizations, residents' committees, service stations, community social organizations, residents and jurisdiction units join hands and do their best to provide community services to maximize the contribution to the public interest. On the other hand, service processes are reconstructed and integrated, focusing on the rational allocation of governance resources and ordered service processes. With multiple governance resources integrated, community service station, as a "transit dispatcher", responds to residents' demands in an all-round way. Upon receiving demands from residents, the station handle affairs within the reach with accurate allocation of resources or initiate mechanisms such as "Subdistrict Initiates the Process and Departments Check in" to transfer tasks "one-to-one" or "one-to-many" and urge relevant subjects to provide services for residents accurately in a timely manner. Various service processes are sorted out in the process: party affairs service — leadership process of the party, government service — administrative process of the government, life

service — service process of the market, public service — negotiation and cooperation process of the participants, etc., making public service provision in order [2, p. 54].

(4) Primary Construction of Flat Network-type Structure of Governance

The integrated governance pattern reconstructs the arrangement and combination of governance resources, changes the pyramid-type community governance system of vertical bureaucracy, integrates all governance resources to apply to the community and brings together governance subjects by virtue of community service stations to carry out governance undertakings, showing a flat network-type governance structure. This structure has the following characteristics: First, the subjects are not separated by their specific functions, but integrated to solve specific problems. The vertical bureaucracy emphasizes vertical hierarchy and horizontal functional differentiation, subjecting to supremacy of interests and conflicts between subjects. In the integrated governance pattern, subjects are included into the problem-solving system with barriers of interest eliminated. With full play to the advantages in resources, different governance subjects, based on public interest and community identification, work together to solve problems. Second, equality and trust are fundamental, and authority ranking is not used as a tool for control. Different from the “top to the bottom” power operation of the bureaucracy, integrated governance represents equality in status of various governance subjects, which work together to govern based on trust with a certain power. It lays a network-type organizational foundation. The community service station, as a “nodule”, runs through the network, connects inside and outside and responds to residents’ demands in a timely manner. This organic organizational structure is conducive to maximizing the overall benefits of governance [9, p. 55–56].

(5) Unique Feature: Consideration to Both External Input of Community Service and Effective Cultivation of Endogenous Force in Community Governance

Although external input of high-quality community services enhances the efficiency of community governance greatly, cultivating the endogenous force of community governance is vital to maintain the vitality of community governance. As a carrier of governance, community service station is not only a physical space for providing comprehensive community services, but also a scenarized social space for reconstructing social practices and producing social capital. At the service station, residents can communicate with each other, get informed of community events and participate in community activities, which is conducive to promoting mutual help among residents, increasing interaction among residents, encouraging residents to discuss about and put forward suggestions for community construction, so that residents can participate in community construction and governance and form community social organizations.

It reflects the role of the reform practice of Qianggen Community Service Station in promoting the manifestation of the integrated governance pattern. For the connotation of integrated governance, the core leadership role of the party continues to act as the foundation within community jurisdiction, the government’s function of social management and public service acts as the pioneer, the community self-governing organizations acts as the base, the community service station acts as the principal platform under the support of government (subdistrict) departments, enterprises, professional social organizations, volunteers, party organization members and communities to reshape efficient grassroots government-affair service processes, to integrate multiple governance resources and to provide comprehensive and one-stop services such as party-masses services, government services, life services and public services. Moreover, the regulatory role of the government, society and market mechanisms is given full play to, with the government regulation mechanism and the social coordination mechanism con-

nected, the administrative functions of the government and social autonomy coordinated for complementation and multiple governance forces integrated in order, so as to respond to residents' demands rapidly, improve the level of community service management and service efficiency and promote the formation of a social governance pattern and operation mechanism of so-construction, co-governance and sharing.

The integrated governance pattern mainly responds to three questions: How to provide government services quickly and satisfactorily and handle affairs in single-visit? How to take advantage of the scenarized space to attract residents to participate in community services in an organized manner? What mechanism can be used by multiple subjects to get united organically, govern together based on negotiation? This pattern indicates that communities are always at the forefront of grassroots governance, innovates fine governance at grassroots level, responds to the challenge of community fragmentation and explores the way of good governance in communities according to the logic of practice.

IV. Thinking and Suggestions on Deepening Reform

1. *Thoughts Inspired by the Reform:*

(1) Whether the Reform of the Comprehensive Setting of Community Service Stations Can Overcome the "Administrative and Marginalization Dilemma" of Resident's committees and "Community Dilemma" of Community Governance?

The administrative dilemma refers to fact that community resident's committee, a self-governing organization of residents, is too busy with the excessive administrative affairs assigned by the subdistrict to perform the functions properly. The marginalization crisis means that the status of resident's committee in the community falls enormously and even be "marginalized" by the establishment of community service stations, which deprived administrative functions of resident's committees. The goal of community building is to turn community into a "social life community". However, at present, community is largely a physical geographic area. Residents have low participation and poor sense of belonging in community building, which relies highly on the government as the "only player". It is called "community dilemma" [8, p. 23].

The administrative dilemma and marginalization crisis of resident's committees are one of the driving forces for the reform of community service stations. The reform of service station promotes the integration of party organizations, resident's committees and service stations, with party-masses services, government affairs services, life services and public services integrated, relocates resident's committees to the center of community affairs and reduces the burden for administrative affairs. However, the dilemma of resident's committees in community governance remains to be solved thoroughly owing to the insufficient transformation of government functions and inadequate self-governance competence of resident's committees.

The participation of multiple governance subjects during the reform is highly concerned. In particular, the community service stations reformed comprehensively are turned into scenarized social spaces to facilitate communication among residents and community recognition, making breaking through the "community dilemma" possible to some extents. However, whether the commendable concept can be continued and realized effectively by creating a reasonable mechanism has yet to be tested by practice.

(2) What is the institutional basis of community service stations as an integration platform and governance center and the legal basis of its governance power?

Community service stations are service organizations established by the government at the grass-roots level. With limited power, they are not law enforcement entities. In the

face of requests from residents that beyond the scope of its capabilities, service stations need to hand over them to different governance entities to handle. It means that service stations have to seek governance resources for superiors in the administrative system while seeking extensive help from social forces outside the administrative system. However, without official authorization, only moral constraints such as the sense of responsibility and consciousness of each governance subject how to ensure that they can respond positively? How to achieve the effectiveness of integrated governance? The institutional basis and power legality of community service stations as an integration platform and governance center need to be clarified.

(3) What is the impact of process reconstruction and setting reform of community service stations on the transformation of community workers into “general social workers”?

General social workers have a general mastery of various administrative skills. The details in the specific setting of service stations include: only 2–3 persons perform general practice in a “multi-post of single person and multi-function of single post” manner to fully respond to residents’ demands. In the initial consultation system, they handle affairs in manners such as immediate-handling, time-limited completion, door-to-door handling and complete commission — with fewer people to handle more affairs, the setting of general social workers will undoubtedly improve the efficiency of administrative services and conserve service resources. Community workers are necessarily required to gain a general mastery of administrative skills. However, it must be noticed that social workers who only have administrative skills can only provide limited services, serve superficially and are lack of proficiency in social work. Faced with the increasingly complex and diverse needs of residents, it is necessary to think deeply about the connotation of “general social workers” and the future development orientation of community social workers [10, p. 44].

2. *Suggestions for Deepening and Improving the Reform*

(1) Government function transformation and community burden reduction are the institutional basis for the effective operation of the integrated governance pattern

Community is a platform for interaction of the state and society. The main target of urban community development reveals that community construction is a major change to the urban grassroots management system and an adjustment to the relationship between the state and society [7, p. 37]. To realize the transformation from administration-oriented community to self-governance and service-oriented community to maximize self-governance and service functions of communities, the government needs to transform its functions and turn from unlimited liability government to limited liability government, from management-oriented government to service-oriented government, so as to strengthen the function of democratic self-governance of communities, weaken the government’s function of social affairs management and enhance the endogenous vitality of community construction and governance [4, p. 8].

In recent years, although the central government has been emphasizing community burden reduction, the challenges in community governance has not been solved fundamentally. On the one hand, the community still has a long way to go to reduce the burden. On the other hand, the community is still accustomed to the instructional approach without fully optimizing the services based on residents’ needs and problems. Although the burden on the community has been alleviated, the existing burden of community in administrative affairs still distract much attention from community workers. Communities have to go all out to deal with short-term tasks such as economic statistic, population census and activities to promote cultural and ethical progress, as well

as daily tasks such as civil affairs & assistance to the disabled, family planning & sanitation and labor security. Out of this reason, community services can only take needs of residents into consideration. Therefore, burden reduction is the top priority of community governance, especially in administrative affairs, so as to leave more room for community self-governance. In the general social worker model, the administrative affairs undertaken by communities are allocated to a few mainstay officers. In addition to the reshaped work process, administrative affairs can be handled more efficiently with fewer personnel; more community workers are free up to collect public opinions door by door. On the premise of improving the efficiency of convenience-to-people services, reduction of burden of administrative affairs is emphasized to spare more focus on serving residents.

- (2) Malfeasance and omission should be avoided for party and government, which emphasizes proper performance in empowerment and power adjustment for a smooth connection of sections and divisions

The reform of the comprehensive setting of community service stations covers interaction of multiple governance subjects, during which the subdistrict-community relationship should be reviewed. Governance resources are applied more to communities via community service stations, which serve as a new means of community governance. The mechanism of "Subdistrict Initiates the Process and Departments Check in" should be activated in cases of inextricable problems resulted from incoordinate power-duty. This requires service stations to be empowered to mobilize the relevant functional departments, establishment of mechanisms for connecting service stations with vertical resources of the subdistrict office, for service supervision assessment, for two-way assessment and for residents' satisfaction assessment, etc.. In this way, malfeasance and omission can be avoided and the service quality can be guaranteed.

The connection between community service stations and the subdistrict public service hall will be reinforced with much attention paid to the integration with the construction of subdistrict public service hall. Service items will be included in the service category and processes of the subdistrict public service hall. By means of unified deployment, unified implementation, professional guidance, joint demand acceptance items of subdistrict and communities will be increased from time to time to realize subdistrict-community interaction. The core-handling system of community service stations will be further developed and improved to realize the seamless connection between the subdistrict public service hall and community service stations. In the public service hall service model, operations of community service stations are managed in a unified manner with closed-loop systems covering acceptance, undertaking, distributing, urging, feedback and closing and effective regulation systems established, so as to dock community service stations with the subdistrict public service hall with service items regarded as crucial.

Within the community, the co-governance and responsibility-sharing mechanism for community service stations and resident's committee will be improved. The administrative functions of the government will be integrated with self-governance of residents in communities dynamically with the grassroots foundation of government reinforced, so as to ensure the solid implementation of social management and public service in communities and promote the establishment and improvement of residents' self-governance mechanism. Community resident's committees and community service stations should give play to their respective strengths in cooperation and co-governance to provide services, with information communication and resource sharing strengthened. In cases where organization of residents and activities are needed by community service stations in handling affairs, community resident's committees should bring its superiority in contacting residents into full play to provide support.

(3) Community Resident's committees and Service Stations Work Together Closely to Enhance Contact with Residents to Avoid being "Marginalized"

Regarding community development standard, the question "Where do people go" deserves pondering. The role and value of communities lies in service. The relation between communities and residents is dominated by administrative purposes due to the prominent orientation to administration, leaving the contact in daily services loose. In order to transform into service-oriented community, interaction with residents should be increased to understand their needs for service. The post of general social workers is set in the reform of community service stations to handle community administrative affairs collectively, with the burden of administrative work for communities relieved, so that the community staff have enough time, energy and labor to re-establish close ties with residents. With reference to the regular door-to-door communication in the 1980s, the service station staff take initiative to visit residents at home to gain knowledge of their needs and solve their problems. In order to avoid "marginalization" and make breakthroughs, community service stations must be worked closely with by dispatching personnel and service station workers to visit residents to understand their situations or cooperate with service stations to organize community activities to get closer to residents.

(4) The resident's committee focuses on the creation of scene-oriented spaces, guiding residents to participate in the multi-party co-governance actively

The level of community development and the degree of self-governance vitality depend on the quantity and type of resources owned by the community to a great extent, as well as the utilization of these resources to provide community residents with diverse and socialized services, so as to turn the rigid administrative community into a vibrant self-governance community. The resident's committee should explore and utilize the diverse resources in the community actively.

Community service station, a scenarized social space, can be used equally by residents, allowing residents to communicate with each other, learn about the current affairs of the community, provide advice and suggestions in a timely manner and discuss about common needs democratically in such a shared public space. It is conducive to the formation of community social organizations. With the help of service stations, residents' committees can organize community activities actively, cultivate community social organizations such as entertainment organizations and voluntary organizations that meet the needs of residents and continues to expand the scope of service subjects; residents are encouraged to participate in the process of community self-government. The self-governance function of residents' committees should be secured to attract more community residents to get engaged in the co-governance of communities as the "masters of community" and join hands with residents' committees.

(5) Community service stations should give priority to training general social workers with both administrative and professional capabilities, and embedding the individual-case management model to improve service level

Professional community social workers aims at providing residents with more considerate and professional social services, requiring them to have excellent professional skills, namely, "social workers"; to be able to either undertake administrative tasks or perform professional social work, namely, "general". In short, general social workers represent an exploration of the localization of social work, requiring community social workers to have both administrative and professional capabilities. Community service stations should also take this aspect as the basis for training general social workers, update training content and keep pace with the times.

In terms of administrative capabilities, general social workers need to have a high level of serving skills and be able to handle various affairs undertaken by community service stations and operate office systems proficiently; other capabilities in aspects such as social communication, organizational management and adaptability are also required. Holding exchange meetings, inviting mainstay service officers and technical personnel to instruct, or launching service skill competitions are alternative to train and improve them. In terms of expertise, social workers need not only to be familiar with professional social work theories, methods and skills, but also to be able to combine theory and practice, analyze problems theoretically and solve problems proficiently. Moreover, they need to widen their horizon of knowledge in law, economics, medicine, etc... The training of expertise needs the trainers to have a reliable theoretical foundation. Systematic courses provided by social work teachers in colleges and universities is the best choice, and teachers in other specialties can also be hired for other aspects by means of holding lectures regularly.

General social workers provide one-on-one butler services for residents and solve the complex and diverse needs of residents with resources integrated to service stations. This is consistent with the process model of social work individual-case management, which can be integrated into general social worker service model creatively. In this way, general social workers will act as both administrative experts but also individual-case managers, so as to increase the professionalism of general social worker service model, give full play to the advantages of social work and serve the residents better.

The process can be divided into six steps: application and acceptance, investigation and diagnosis, plan development, plan execution, supervision and coordination, case closure and evaluation. In the first step, residents visit community service stations for help with complex and diverse problems. General social workers evaluate their claims and consider whether they are within the service scope of the community service station. Claims within the service scope are accepted by general social workers, and the residents should fill out the relevant documents to form a professional relationship with general social workers; claims beyond the scope will be transferred by general social workers to other agencies or persons to resolve. In the second step, after accepting the case, general social worker needs to understand and collect information on the various conditions of the service object, and make judgment on the causes, status quo of the problems and social resources owned by the individual according to materials submitted by the residents and conversation with them, so as to pave the way for subsequent work. In the third step, after assessing the needs and problems of the residents, general social workers make a service plan customized for the residents. In the fourth step, general social workers will work according to the plan. This section is critical in case management, as smooth execution of plan is the premise for breakthrough in serving residents. Sufficient service resources are fundamental for the smooth implementation of plans, requiring general social workers to connect the service object with the service resources. In the fifth step, when residents' demands are beyond the service scope of the service station, general social workers will help the residents to connect with the resources outside. To ensure the realization of plans, general social workers need to monitor and coordinate with the service providers. In the sixth step, after the residents' claims are met, general social workers will issue relevant certificates to finish the professional service and evaluate the service goals and plans, the performance of both parties and the service effectiveness and efficiency. Residents will also conduct satisfaction assessment against the services provided by general social workers.

After the process is clarified, it is also necessary to clarify the basic skills needed for general social workers in the service process: communication, coordination, recording and evaluation. Good communication is the basis for smooth progress of service, and gaining more useful information through communication is conducive to the improve-

ment of service effectiveness and efficiency. Therefore, general social workers need to strengthen the training of communication skills, so as to be able to express ideas via language and body symbols and environmental symbols; others should be respected as the service objects are dignified and valuable individuals, so they should be accepted unconditionally, the empathy ability of general social workers should also be improved to make guests feel relieved for the perception of empathy. Coordination means that general social worker should negotiate and mediate between service objects, service resources and various service entities to reduce cooperation costs and ensure the smooth progress of service plans. Record means that general social workers should keep written records of information about interactions with the service objects based on professional judgment as evidences for work undertaking. Specific information about the service objects should be kept confidential according to the principle of confidentiality. Evaluation means that general social workers should evaluate service process and service effect to reflect and summarize the advantages and disadvantages of their work. Professional questionnaires are optional for evaluation, and questionnaires should be designed based on the relevant indicators of specific services. They should be filled out separately by the service objects and general social workers. Alternatively, general social workers can regularly conduct large-scale service satisfaction surveys among residents based on the knowledge of the actual situation [1, p. 37].

(6) Community service stations should strengthen the bond with various subjects, get access to more resources, gain power in practice and act as the real center of governance

With multiple governance subjects connected and governance resources integrated, community service stations provide residents with comprehensive community services. With the continuous refinement of social division of labor and the increasing diversification of residents' demands, community service stations need to get access to and integrate more service resources and expand the service range continuously, so as to keep up with the growing demands of residents and respond to residents' demands effectively, comprehensively and rapidly.

Transformed community service stations can be likened to a "multi-function socket" that interact with all subjects. As mentioned above, for the part of the author, the source of power of community service stations to integrate and dispatch resources lies in the practice of interaction. At community service stations, each subject can gain "benefits" here: for residents' demands, service stations can match the service unit accurately according to the content; for the government's requirements, service stations can help to implement; for needs from enterprises, social organizations, service stations can help them connect with the government and residents. Community service stations need these subjects to provide related community services. Under such "interest exchanges", each subject and the community service station will form a close relation with mutual reliance and help. As the center of interaction, community service stations can also obtain power over other subjects to allocate various governance resources. In order to become the true governance center, community service stations must constantly strengthen interaction with all subjects and plays an indispensable role at the center.

(7) In the reform of comprehensive setting of community service stations, conditions and needs of residents should be concerned, and the implementation should be in line with features of the community

The reform of the comprehensive setting of community service stations in Qianggen Community is worthy being learned from by other areas, but the specific measures and successful experiences cannot be simply "copied and pasted". All explorations of community governance are people oriented and performed to meet increasingly diverse

needs of residents and solve the problems of residents' better and faster. Therefore, features of communities should be considered in the reform and construction of community service stations with opinions and requirements of residents in the community accepted extensively. Reform of service content and reconstruction of spaces should be based on conditions and requirements of residents to provide them with exclusive "menu of special services" and "residents' home". It is also necessary to identify all the governance resources available within the community, to take party organizations as the center, to communicate and collaborate actively and to summarize the experience of "integrated governance" with local characteristics.

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ПРАВИЛА ОФОРМЛЕНИЯ СТАТЕЙ, ПРИНИМАЕМЫХ К РАССМОТРЕНИЮ РЕДАКЦИЕЙ

Предлагаем разместить статьи в научно-практическом журнале «Управленческое консультирование», адресованном специалистам в области государственного и муниципального управления, руководителям органов государственной власти и бизнес-структур, ученым, преподавателям, аспирантам.

Журнал «Управленческое консультирование» входит в Перечень рецензируемых научных изданий ВАК РФ, в которых должны быть опубликованы основные научные результаты диссертаций на соискание ученой степени кандидата наук, на соискание ученой степени доктора наук по следующим группам научных специальностей: 23.00.00. Политология; 08.00.00. Экономические науки.

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Каждая статья должна быть сопровождается сведениями об авторе(-ах), (на русском и английском языках): фамилия, имя, отчество полностью; место работы; должность; ученая степень; ученое звание; адрес электронной почты. После указания места работы обязательно указывается город и страна.

СТРУКТУРА РУКОПИСИ

Статья должна быть структурирована. Наиболее распространенная модель структуры научных статей — IMRAD — аббревиатура от «введение, материалы и методы, результаты и обсуждение» (англ. introduction, methods, results and discussion). В конце статьи следует Заключение (Conclusion). Если статья посвящена теоретическому исследованию, то раздел Methods (Методы) заменяется на Theoretical Basis

(Теоретические основы). Каждая часть должна быть выделена в основном тексте отдельно.

Рукопись статьи должна содержать *реферат* (аннотацию) и ключевые слова. Статьи без *реферата* (на русском и английском языках) не рассматриваются. *Реферат* не должен содержать ссылки и аббревиатуры. Объем ограничен 250–300 словами. В *реферате* обязательно указываются: Цель, Методы, Результаты, Выводы (по 1–2 предложения для каждого пункта). Ключевых слов может быть от 4 до 7, обычно — 5–6 слов. Термины-словосочетания считаются одним ключевым словом. Желательно избегать составных ключевых слов. В состав ключевых слов не рекомендуется включать слова, содержащиеся в названиях статьи.

Введение (*Introduction*)

Введение должно определять суть проблемы, указывать цель исследования и представлять его гипотезу и научный подход, обосновывать важность исследования. В этой части уместны ссылки на уже известные выводы и опубликованную литературу по данной проблеме.

Материалы и методы (*Materials and Methods*)

Цель данной части — провести оценку надежности используемых методов и их влияние на результаты. Здесь приводятся план и последовательность процесса исследований, протоколы эксперимента, используемые материалы, предметы, оборудование, готовые статистические данные, программное обеспечение и т. д.; а также методика оценки результатов. Если ключевым моментом в работе является методология эксперимента, необходимо описать ее процессы в деталях.

Результаты (*Results*)

Эта часть представляет результаты исследования в четкой логической последовательности, без интерпретаций результатов. Именно здесь чаще всего используются таблицы, рисунки и графики. Следует избегать повторения данных в таблицах и графиках (в случае их наличия), такие данные следует только прокомментировать с точки зрения трендов или наиболее важных моментов.

Обсуждение (*Discussion*)

Обсуждение должно быть сфокусировано на интерпретации результатов исследования и других связанных с ним материалов. Подчеркните новые и важные наблюдения. Объясните значение наблюдаемого мнения для цели исследования. Свяжите результаты с предлагаемой гипотезой. Любые неожиданные результаты или наблюдения; которые имели место, могут быть объяснены именно здесь.

Эта часть завершается детальным заключением (выделяется отдельно). Следует обобщить результат и его значение, описать последствия и практическое применение исследования, дать возможные рекомендации.

Сокращения и аббревиатуры должны быть расшифрованы при первом их употреблении (в скобках в тексте или под текстом).

При написании статьи необходимо избегать личных местоимений, в том числе научного «мы». Это же касается ссылок: при ссылках на собственные работы стоит избегать предложений типа «как показано в нашей работе». В первую очередь, это требование анонимности.

Выводы (Conclusions)

Подведение итогов исследования — получилось ли достичь цели и доказать определенную гипотезу? Какое значение имеют полученные результаты? Как можно применить их на практике?

Список литературы (References)

Список литературы в конце статьи дается **в алфавитном порядке**.

В списке литературы должно быть не менее 25 источников, и в тексте статьи все они должны быть процитированы. Рекомендуется наличие не менее 10 иностранных источников, из них не менее 5 источников, индексируемых в базе данных Scopus. В случае, когда цитируется англоязычная работа, обязательно ссылаться на оригинал, а не на русскоязычный перевод.

В тексте дается ссылка в квадратных скобках — например, [7, с. 625].

Ссылки на официальные сайты, правовые и законодательные акты, архивные материалы, учебники/учебные пособия, словари и газетные статьи даются постранично (в сносках) и не выносятся в список литературы, размещенный в конце статьи.

ОФОРМЛЕНИЕ ТАБЛИЦ, РИСУНКОВ, СХЕМ И ФОРМУЛ

Материалы могут содержать таблицы и черно-белые схемы, выполненные в редакторе Word (for Windows). Применение объектов Word Art в схемах не рекомендуется. Все рисунки, диаграммы и схемы, включенные в текст статьи в электронной версии, должны быть представлены также отдельными файлами в тех форматах, в которых они были сделаны (объекты должны давать возможность редактирования). Каждую таблицу и рисунок следует снабжать порядковым номером и заголовком/подписью, продублированными на английский язык. Все графы в таблицах также должны иметь заголовки.

Формулы должны быть набраны в редакторе Microsoft Equation, где их набор более корректен; также возможен набор формул в MathType ... Equation.

Простые строчные формулы желательно набирать с клавиатуры, не используя формульный редактор.

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А. В. Виленский называет его «своего рода „золотым легионом“ постиндустриального общества» [7, с. 625].

В затекстовой ссылке:

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